Appearing for the first time in paperback, this valuable book is a study of social work in relation to the evolving role of social workers in the social services, and to their training. Dame Eileen Younghusband considers past discoveries and setbacks insofar as they bear upon the present position, and she studies the present for the light it casts on the future. Her emphasis is upon the new situation which is created as knowledge advances and the social services become increasingly aware of personal problems and social disabilities. In fact, the contribution of social work to mental health is a continuing theme throughout the book. There are chapters on the juvenile courts, and a section on international aspects in which the philosophy of social work and its contribution to social change are discussed.

The author was for many years chairman of a London juvenile court, and chairman of the Working Party on Social Workers in the Local Authority Health and Welfare Services (Ministry of Health). She has been, at various times, a Social Affairs Consultant to the United Nations, Adviser on Social Work Training at the National Institute for Social Work Training, President of the International Association of Schools for Social Work, and a lecturer at the London School of Economics. To social workers, whether active or in training, she will need no introduction and they will welcome a book incorporating her immense experience and all the originality and clarity of thought they have learned to expect from her.

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ISBN 0 04 360022 0

EILEEN YOUNGHUSBAND

social work and social change

National Institute for Social Work Training Series   NO. 1

SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL CHANGE

SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL CHANGE

BY

EILEEN YOUNGHUSBAND

London

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET

*To social work friends in many countries,
and especially to Charlotte Towle, with gratitude*

PREFACE

Social work is undergoing and has already undergone great changes in the last decade or so. It has been profoundly affected by social change in general and has also begun to be more articulate, precise and objective about its own methods and aims. The papers that form this book which were written at different dates themselves demonstrate this change. The earliest paper 'Training for Casework: Its Place in the Curriculum', dates from a United Nations' seminar in Finland in 1952. The situation described in it contrasts sharply with that outlined in a paper for another United Nations' seminar in the Netherlands in 1963.

Thanks are recorded to the United Nations for permission to reprint these two papers, and also to the University of Chicago Press for permission to reprint 'The Dilemma of the Juvenile Court', and to the Unitarian Service Committee, Boston, for permission to print 'The Philosophy of Social Work' and 'Some Highlights of Social Work Education'. Acknowledgments are also made to the various periodicals in which other articles appeared. Finally, grateful thanks are due to Robin Huws Jones, Charles Furth and Shirley Knight without whom what follows would have remained in a decent oblivion.

EILEEN YOUNGHUSBAND

London, 1964

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PART I

THE SOCIAL SERVICES AND
SOCIAL WORK

1

FORWARD TO 1903[1]

IT is worth pausing to look back over the development of social work in order to try to understand what we have discovered, what we have achieved, what we have lost by the way, and what objectives we should try to set ourselves for the future. This excursion will not induce complacency, for there is nothing to be complacent about. But if we turn to look at the history of social work, the peak periods and the troughs, we find reason to hope that, having rested for too long by still waters, we are once more on the march.

In a short space it is not possible to do more than bow to the earlier pioneers like Vives, St Vincent de Paul, Count Rumford and Thomas Chalmers, though the discoveries they made in fact became part of the life blood of social work. They are, however, its more remote ancestors. The grandparents of social work in this country are typified by the Charity Organisation Society and the police court missioners. The C.O.S. of course discovered just what its name said—the importance of organizing charity. This meant instead of indiscriminate doles a thorough investigation of each case, making a plan in co-operation with the applicant, always giving adequate help if you helped at all, seeing a case through to the end once you had taken it on, only helping the deserving, and keeping full records of what you had done. Some of this rings harshly on modern ears, even if it is not quite so fashionable nowadays to decry the old C.O.S. But if we translate these principles into current medical terms which are familiar to us they sound much better. They then become thorough initial diagnosis of the disease, not giving a bottle of cough mixture to cure tuberculosis, taking the patient into the doctor's confidence, using all necessary resources for the treatment of the patient, and where resources are limited concentrating them on 'treatable' cases.

It is only necessary to think of the mid-nineteenth century with its mass poverty ill relieved by a harsh poor law or indiscriminate and inadequate charity doles, or (more effectively) by organized mutual

[1] The substance of a lecture given at Barnett House, Oxford, 1953.

aid and spontaneous good neighbourliness; to think too how little we knew by then about rescuing people from drowning in the mass of poverty, to realize how much the old C.O.S. achieved. Its discovery, repeating in a measure those of earlier times was that, if almsgiving is to be effective in helping the receiver rather than solacing the emotions of the giver, it must follow upon objective study of the situation which creates the need, and must be combined with a personal, individual approach in which everyone concerned is aiming at the same result. In modern terminology this would mean a thorough diagnosis followed by treatment planned in the light of the diagnosis. This, for the C.O.S. pioneers involved the study of a variety of social situations as well as of individual need.

These C.O.S. workers may have to us an unpleasant odour of condescension, of hard-faced middle class women 'organizing' that lovely, elusive virtue of charity, of the 'haves' complacently denying help to the 'have nots'. But they were also a group of pioneers, some of them leading men and women of the day with first-class minds which had absorbed a liberal culture; and they pursued with avidity in the actual centres of poverty the clues to social change and personal rehabilitation. The mistake they made was in thinking that financial or other aid was in its nature calculated to undermine independence so that few should receive it and those few be subject to individual diagnosis and personal supervision. This was why the C.O.S. disliked the Fabians, who in turn disliked the C.O.S. because they fell into the opposite error of thinking that to cure economic ills and to offer certain universal services would of itself cure most individual problems of social maladjustment. In the event both were right and both were wrong. But alas! they failed to communicate with each other, and hence some of the troubles of the present day.

The primary emphasis of the C.O.S. for a good many years was on the organization of charity rather than on casework as such; that is to say on the best methods of correlating the giving of material help from various sources in a situation where material help, coupled with personal recognition, was often desperately needed. The police court missioners, who began their work about seven years after the founding of the C.O.S., started from the other end. Their forerunners were private people who had been willing to come forward in the courts to stand surety for an offender in order to save him from the nineteenth-century prison. They did not primarily offer material help but a personal relationship. The police court missioners were firstly evangelists trying to save men from intemperance in a society where drink was 'the

shortest way out of Manchester'. They may have made many mistakes but the whole basis of their work was a personal relationship with the offender designed to help him to become a better person, and therefore a better member of society. They were thus amongst the true ancestors of casework in this country. And casework itself, so far as its principles are concerned, is rooted in the Judeo-Christian and democratic traditions of respect for the value of each individual person. His right to make his own decisions about his life is a tenet to which the early social workers unfortunately did not subscribe.

Meanwhile the pioneers of the settlement movement were discovering how to help people to find through group activities more civilized ways of living and more satisfying personal and community relationships. They were also discovering how to investigate and understand the needs of a neighbourhood, how to make these needs known to the outside world and how to help the people themselves to do what they were able to meet their needs. And they were trying to heal the divisions of the Two Nations. These same processes are now being used in the under-developed parts of the world under the title of community development. Octavia Hill's work in its original form was also clearly a kind of community development, and with a good deal of group work and casework too, though later it became housing management in the stricter sense, with her workrooms, clubs, playgrounds and social action left out of it.

Here, then, by the beginning of this century was all this hopeful activity in full flood. The vigorous and able members of the C.O.S. and its affiliated societies had discovered some of the main methods of casework, especially on the organizational side; the police court missioners, and the moral welfare workers too, were experimenting with constructive personal relationships; the settlements under the leadership of their outstanding early wardens were active not only in their own neighbourhoods but also as centres of social research and were leaders in movements for social reform; and last but not least there was Octavia Hill with her understanding that housing, community development, casework and group work all belong together. There was training too. The settlements, Octavia Hill and the C.O.S. were from the 90s onwards the founders of social work education in this country. By 1903 the C.O.S. had started its own School of Sociology with some of the leading university teachers and social reformers of the day on its committee and the economist Alfred Marshall as the Chairman. The training was based on a combination of theory and practice with much emphasis on direct experience under tutorial guidance.

B

How promising and how full of vigour was social work in England fifty years ago! The essential initial discoveries about its nature and processes and the methods by which social workers should be trained had been made. All seemed set for a steady advance into territory which had been soundly surveyed. Then for reasons which it is difficult to determine a blight set in, and, with one exception, social work in this country remained almost static, compared with the preceding half century, until after the second world war. Some might prefer to call this uncreative era a period of consolidation. They might with justice point out that during this period the almoners freed themselves more and more from the original purpose of saving the hospitals from abuse by those who could afford to pay for treatment, and so became more truly medical social workers; that the police court missioners became probation officers, the direct servants of the courts, and to an increasing extent trained for their work; and that the family casework agencies grew in number and became more concerned about individual case-work and less about the undeserving. Councils of social service and community associations also by degrees entered the field and made some new discoveries about methods of community organization. Meanwhile all through the period there were immense advances in social betterment; the foundations of the welfare state were slowly but steadily laid; and a great deal was discovered about how to eliminate poverty. But social workers played almost no part in this and in social work itself there was nothing akin to the earlier advances and the earlier enthusiasm. Few people of the calibre of the early pioneers joined its ranks and no major discoveries were made about method or principles. The skill of the social worker was still mainly empirical, based upon intuition and common sense, and little was added to the existent body of knowledge. Training too had reached a stage of stagnation compared with its early promise. It had long since moved into the new university social science departments, where students were well educated in these basic subjects but with a relationship to the world of practice which became more tenuous as the years went by. After completing these courses they were either employed with no further preparation than short periods of practical work had given them or else they went on to what amounted to an apprenticeship training as almoners, probation officers or personnel managers.

Thus it came about that the initiative passed across the water to the United States. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century we gave to them the C.O.S. and we and they together 'discovered' probation and the settlement movement. In 1895 the New York C.O.S. started what later

became the New York School of Social Work. In 1903 the London C.O.S. started its School of Sociology. The New York School of Social Work is now part of the University of Columbia and has a world-wide reputation. Our School of Sociology died. We produced no Mary Richmond, no Gordon Hamilton, no Charlotte Towle, no standard books and practically no general literature on social work. The great depression in the United States gave social workers the biggest oppor-tunity in their history; they rose to the challenge, they helped to form social policy and they learned how to apply the practice of social work to large-scale public administration. The years of unemployment here gave no new opportunities to social workers, except in small-scale voluntary societies; it did not teach them and they did not learn from it anything that was new. Fundamentally the great advances made by the Americans came from the work of Mary Richmond and from the application of dynamic psychology as the scientific foundation under-lying the techniques of social work; while we continued to rely on the study of academic psychology in the class room and unadulterated intuition and common sense in the field. The difference is that the Americans took hold of what the scientific study of living human beings had to tell them about the development of children, about the way people behave in relation to each other, particularly in families, about the characteristics of different kinds of people, for example, the ill, the delinquent, the solitary, the aggressive, the uprooted. They used all this knowledge in their practice of social work and added to it and they reduced the whole to consistency and coherence so that they could teach it to others. In short, they have used organizational method and applied scientific knowledge as the basis for developing the pro-fessional practice of social work.

The stagnation in our own training and practice was broken at one point just on twenty-five years ago.[1] In 1929 the Commonwealth Fund of America began to sow the seeds of the child guidance movement in this country and, as an important part of this, made possible the training of psychiatric social workers. That training was from the first based upon two assumptions: firstly, that theory and practice are two sides of the same thing and must be planned as integral parts of a total educational process; and secondly, that in consequence individual teaching, supervision and class room discussion are a necessary part of the practical work. This practical work was not something to be under-taken in isolation from the university teaching but was regarded as a means of helping the student to see theoretical studies applied in the

[1] N.B. This was written in 1953.

'live' and of beginning to develop skill in the actual practice of social work. The result is that psychiatric social workers are still our most skilled caseworkers; not, as is often thought, because they do particularly difficult work, but because they are better trained than other social workers. But we have forgotten that this more effective training is based upon the same educational principles as the training which was evolved by the early pioneers. We took a wrong turning—or rather we did one good thing and left another good thing undone—early in this century and after twenty-five years began to recover by means of an American importation what we had lost. The profound, though possibly inevitable, mistake that was made when the mental health course was first instituted was that instead of making it a general course in social casework with the option of a psychiatric social work, medical social work or probation or family casework 'bias' it was instituted as, and has remained, a specialized training for work with those who are seriously disturbed emotionally. The result has been that psychiatric social workers have tended to be separated from other social workers and to be regarded with a mixture of envy and suspicion as a peculiar people. This more adequate form of training has thus not been able to fertilize the whole field of social work as effectively as would have happened if the course had been more broadly based.

Apart from this one exception, and partly because of the consequences which flowed from making it an exception, the long period of stagnation continued until the end of the second world war. There was no attempt to apply the new knowledge in psychology to the training of social workers; while at the same time most of the social studies of the period were extensive rather than intensive, concerned with economic and external environmental factors rather than with people's attitudes and reactions to each other and to the society in which they lived. The gain in training, though it was also the cause of a wrong turning, was that more and more university social science courses were started in which an increasing number of students were given a good theoretical basis of knowledge (better in some subjects than others) on which to build the further professional training. The snags were that the staffs of social science departments were often too busy teaching students to have sufficient time for research, writing and experience in the field —and there wasn't a unified professional training. More and more specialized courses developed, for almoners, probation officers, moral welfare workers, family caseworkers, youth leaders, psychiatric social workers, neighbourhood workers, housing managers, personnel

managers, and (since the war) child care workers and youth employment officers. Most of these were not co-ordinated with the teaching given in the social science departments, and the practice was in the nature of an apprenticeship, with the exception (as has been said) of psychiatric social work. There was practically no literature, no teaching material and no one qualified to teach the practice of social work. Moreover, our social services themselves were, and still are, becoming more and more specialized, and so they have insistently demanded that more and more people shall be trained in a 'know how' which they ought to be given on the job, instead of being educated as all-round social workers, equipped with the skill common to all forms of social work.

So far, this historical retrospect has been relieved only by two or three rays of light since the early days of the century. But in the post-war period the situation has changed more profoundly than we realize unless we look at it in the light (or against the darkness) of the past fifty years. Now the stagnation is ended and we are once more on the move, though slowly and painfully, realizing all the lost ground we have to regain. Some of the changes since 1945 have been actual happenings, others have been changes in attitude which prepare the way for something to happen. We are on the move again as we were in 1903 but against a background of immense gains since those days in the field of social welfare and in scientific knowledge. The change in attitude towards social workers partly resulted from the war. Put in its simplest terms, this amounts to a recognition that something important and useful is done by social workers which is not so fully accomplished by anyone else, so that they are now accepted as a necessary part of the social welfare services. From this recognition has followed the use of social workers as members of teams, as field workers and as administrators who are given a status and salaries and promotion prospects markedly better than before the war. At the same time, there have been great advances in the study of human relationships, particularly of certain groups with whom social workers are closely concerned, deprived children for example, and delinquents and problem families, so that research by doctors, psychiatrists, sociologists and others is providing the scientific material on which social workers can base their practice. Fortunately we are also beginning at last to realize the need to call a halt to over-specialization. We have begun to see that in concentrating on some one particular aspect of the individual we have lost sight of him as a full human being who is part of a family and part of a network of social relationships, and that these come first in helping

him to meet his deficiencies, instead of being the incidentals which we have made them. This swing of the pendulum away from specialization has not in practice gone very far yet but it is leading to much heart-searching about our bewildering variety of specialized trainings. At last, too, we are beginning to realize that the application of academic knowledge does not happen all of itself, and that in addition to the application of knowledge there is a skill in social work which needs guidance and teaching in order to produce it. Social workers in the past 'just grew' like Topsy but she has never been held up as a model of child nurture. It is high time for us to start to erect a real building with solid materials on top of the good foundations laid by the social science courses. If everyone concerned were really to put thought and effort into this we could in time make a contribution not only to our own country but also to the world as a whole in the education of social workers.

Up till now we (both practising social workers and those concerned with their training) have done depressingly little to help ourselves. Others have laboured and we have not even entered into their labours. Other people indeed have done a good deal more for us than we have done for ourselves. Almost all the literature we have is produced either by non-social workers in this country or else by social workers on the other side of the Atlantic; we have got almost nowhere with supervision as a means of relating class room teaching to fieldwork practice in order to help students to develop social work skill; and we have not collected the material nor done the hard thinking needed to teach social work at a proper academic level. Consequently we social workers are not being used as we might be used, achieving what we might achieve, advancing as we might advance, and this not because other people fail to recognize our merits but because we ourselves stagnate at a low level of achievement, whether academically or in practice or social action.

There in our history lies the challenge to us. Much that we had we blindly threw away or let slip, much that we could have had we ignored. Yet after all the years of marking time we have a chance once more to go forward, a chance better even than that of fifty years ago because of all the achievements in social welfare and scientific knowledge since those days. If, then, this is no time for complacency, yet it is a time for hope and effort, a time in which we can learn from the discoveries and the failures of the past in order to go forward and do that which is required of us in the future.

2

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL WORK[1]

DEFINING 'social work' and 'social worker' is a common though not very profitable undertaking. It will suffice for the present purpose if we regard the social worker as one who is particularly skilled at understanding and helping individuals or groups who are experiencing conditions of stress and strain which they cannot meet themselves. Historically, social work, like much other voluntary effort on behalf of one's neighbour, sprang from the religious motive. It had two parts, the giving of alms and the giving of service. The giving of alms was an obligation on the faithful; the emphasis being primarily on the salvation of the soul of the giver rather than on the good done to the recipient. In mediaeval Christianity a magnificent though abortive attempt was made to provide for all social needs by this voluntary almsgiving and it was only when, for various reasons, it failed that the State took over. In some Mohammedan countries at the present day reliance on providing for the relief of need by the alms of the faithful still continues. The obligation to give personal service—to feed the hungry, to heal the sick—was due perhaps to a more profound religious motive. In both Christianity and Judaism there is a call to comfort the weak hearted, to raise up them that fall, to loose those whom Satan has bound: a call which has contributed most powerfully to our modern desire to rehabilitate the offender and the disabled, to provide kindly care for the old and the ailing and to understand and to help rather than to condemn the social misfit.

This concern for those who fall by the wayside has never had an easy passage, partly because it runs full into the problem of human motivation and to moral judgments about this. For centuries we divided the poor and the unfortunate into two groups. The first, those who had fallen into calamities which they could not help: the sick, the disabled, the widows, the orphans, the thrifty old—that is to say broadly speaking, the deserving. The second group included offenders against the law,

[1] The Seth Memorial Lecture, given at the University of Edinburgh, May 1952.

unmarried mothers, vagrants, the unemployed, the old without savings
—broadly speaking the undeserving. The first group had suffered from
what insurance companies call an Act of God. The second suffered from
a defective moral will. The first group was deserving of pity and could
with impunity receive charity and personal service. The second group
was much more dangerous because kindly treatment might increase
its numbers and undermine independence. Therefore any relief of its
necessities must be on a basis of deterrence, accompanied by exhorta-
tions to greater exercise of will power and the reform of evil and thrift-
less ways. Today a more profound understanding of the social causes
of individual failure, as well as of the strange working of the human
heart, have tended to blur the sharp distinction between the sheep and
the goats—to the scandal of some of the sheep and not always to the
edification of all of the goats.

These changes are of course bound up with changing attitudes
towards poverty itself. Down to the closing decades of the last century
it was assumed that poverty was inevitable—as indeed it was before the
application of science to the production of material goods began to
make possible its ultimate abolition. There has been during the last
eighty years or so a growing consciousness that mass poverty is
socially caused, that it is due to causes beyond the individual's control
and therefore can only be removed by collective action. This century
has seen a vast reduction in the amount of primary poverty in some
European countries, in the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, and it is no matter of chance that social work is most highly
developed in those countries which have gone furthest in the abolition
of extreme poverty.

It is, as we all know, the application of science to industrial processes
and to agriculture and transport which has made possible these massive
improvements in the standard of living, which has lightened human
drudgery and brought about that degree of leisure and well being on
which depends the margin between existing and living. It was the
science of economics and the work of such pioneers as Charles Booth
and the Webbs which threw light on the social causes of poverty and
under-employment, and later work which revealed possible remedies.
Medical science, public health and hygiene have also helped to break
that vicious circle of poverty, disease and early death which still
persists in many parts of the world. The discoveries in these and other
branches of science, and their application, often through hard-fought
battles against inertia, ignorance and vested interest, have all interacted
to improve the environment beyond recognition, and have made it

possible for people to live more satisfying lives with less pain, calamity
and drudgery in them.

The social reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies who worked for the abolition of illiteracy, preventable disease,
sweated labour, slums and overcrowding, unemployment and destitu-
tion, tended to think that to solve these ills would of itself free men to
live happy, self-determining lives with no personal problems which
they could not deal with unaided on their own account. Parallel with
the social environmental reformers came the growth of the C.O.S. with
its emphasis on the detailed investigation of individual cases of distress.
Perhaps it would be true to say that for many years of its history it
laid a greater emphasis on the organization of charity than on personal
service and the rehabilitation of those in distress, but all the same its
path lay in the line of a great tradition. This is a tradition to which we
owe at least some substantial part of modern casework as it is evolving
at the present day. The great pioneers of this tradition were the
Spaniard, Vives, who in the sixteenth century discovered many of the
essential principles of social reform and personal casework and whose
influence lay behind our Elizabethan Poor Law; St Vincent de Paul,
Count Rumford and Thomas Chalmers who in seventeenth-century
France, eighteenth-century Bavaria and nineteenth-century Glasgow
showed that pauper conditions make paupers and that social reform,
education and personal service, based on a belief in the goodness and
the strengths in human nature, can cure some social ills that ruin
individual lives.

All of these methods were based in varying degrees on an analysis
of the cause of particular evils, more especially destitution and un-
employment; the control of indiscriminate charity and the application
of the appropriate remedy to the particular case. The emphasis was
upon the increase of self-respect and the giving of personal service, so
that the poor might be known and helped individually. Those who gave
this personal service—'not alms but a friend' as Octavia Hill put it—
might be St Vincent de Paul's Sisters, or Dr Chalmers' deacons and
elders or the school and parish visitors each with their own district on
whom the early C.O.S. relied.

Unfortunately those who believed in changing human nature by
social and economic reforms and those who believed in doing so by
individual service usually pursued their separate paths, eyeing each
other with mistrust and sometimes with active hostility. The third
stream of social endeavour, mutual aid, was for certain historical
reasons more closely related to the social reform than to the personal

service movement. It expressed itself through the friendly societies, trade unions and the Co-operative Movement. Its aid to its members in misfortune was saved from patronage by the more to the less fortunate and from the harshness of a grudging poor law. It did not, however, really come to grips with the more fundamental problems of giving: 'Silver and gold have I none but such as I have give I thee . . . Rise up and walk.'

These three streams flowed in their separate courses, to the impoverishment of all of them. It is only now in the last decade or so that they are beginning to come together as we realize that though different they are not mutually exclusive ways of coming to grips with social problems. Each approaches the essential problem of social well-being from a different angle and each is complementary to the others. The environmentalists and those who emphasized personal service, the forerunners of social caseworkers, were both right. To improve the environment is the appropriate cure for certain mass evils like slum conditions and unemployment. This of itself lessens the number of social casualties and makes it more possible for ordinary people to run their own lives without individual help. But it shows up more clearly those who still need individual help—'problem' families who make slum conditions, those whom we used to call the work shy but now call the voluntarily unemployed, the mentally sub-normal, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, delinquents, children without homes, husbands and wives at odds with each other, and other people who cannot successfully manage their lives in all the stresses and strains of a complex industrial society. And this is the point at which social workers come into the picture. They have a respectable ancestry in religion, science and the great social reform movements, and it is their especial function to be expert at understanding and helping people in difficulties caused by their relationship to their social environment.

Perhaps it is easy to exaggerate the uniqueness and effectiveness of social workers. It has taken a number of centuries to bring them to birth and professionally they are still only in their infancy. But it seems possible that we have stumbled on something immensely important in discovering this function which we term in the narrower sense social work. We have a great deal more to learn about the science and art of social relationships before social workers can become effective but in the future the profession or professions that will emerge from these beginnings, may well exercise as important a function in society as doctors and teachers do now.

So far as it has evolved at present, the objective of the social worker

is to help people who because of personal or family problems or because of their social environment are in one way or another failing to respond as fully as they might to the social demands of living. They are less effective people than they might be and therefore they are less happy themselves and contributing less to society than they are capable of doing. This situation may arise on account of illness with certain social components, for example the social problems involved in tuberculosis or multiple sclerosis or on account of delinquency, or mental sub-normality or disorder, or old age or disablement; or on account of illegitimacy, or matrimonial discord, or child neglect or destitution. Some of these are things that happen to quite ordinary people who will be able to manage their personal and social problems without any help from a social worker. Very many will only need a mass service like the income maintenance services and not an individual one. It is fortunately true that only a minority of the population needs an individual personal service. But there are some circumstances in which everyone in a particular group does in fact need individual help in order to become a reasonably good citizen and member of a family. For example, every child deprived of a normal home life needs individual understanding and the care of someone who will give him genuine affection in a substitute home. Similarly, most delinquents require an understanding of their particular circumstances and personality, how their delinquent behaviour arose and what kind of help in what type of environment is most likely to enable them to find a more satisfactory way of life.

The initial task of the social worker is to assess the real nature of the difficulty from which the person needing help is suffering. This assessment may also require the skill of a doctor, or a psychiatrist. And conversely the social worker is often called into consultation with these in assessing the social component in medical or psychiatric treatment. The next step is to appraise the strengths and weaknesses in the situation and decide upon the probable line of treatment. Firstly, this involves assessment of the person's own insight into his difficulties and the extent of his desire to solve his problem; whether he is suffering from any physical or mental disability and if so whether he is likely to accept and respond to treatment; what kind of person he is; what type of life pattern he has and how this affects and conditions the help which the social worker can offer to him. Secondly, it involves some understanding of his family relationships, whether there are strong positive ties of family affection, in spite perhaps of rough tongues and poor household management; whether in his childhood he experienced love and a real home life or whether he felt that no one really wanted

him or cared what became of him; if he is married, whether he is a good husband and father, taking his share of family responsibilities; what are the economic circumstances of the family, its living conditions and the ways in which it manages its resources and the light which this casts on its members as people. Thirdly, his relationship to his environment is important: the kind of neighbourhood in which he lives, its culture patterns and the accepted social standards of his neighbours and workmates; whether or not he joins in social activities and has strong individual and group ties outside the home. And lastly, given his need and his reactions to it, what resources there are in the community that exist to meet this need. These resources do not only consist of the official and voluntary social services as such but also in all forms of good neighbourliness. People in trouble experience a return to some of the dependencies of childhood and they need to feel a certain warmth of response from others and also that they have something to give to other people—that they are wanted. Social workers must know a good deal about this alternating need for dependence and independence in people and how to help in ways that give to both their necessary outlets.

The social worker will obviously not arrive at a full understanding of anyone's need in a single interview. More and more will emerge during continued contact with a person and his family, and diagnosis and treatment will merge into each other. Moreover, the problems people think they have are not always the root cause of their difficulties. For example, in the juvenile court many parents are troubled about their children's conduct, when what really needs changing is the parent's own attitude towards, and handling of, the child. It is only if the parents can change that the child will be able to do so, and their desire that the magistrate should give him 'a good talking to' would do nothing to touch the real cause of the bad behaviour. This means that the social worker has to be skilled at perceiving the actual need and acting appropriately in relation to it. It is very little use, for example, to offer nothing but a fortnight's holiday to a woman whose strained nerves are due to bad relationships with her husband; or to help a disabled man to take up a career he wants but for which he is fundamentally unsuited. To do what people want at the moment rather than to help them to face their real conflicts and limitations may merely aggravate these.

This is one of the real danger spots of social work. It is all too easy for social workers, unless they have a good deal of realistic common sense, to think of themselves as a god in the machine, changing people's

lives. Or else to fall into the opposite temptation of becoming over-busy, issuing stock remedies, arranging this and providing that. This may flatter their own sense of importance and professional competence; it looks well to the rest of the world, and they—and their employing authority in annual reports—may be able to point to a series of achievements. But in fact they may have achieved nothing at all of any real value. They may have been busy but harmless or they may actually through well-meant activities have done something to disrupt family life.

No society can afford to employ people to be more or less harmless, nor can we risk their doing harm. It is just because social workers come into people's lives at points of extreme tension that there are dangerous potentialities inherent in their work and in the way they use their relationship with people in distress. They will most certainly need to call in the aid of environmental services as part of the rehabilitation process but not as a series of plasters which leave real issues unfaced or needs untouched. Because they are there to give certain personal social services to those needing individual help in their social discords, they must know a good deal about community resources and must have wisdom about human behaviour and the basic desires which motivate human conduct. They need to know, not only in theory but also as these are manifest in living people, how certain life experiences affect personality, particularly at the peak periods of early childhood, adolescence, middle age and old age. They must understand in general and also in its particular manifestations, the need that everyone has for security, for achievement, for dependence and independence, to feel wanted, to feel loved, to be part of a family, to take part in the life of the community, to overcome difficulties, to make friends. Social workers must know what kinds of behaviour, what characteristic reactions, to expect from people of different ages and personalities, in different social and cultural settings, who have suffered from a variety of damaging experiences; and who show varying degrees of personal disintegration or internal conflict. The aim of social work is to make helpful things happen to and for people. This means using environmental services and neighbourly help as an integrated part of total treatment, and at the right points in it. It also means understanding how behaviour may be modified by environmental changes when good advice and exhortations to improve conduct would alike be useless. For example, children may be out of hand both because of unwise discipline and also on account of lack of play materials and satisfying outlets for natural energies. Helping the parents of such children may

include helping them to a better understanding of discipline and of the characteristic behaviour and needs of children at different stages of their development. In other words, social workers must not only know about people's needs at different ages and in differing circumstances and what will happen if these are not met but must also know what are the possibilities for socially acceptable outlets for these energies. Their duty is not only to help individual people but also to make it known when the community is not providing for the needs of which they become aware in the course of their work.

Social workers are very chary of doing things 'for' people, or of persuading them to do anything at all against their will. They may be put in the way of getting things but the final decision and the final steps should be taken on their own initiative. The ultimate goal is to help people to become more independent, more free from the crippling results of their own defects and their environmental disabilities, more able to order their affairs and to lead happy and satisfying lives. Most people's troubles also involve family relationships, whether this be the family repercussions of illness or of infirm old age, of delinquency, of illegitimacy, of marital disharmony, or of an all-round failure to come up to the general level of civilized behaviour expected in our society. Therefore social workers doing an effective job with any one member of the family are likely to find themselves concerned to some extent with the interactions of the whole family group. Even those without families carry within them the living memory or the vivid fantasy of family life, as for example the adopted child who is troubled by the thought of the unknown mother who parted with him.

Although social work with individual people, social casework, is being used increasingly in the social services, it must not be forgotten that some of the same principles apply in work with groups of people, whether in youth clubs, community centres, children's homes, approved schools or residential schools for maladjusted children. By an understanding of the interactions of the members of a group in relation to each other, social group workers can help people to become more articulate about themselves and better able to communicate with others. Thus controlled use of group relations as a means of individual fulfilment are beginning to be used with normal people in the ordinary world, and for disturbed people under controlled conditions of living.

The important question arises whether we are using social workers to the best advantage in the public social services in which by now the majority of them are employed. Unfortunately the answer is not clear. The social services themselves have grown piecemeal, trailing clouds

of history, and the result is that both they and the staffs who operate them have become too narrow and sub-divided to function effectively in relation to personal social problems. This is widely recognized by now but the remedy is not easy to see. Separate departments of local authorities and various government departments are all responsible for a variety of personal services to members of families in their own homes. But the focus is on a particular need of a person rather than on the general welfare of individual people in their family setting; although in fact a number of social welfare problems are interwoven with each other and may affect and be affected by other members of the family group. This neglect of the family as the basic social work unit is resulting in spasmodic intervention by too many social workers, who visit the family for one specialized purpose or another, and in a failure to use scarce resources to the best advantage. In a machine age when we see so clearly the advantages of sub-division of labour applied to the processes of production, and at a time when our social machinery is becoming more and more complex, we have allowed ourselves to apply to people the same techniques of sub-division that we apply to things. Yet human beings are unities and they cannot subsist in isolation from the family and social settings with which their lives are interwoven.

Parallel with this specialization in the administration of the social services, there has of course grown up a corresponding specialization in the training of social workers. There is confusion of thought in the universities themselves as to whether or not they are or should be providing vocational training, and, if so, how far it is legitimate for them to go in this direction. The sub-division of the social services and the indecision of the universities about vocational training are between them largely responsible for the present unsatisfactory state of social work education. At present students take a social science degree, diploma or certificate, followed by one or other of the specialized trainings sponsored by different agencies and designed to turn them into almoners, probation officers, child care officers, psychiatric social workers or youth leaders. The result is that the courses themselves are not nearly so adequate as they might be if teaching and other resources were pooled; moreover it is difficult to move from one branch of social work to another, although the essential social work processes and skills are the same in whatever setting they operate.

Social workers need to know a good deal about the social services and the administrative set-up of different services but their more essential task is to help those people who cannot make full use of the social services without such help; those for whom in some sense the

social worker *is* the social service. This means that much of the training must consist in actual practice under guidance. We academic people have still not wholly emerged from the era when we scoffed at those veterans of social work who insisted upon the importance of experience, and who in their turn made light of our devotion to theory and to general principles. The truth is that, as we now begin to see, both were right and both were wrong. Teaching the elements, the basic principles of a subject, is a necessary part of a student's background studies without which he will be a technician rather than a professional worker. But social workers have to 'do' as well as to 'know' and when it comes to the professional training, then what matters is that students should learn in living situations to practise those things that they learned in broad terms in the lecture room. For example, they must not only learn about the needs of deprived children in general but must take part in, let us say, finding the right foster home for a particular child, studying the child and the foster home and making a judgment as to whether this child and this substitute home will grow together; and then must watch the living, developing relationship that will result if the judgment has been right—or deal with the disastrous consequences for the child if it has not. This process need not be a matter of hit or miss any more than teaching children to read. Both processes obey certain laws and are based on certain principles which can be learned, and upon an art which can be applied. But a substantial amount of good teaching related to direct practice is necessary in order to be able to understand different kinds of people and their needs and to be able to help them effectively. For example, it is quite easy to discover that a child is delinquent because he feels unwanted at home, it is difficult to understand the precise family interaction, and more difficult still to help him and his mother and father to feel differently about each other and to act accordingly. Moreover, social workers must become very well aware of themselves and their own motives and prejudices, other-wise these may cloud their judgment and warp their work.

We have a long way to go yet in the proper use of social workers. If we used them aright they could be a means for strengthening family life; and incidentally for reducing a good deal of neglect and the mental cruelty that is sometimes more deeply damaging than physical harm. Yet it is not easy to forecast the future of social work in this country. One of the biggest changes that has come about in the last few years is that social workers are now taken for granted as being a necessary element in the satisfactory administration of most of the social services. They are most deeply entrenched in casework services—in probation,

child care and medical and psychiatric social work. They join hands with the educationalist in the youth service—or sometimes fail to do so. Perhaps the most significant development is that they are beginning to find their place in the institutional care of diverse groups of people; in children's homes, in residential schools for maladjusted children, in approved schools, in borstals and prisons, in rehabilitation centres and in Part III temporary accommodation—that new name which made the old workhouse smell sweeter. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the social work function and outlook in the care of those who for one reason or another are congregated in institutions. In such a situation social workers have, or should have, a double role, using both casework and group work methods. They will use knowledge of individual people and their relationships to each other within the particular institution, and also maintain contact between the individual and his family in the outside world. We have come in recent years to a much clearer appreciation of the importance of after care for those from institutions as diverse as children's homes and prisons. We now begin to understand that the term 'after care' is itself a misnomer: to be effective we need a continuous and living relationship between the person in the residential situation and his home surroundings, which begins before he leaves home and continues until he is strongly rooted again in the outside world.

Social workers are to a limited extent engaged in social research but they are only fitfully employed in social planning and administration. The major exception to this is the child care service where a number of professional social workers were appointed as children's officers in 1948 and are trying to embody their knowledge of individual need and individual differences in the administrative set-up of a new service.

This employment of social workers in hundreds, even in thousands, in the public service has precipitated the whole problem of the re-cruitment of trained workers. It has cast light, as has been said, on the inadequacies of the existing social science courses, followed by specialized trainings. In particular because these specialized courses cover much the same ground yet are unrelated to each other and fit their students only for one particular branch of social work, be it probation, child care, medical social work, psychiatric social work or group work. It has also become obvious that we cannot hope to staff universal services exclusively with people who have undergone several years of full-time training; for indeed neither our man-power situation nor our training facilities and financial resources would permit us to do so. This in itself should be a challenge to make the full training as

good as the present state of knowledge permits; for it is the professional workers who will set the standard, and who will have to supervise numbers of untrained or in-service trained workers. Yet this we are failing to do and advances in social work education have not kept pace with expansions in the employment of social workers. We need to set our house in order at a number of points, not least by providing a general course in social practice following upon and integrated with the social science courses, a course which would give a basic preparation for all forms of social work. This would involve the closest possible interrelation between theory and practice, and intensive teaching in the actual field work. The particular setting in which any given social worker is to function is of far less importance than a real grasp of the essential method and the principles on which they will operate wherever they work. In addition to this groundwork of professional training, we also need advanced courses for social administrators, research workers and specialists wishing to make a more intensive study of their field.

This leaves out of account the untrained rank and file. These are bound for some time to form the backbone of some services, for example the local authority welfare service and perhaps of the community care of mental defectives and the mentally disordered. For them there is need of well-planned systematic in-service training and real on-the-job teaching, as well as grant aid and leave of absence for some to take professional courses. At present many hundreds of such workers get virtually no training at all.[1]

It is almost impossible to break down the over-specialization in training until we can break down the narrowly defined employment of social workers and use them to serve individuals and families rather than to perform a series of more and more sub-divided functions. One day perhaps there will be set up a local authority family welfare department which will be responsible for all the social work services to families in the locality who need individual help with their problems.

Social work itself, that outgoing impulse to help the less fortunate neighbour, is very old. Social workers as a separate professional group are very new, indeed only fledglings as yet. In this century with all its ills, there is yet abroad amongst us a spirit which seeks to understand, to help, to raise up, to heal and strengthen rather than to condemn, to coerce and to hurt. This is the essential spirit of Christianity and of

[1] This situation has been much changed since the publication of the *Report of the Working Party on Social Workers in the Local Authority Health and Welfare Services*, H.M.S.O. 1959.

democracy as well as of science. Social work at its best embodies that spirit and can help it to bear fruit in the lives of frustrated and unhappy people. There is thus a duty laid upon us to see that social workers are given the necessary equipment and the recognition from society that will enable them to fulfil their demanding task to the best of their human abilities.

3

SOCIAL WORK TODAY[1]

TODAY is all our yesterdays, as well as this moment in time when we try to fulfil while we are able our dreams for the future, in order that that future may be in some way better, nearer to the heart's desire, than the past or the present: yet the future will be largely determined by our foresight, by what we do and think and discover today.

At the same time we must not forget the living past, so actively present in our attitudes, our ways of doing things, the structure of the services in which we operate, and our ideas and ideals. The past fifty years have seen enormous changes but some of the things which we strive to realize are the same now as they were then. Far-sighted and clear-minded people of fifty years ago and more saw what needed to be done long before we had the changed attitudes, the knowledge, the social machinery or the necessary skill to carry these things into effect. So in one sense we are always catching up with the past, just as in another sense the past is always catching up with us: what we did or thought or planned previously largely determines what it is possible for us to do today. There is always a long time lag between our first realizing what we need to be able to do and our discovery of how to translate this perception into practice. Thus one of the greatest frustrations, and the greatest challenges, in social work at the present time is our much more accurate perception of people's needs and how we might be able to help them, as individuals, groups or communities, if only we had just that much more knowledge, and knew how to use the knowledge.

In the last fifty years there has been an almost unbelievable change in the whole of that social environment which so much concerned social reformers in the early decades of this century. Some of us remember the poverty, the unemployment, ill-health, malnutrition, drudgery, ignorance, drunkenness, squalor and slums of those days, and we thank heaven they are largely ended. Though at the same time we know

[1] A paper read at the Edinburgh Guild of Service Jubilee Meeting, May 1961.

full well that appalling housing conditions still remain. And in any event this affluent society is perhaps not spending sufficient of its increasing resources on public amenities and public beauty. On the debit side, the very rapidity of social change and increased mobility of all kinds have loosened kinship bonds in some neighbourhoods, while social mobility in itself strains family relationships. The problem of mental health confronts us at every turn. There may well be more isolation and loneliness, perhaps more people 'don't neighbour', more old people are alone, more families are smaller and without much of the protection and warmth of the past; while the strain and rush of life and the demands upon the individual are greater. Simultaneously, the range of choice has increased, and moral standards have become more fluid, which is part of the inherent stress caused by a freedom of choice greater than the mass of people have ever known before. Indeed this wider range of choice is one of the most significant of all the changes of the past fifty years, especially for the practice of social work, for a considerable amount of current social work is concerned with helping people to exercise choice in a responsible way; and it should also be concerned with seeing that they are provided with better means to do so.

Traditionally, social work and social workers were associated with poverty, with the problem of how to secure for the poor essential goods and services without at the same time pauperizing them. To Thomas Chalmers, Octavia Hill, the Barnetts and the C.O.S. pioneers, what the poor really needed was a continuing friendship and a type of pastoral care which would nerve them to take arms against a sea of troubles and by contending end them. The fact that no amount of contending would enable a widow to bring up her children decently or an unemployed man to find work in a trade depression was left to Charles Booth, the Webbs and others to demonstrate—with the aid of a passion for social reform and new tools of scientific research. It is strange indeed that Chalmers and the C.O.S. were so very right at the same time that they were so very wrong.

Their rightness is only beginning to become clear, now that the seas of poverty have been swept back and the basic material needs of life met at a minimum standard from the cradle to the grave. They were of course shockingly paternalistic, moralistic, authoritarian and often harsh in their judgments according to our ideas but much of that was taken for granted at the time, and the real significance of their discoveries was their emphasis on what they called friendship, getting to know 'the poor' individually and influencing them through strengthening their will and demanding morally responsible action from them.

In other words, helping them to exercise choice, to make decisions and to act responsibly within the limited range that was possible to them.

We should give very different names to these same things nowadays, while 'the poor' have become all those who need help with problems of social functioning. But the real significance of the discoveries of the pioneers of social work was their emphasis on the importance of personal relationships, of creating a bond of mutual respect and understanding with the person to be helped, and using that relationship in his interest, working with his strengths rather than catching him out in his weaknesses, and expecting of him that with the support of this relationship he would become more able to help himself, more independent, than he was before. Stated thus this is of course the essence of modern casework and to a large extent of group work too. It is also the essence of independent discoveries now being made in community development work in Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

Although the whole level of living, the area of choice, the mental horizons of today are very different for the mass of people from those of fifty years ago, yet in the meantime social work, and indeed the social sciences, have been travelling a long road to the discovery of why the great pioneers were right in those things which they had grasped intuitively but which they often clothed in most unfortunate terminology. Although these pioneers worked empirically, whether in Scotland, England, the United States or Germany, in the struggle to bring order and decency into the chaos and squalor of urban destitution, yet at the same time they demanded help from the newly emerging sciences of economics, psychology and sociology, and they themselves studied their districts and the needs of those whom they tried to help with a concentration and enthusiasm which should put us to shame at the present day: for we are all too apt, both in public and voluntary services, to be content to do the job and fulfil the administrative requirements without systematic study and evaluation of the consequences or effectiveness of the service we offer. Our implicit attitude too often is that because we intend the results to be good therefore *ipso facto* they must be good, whereas in fact the service we offer may, for aught we know, be harmless but ineffective, or even actually harmful or unwanted by the recipients. More often than not, neither social workers nor social agencies know why they succeed nor why they fail. Indeed for the most part even our criteria are either so general or so crude as to be almost useless for evaluation purposes.

Reference has already been made to that tragic rift which set at variance those who sought to bring about social reform by changing

the environment and those who sought the same ends by effecting change in the individual. These opposed views as to what constitute the most powerful determinants of human behaviour have also persisted until very recently in sociology and psychiatry respectively. However, greater knowledge is now breaking down the barriers between these sciences as we discover on the one hand that, for example, even mental illness is to some degree culturally conditioned; and on the other hand that early childhood deprivation may permanently affect personality development. In other words, that the division between the individual and the environment is the same false dichotomy as that between nature and nurture.

The result of expanding knowledge in all the sciences which tell us about ourselves is that water-tight compartments are going, and we now regard these sciences as interconnected means of knowing more about the biological, physiological, psychological and sociological aspects of how men function as social beings. This knowledge is applied by an increasing number of professions, and mediated to the population at large by such means as the statutory and voluntary social services. Effective and steadily improving action therefore depends upon advances in scientific knowledge, the application of this knowledge appropriately in professional practice, and an administrative structure and procedures which facilitate rather than impede the service. One of the characteristics of social work today, as opposed to yesterday, is a good deal more clarity about its own comparatively small but nonetheless essential place in this vast and complex structure of sciences, professions and services. In earlier times social work attempted to cover the water front, which was natural enough when so many needs went unmet. Nowadays, however, the growth of health, education, housing, employment, social security and other social services has made it possible for social workers to concentrate their activities, and thus to begin to discern more clearly what these ought to be in relation to other services and professions. It seems to be generally agreed now that, in essence, social work is centred around those social problems which arise from the interrelation between man and his social environment. This differentiates it from medicine or teaching, even though it has affinities with these other professions and they with it. Social work is sometimes described as the art of helping people to help themselves. This is not an unduly difficult art with those who respond to and make intelligent use of help, advice, and provision of necessary services, but it is not an easy task with those who don't know what they want and won't be happy till they get it, or with those who do know what they

want and would be worse off than before if they got it. These are the people who offer the greatest challenge to social work. A challenge which it has been meeting courageously, if not always effectively, for many years. It endeavours to help husbands and wives at loggerheads with each other, children without homes or in homes where they are misused, delinquents, prostitutes, unmarried mothers, multi-problem families, ill, handicapped and mentally disordered and sub-normal people. And also other socially inadequate people who get themselves into difficulties, including those who suffer from intolerable environmental conditions. Unfortunately social work with and for these different groups of disturbed—and sometimes disturbing—people has tended to be segregated in water-tight compartments, creating the impression that they are all quite different from each other, while those who work with any given group often claim that these are much more difficult and require more skilled help than any of the others. But deeper analysis by psychology, sociology and social work itself of the reactions, personality characteristics and behaviour of different groups of people in social difficulty has made us more aware nowadays that when we talk like this we are really looking at symptoms and services, rather than underlying causation and the kind of behaviour which follow when the basic human needs are not met nor energies satisfied legitimately. This analysis is also enabling social workers to contribute to preventive services, as well as individual treatment of social breakdown.

There is current discussion in medicine about what determines symptom choice: in social work too we realize more clearly now than we have done for fifty years or so that we must strive to understand the person-in-his-life-situation before we can hope to get light on the contributory causes, both personal and social, of his delinquency or marital conflict or social isolation or whatever it may be, as well as the kind of personality development or environmental pressures which are likely to lead in the individual to one form of socially undesirable or personally damaging behaviour rather than another. This means that social work faces, and must face, the difficult task of taking a wider range of contributory factors into account but doing so with increasing precision, with increasing ability to weigh accurately the different elements in any given situation. It is indeed essential that social work action should be realistically and accurately related to the needs of the particular situation, taking into account the strengths in each unique individual and his family, and aimed at understanding what improvement can be expected, as well as how to bring it about. In some cir-

cumstances indeed considerable improvement is possible, in others a beneficial change at one point will set up a chain reaction for the better, in yet others a holding operation may prevent further deterioration and additional strain on other members of the family. Unfortunately social work today is characterized by a great deal of diffuse and fumbling activity. It is insufficiently realized by many social workers, or by their employing bodies, that there cannot be effective social work without careful study of the relevant elements in a given situation, leading to a social appraisal of causation. This should result in a plan of remedial action, using other appropriate services and resources if need be, and changing as the situation develops and as the person shows the quality of his response.

This brings us to the whole question of training. And this also is a point at which the past is very much alive today. Indeed we have still not caught up with the best thought of fifty or more years ago about training and research in social work. In the intervening years a series of separate trainings grew up, closely related to particular services, medical social work, psychiatric social work, probation, moral welfare, youth leadership, child care, family casework. Sometimes these separate trainings have had a common base in a university social science course which preceded them, but even so the two have not fitted together very well, indeed they are not designed to do so, and the first has thus tended to be too diffuse and the second too specific and specialized. A consequence of this specialization has been an emphasis on particular problems, delinquency, childhood deprivation and so forth, rather than upon a broad understanding of the human being in society, and an ability to use social work skill in any given situation or cluster of problems. Now this is being reversed as social workers, met in joint discussion, discover greater similarities than differences, and as we contemplate the limited range of human reactions to over-stressful situations. For example, in professional training courses there is much more emphasis now than formerly upon the significance of family relationships and normal human development and behaviour before the student begins to concentrate on pathology—marital conflict, unmarried parenthood, child neglect and so forth. This reversal does not mean that we are throwing out specialization but that we are moving towards a common content of professional training, together with some degree of specialization either within or following this professional training. There is, however, still in some quarters a tendency to confuse specialized training with advanced training, when we are in fact in this country almost wholly devoid of opportunities for

advanced study in the field of social work. So far, too, we only have professional training for casework, though much social work today is in fact with groups and local communities.

Apart from these trends in training, it has not been the practice in some social services to employ trained social workers. In these services the assumption has been that all that was required was to learn to apply the law and the regulations in the individual case, to fit into the local government or other administrative structure, to be kind and helpful to the 'deserving' and tough to the 'undeserving'. Many officials so employed are doing a very good job and giving devoted service within these assumptions. Some are natural social workers, sensitive to others and with a genius for being helpful to those in distress: others are not. But the great weakness of this way of endeavouring to meet need is that there is no systematic and objective assessment of the situation, based upon evidence that clarifies causation, and thus no plan of treatment and no methodology of action, either for the initial assessment or for the implementation and periodic review of the treatment. This means that in this enormously complex field of human relations in their social setting, which is after all what social work is primarily about, untrained workers—and those who employ them—are operating in general on a hit or miss basis. This sometimes succeeds: but it can also result in prejudices being sanctified as virtues, in snap judgments, in superficial or irrelevant activity, and in a tendency to sweep into the broadest categories of moral judgment the subtle varieties of human behaviour and motivation, hopes and fears, desires and mixed feelings, whether rational or irrational. Professional standards and professional self-discipline are as essential in social work as in other professions which deal with people's intimate affairs and deepest feelings.

It is we, all of us who in any way determine policy and form current attitudes, who are responsible for this situation: a situation in which large numbers of social work posts are manned by people who must do the job without the training and support they need—and often too with impossibly large case loads. In the coming years, when we do begin at last to train rank and file social workers on a substantial scale, many already in these services who have been expected to work in one kind of way will face anxieties about their own future and uncertainties about their ability to jump the chasm that separates old from new ways of working. This is an inevitable consequence of introducing training in social work theory and practice in substitution for the old less demanding learn-as-you-go-along. Yet to their great credit the untrained

officers in our public services are eager for training, and it is very much to be hoped that the courses provided for them will be designed to make the maximum use of their knowledge and experience, to strengthen and carry further what is good in this as well as helping them to see what must be discarded in the light of fuller knowledge. For many of them the training will not be easy but it should be made as rewarding and as stimulating as possible.

There is enormous leeway to make up in every aspect of social work training. But we are awakening at last to the realization, here as elsewhere, that this world of change, this world of dizzily advancing science and technology, is no world for the untrained. We cannot deny to the social worker what we do not deny to the plumber's mate. Moreover, we cannot allow those who perform one set of functions to be right out of line with those who perform another set of related functions. For example, if mental hospitals are increasingly able to give treatment rather than custodial care, then we cannot afford not to have a parallel supporting treatment service for care in the community. And this requires skilled social workers. One of the greatest tasks in social work, as elsewhere, is to lessen the gap between knowledge and its application, and to see that the application gets through effectively to the right people at the right point. If, for example, we think that a court in sentencing an offender should seek to understand him as a person, why he committed the offence and how he can be motivated to become a better citizen, then we must have probation officers capable of providing the court with the appropriate assessment, and able to make and use the kind of relationship with lawbreakers that will result in socially acceptable behaviour.

We human beings know little enough about ourselves, individually and as members of society, in all conscience but we do know a good deal more than we practice, and we could add to the knowledge we have more rapidly if we used it and reflected upon the results. It is profoundly unethical if in dealing with people we employ methods that are less skilled, less intelligently compassionate, than they need be. If we use hit or miss methods to a greater extent than we must, then we will miss more often than we need, and in so doing damage or fail to help others more often than is inevitable.

Training is not a substitute for the right personality or the right attitudes. Kindness, compassion, sensitivity, maturity, imagination and intelligence are as essential in social work as in all the other professions directly concerned with helping people. But these qualities are not enough for the social worker today unless they are matched with

knowledge, with skill in practicing the art of social work, and with a professional discipline which faces open-eyed and is able to discount personal prejudices, likes and dislikes, which does not seek for self-gratification nor to make over other people according to some preconceived image of what they ought to do or be.

Training cannot guarantee these things but good selection, wise teachers and a well-planned curriculum can do a good deal to cultivate them, whether in the class room or in practice. We know enough about human behaviour and development to be able to give students a body of knowledge which will widen their imagination and systematize their thought; we begin to be able to achieve this in sociology too, the science of man in his social relations; we can certainly do it so far as the economic determinants of people's lives are concerned, and in regard to the structure and function of the social services, administration and the relevant parts of the legal system. Moreover social work has developed its own theory of practice, its methodology, which takes appropriate elements of knowledge from these different studies and applies the knowledge through the characteristic methods of social work practice. This too the students must study, and must also learn to use it by substantial periods of practical work in which they are taught systematically in relation to cases for which they take real responsibility. It is far from easy to bring these two parts, theory and practice, together in specific rather than general terms, but it can and must be done, and in fact we know a good deal about how to do it. If we do not take very great care about this, then much of the time and effort we spend on training will be wasted. Students need help to apply what they learn, and if they do not apply it in one way or another they will forget it.

We have in Britain no advanced training, no research units in social work, and a very scanty literature devoted to the advancement of theory and practice. Moreover we woefully lack the qualified social work teachers and supervisors whom we so urgently need to give sound teaching and direction in the new courses which are being started. This is an unhealthy state of affairs from the point of view of real advance in the theory and practice of social work. Our greatest need, however, is determination to advance and confidence in our ability to do so. Social work today is essentially part of an historical process. It has taken a big leap forward in the years since the war, indeed we have only to look back ten or fifteen years to see the great advances that have been made. But the good is always the enemy of the best and we, like the pioneers of social work and social reform, have in our

day the obligation so to think, plan and act that we do not fail to do the best we can now and that we do not fail the future. The social work of tomorrow could be very much better able to help people than the social work of today: but only if we act intelligently in contributing to make this possible.

4

THE SOCIAL SERVICES AND
SOCIAL CHANGE

W E are continually told that we live in an age of revolutionary change: indeed this has been impressed upon us so often and for so long that we are perhaps beginning to accept it as one of the facts of life without realizing that to an increasing extent the possibility of conscious control of our social affairs is being put at our disposal by science.

A revolution indicates that a number of things are changing radically, even precipitously, for better or worse, as measured against the yardstick of some golden or dark age in the past. And undoubtedly the change has been from a dark to a very much less dark age for the people of Britain so far as poverty, health, education and housing are concerned. In any event the word revolution is a misnomer in the context because it suggests a violent break with the past whereas we have succeeded in accomplishing revolutionary change within a framework of continuity.

A social revolution, whether small or big, seems to be composed, as the term has come to be used, of rather diverse elements which have little integral relationship with each other but are nonetheless necessary in combination to precipitate social revolution for the better (incidentally when we talk about social revolution we assume that it has resulted in improvement, an assumption that can be allowed to stand for the purpose of the present discussion).

Some of the necessary ingredients seem to be:

(a) An increase in economic production, that is to say a more rapid increase of goods and services than of population.

(b) An increase in scientific and technological 'know how', since practically all advances in modern social services are dependent upon putting to use the discoveries of science, either as a service, for example immunization, or to facilitate the service,

for example mechanical devices, or to measure the service, for example statistical methods.

(c) Development of the professional and technical training and practices through which scientific findings can be applied in actual services to people.

(d) The administrative structure which makes it possible for professional and other skills, services and goods to reach those for whom they are intended.

(e) The climate of political thought, which includes the social reforms, goals or ideals advocated and accepted at any given time, whether by political parties or by individuals or groups who aim to improve any segment of social life.

(f) Crises and catastrophes from within a fundamentally cohesive society. These seem necessary to shake us out of the even tenure of our way and to precipitate change. There is significance in the frequency with which disaster has preceded advances in the social services, whether the crisis be as great as two world wars or as small in comparison as the Carlton Approved School disorders or the death of Dennis O'Neil. But the crisis must result in improved (and stabilizing) action or it will merely precipitate further crises.

(g) Some change in our own vision so that we become able to see, thanks usually to someone more sensitive than ourselves, social ills to which we have heretofore been blind. In the late eighteenth century it took Thomas Coram a long time to convince his contemporaries that 'infants abandoned upon dunghills' were not to be tolerated as one of the normal sights of life. The social history of the nineteenth century, in many ways so terrible, is nonetheless full of the achievements of those who were able to see and to crusade about those social evils to which others were blind or indifferent. It has taken us a good long time in this century to begin to 'see' mentally ill or neurotic people, the severely handicapped tucked away in their homes or in institutions, the effects of maternal deprivation, or society's share in delinquency or unemployment. And we are still blind to, for example, the plight of the deaf, especially those born deaf, a handicap probably more profound in all its consequences than any other physical handicap.

The capacity to 'see', seems worth further exploration because exercise of the creative imagination is more and more demanded of all of us who are in any way concerned with the administration and development of the social services. Our ability to see, in the sense of suddenly perceiving new dimensions to a social ill and feeling that it is no longer to be tolerated, requires real capacity to look at familiar things with fresh eyes. But this ability is nonetheless at the heart of social revolution since it provides the impetus for change, without which any given scientific research would not be undertaken or else its findings would lie fallow. The impetus comes initially from those whom, significantly enough, we later refer to as far sighted, those who perceive that to which we are blind, and who in time, aided by crises, open our eyes. The far-sighted individual or group gather others round them and often form a voluntary organization to apply and propagate remedies for that ill which they have seen. This social imagination and inventiveness is the true function of voluntary organizations. In time, if that which they have pioneered corresponds with reality, and of course sometimes it is entirely cockeyed, responsibility for remedy may be taken over by public authorities and becomes universal. If the voluntary organization goes on being able to see new needs and to devise effective remedies it lives, if not it dies. And sometimes it is an unconscionable time a-dying.

The capacity to see afresh is and will continue to be increasingly difficult. These current difficulties relate on the one hand to the development of the welfare state and on the other to the manifold consequences of rapid social change. Thus to a considerable extent, though certainly not to the degree which is possible, even with our present knowledge, we have eliminated or are in the process of eliminating or alleviating social ills whose effects are in the physical sense of the term visible, whether destitution, slums, unemployment, ill-health or ignorance. Barring the hazards of war and of population growth these processes will continue almost by their own momentum, since the services themselves are well established, the advances of science are rapid, and the yardstick by which most of them are measured itself changes with scientific advance and a rising level of living.

The result is bound to be an increasing demand on all of us for the imagination to see that which cannot be seen. It took much insight, the struggles of social reformers and new scientific discoveries before we were able to 'see' slum children deformed by rickets, yet probably much more effort is demanded of us to see that the quiet, withdrawn child in the class room or the problem family mother may be more

deeply damaged in spirit than the rickety child was in body. At the present day we are being forced into seeing the end results of marital discord, desertion, illegitimacy, delinquency, racial disturbances and the like by their consequences. Yet we may still be blind to the contributory causes which lie many years away as well as in the explosive present. It is usually only when these disharmonies and disintegrations of human relations flare up into some kind of social nuisance that we perforce take notice of them. Then it is often to protect other people from the infection of these psychological disorders, which shows a dawning recognition that they are quite as contagious as some of the infectious diseases which we are now able to control in a consciously planned and systematic way. It is significant that we have begun spasmodically to see that these people and many others are suffering quite as much from a sickness in the human spirit and a sickness in society as those who lie in hospital with respectable and visible physical illnesses.

In addition to those who force us to take notice of them by the havoc they cause to themselves and others, there are those who have quietly withdrawn or are being forced by circumstances into withdrawal from sufficient human relations. They exist at every age from the isolated child in the top floor flat, the spinster in the bed-sitter, men or women with all their possessions strapped to them wandering between common lodging houses, the ex-prisoner, those who 'don't neighbour', the severely handicapped, lonely old people and those who live and die unbefriended.

It is not for a moment suggested that no one has yet begun to see nor has been concerned to offer help to all these different people who in one way or another and often because of some distortion of their own personalities are suffering from a failure of human relations, who, as a great pediatrician once put it, lack the vitamins of mental health. Much is indeed done to try to help them by individuals of good will, by voluntary organizations, the churches, local authorities, hospitals, the probation service, disablement re-settlement officers, the National Assistance Board and so on. The point is, however, that although we are doing a great deal it is far from being enough, moreover at certain points we are waging a losing battle with ineffective weapons. The arms we need in order to win the next stage in the battle of social service are, as in the past, the imagination to see unrecognized need, the drive to remedy it, and the knowledge and skill to do so. Perhaps the most important of all is the will to see and help, because in trying to understand and lessen personal and social disharmony we are being

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forced to embark on a largely uncharted course and we may well be groping as blindly for the right answers as were those who in the early days of the public health movement thought that infectious diseases were communicated by effluvia. Yet it is as essential today to locate the causes of those failures in human relationships which nowadays damage and impoverish more than physical ill health or material poverty as it was in the mid-nineteenth century to discover the causes of cholera and other communicable diseases.

Since we are now becoming aware that these vitally important personal and social levels of human functioning are capable of being understood and regulated, they are bound to be taken into account to a much greater degree in the future administration of existing or new social services. Sometimes straight common sense suggests an appropriate answer, as in the provision of social clubs for handicapped people; sometimes experience finally teaches us, for example, not to locate houses designed for old people in the furthest corner of the new housing estate; sometimes uncommon sense is needed, for example, to realize that prisoners are more likely to return as reasonable citizens if their self respect and capacity to accept responsibility is increased rather than destroyed. But in addition to the common sense and imagination of lay people there is in this field increasing need for the disciplined imagination and systematic use of research method characteristic of the scientist, whether in psychology, psychiatry, sociology or anthropology. This necessity arises partly because in the current conditions of rapid social change and mobility of every kind people are continuously subjected to a greater range of social uncertainties and personal stresses than in most previous generations. But basically this research is necessary because the social and behavioural sciences are beginning to be able to design the kinds of research that will answer essential practical questions, as well as making us aware of things to which we have been blind, such as that young children need mothering. For example, prediction studies can already begin to tell us more accurately than common sense judgments what percentage in any particular relevant group will become delinquent or stop being delinquent or make good foster mothers.

Research which results in clarifying connections between certain behaviour and certain contributory factors, for example between some social environments and gang warfare or racial tension, may or may not in anwsering the question 'why?' suggest answers to the further more practical question 'so what?'—'so what can we do about it?' The 'what', so far as improving human relations in both their immediate

and broader aspects is concerned, boils down to discovering how to create the kind of situations in which people's feelings about some person or persons, or their situation, or their values change for the better and therefore they behave quite differently, since they are more at peace and more in communication with their own selves and with other people. The key seems to lie in gaining more precise knowledge about what it is in the individual's biological make-up, personality development, personal relationships and social environment interacting with each other which constitutes the motivating force that makes him behave as he does, and what changes at any of these points would help him to feel and behave differently. This might be as simple as setting up a Darby and Joan club to lessen the isolation of some old people or as complex as action research to change the character of a neighbourhood.

What is insistently asked of us is that we should really grasp the concept that living beings function as a unity in these different biological, physical, psychological and social dimensions, and that we must become as aware of points at which the psychological and social equilibrium is disturbed as we are about disturbances in physical functioning. Increasingly we shall have to learn how to measure these other disturbances in terms as exact as those which we are now able to apply in public health. Incidentally this would mean that a new venture for individual, group or community betterment would not be started without thought for its personal and social repercussions. It would only be started after careful study by persons with the relevant scientific training had shown that a particular service or policy seemed to be the most appropriate and effective way to meet a clearly identified need. And it would follow that the new service, whether large or small, would have embodied in its operation ways of evaluating its results. In other words, it is vital that we should begin to think in terms of the same kind of consistent study in the human relations and social aspects of the social services that we take for granted in medicine.

The shape of things to come is of course vitally related to the question of personnel. It is of little use to be able to point to fruitful research findings or a coherent body of theory if these cannot be applied through being translated into operational terms. This includes such social policy decisions as endeavours not to break the web of kinship in re-housing slum dwellers. It also includes the knowledge and skill of professional persons who operate the services. In the application of any science, whether social, medical or natural, this means giving a sufficient understanding of its findings to those whose professional activity lies in

another field, for example, we accept that teachers must have and be competent to use knowledge about children's development and behaviour as well as about arithmetic in order to enable children to learn arithmetic. In addition, ˙new professions are arising whose primary function lies in helping individuals, groups and communities to achieve better human relationships through learning how to manage their own personalities and their social relationships better, which of course includes changing environmental circumstances which interfere with this. Those who exercise this range of skills include clinical, educational and industrial psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, social workers and a variety of less clearly defined groups. That which is common to all of them is use of knowledge drawn from the social and behavioural sciences in different but related types of professional practice, and the advancement of these sciences through research and through recording the results of their work. They practice of course in varied settings, some are more clearly defined than others so far as professional boundaries and competence are concerned, but for all of them the boundaries are fluid and there is no saying what form or function any will have even in twenty-five years time, since knowledge in these as in other sciences is now beginning to grow in geometrical ratio. Thus it is not easy to forecast what blending of biology, demography, psychology, psychiatry and sociology will form the basis for the competence of the chief officer of social health in the year 2000. All we can say with reasonable certainty is that he will have come into existence, that he is more likely to be a team of specialists than one person, and that new administrative structures and processes will also have to be evolved to enable the best educated people of the future to benefit from all that men will know about themselves.

5

ADOPTION AND
THE UNMARRIED MOTHER[1]

WE often talk about the confusion and bewilderment of the unmarried mother. Let us confess that she is but reflecting back the confusion and bewilderment of society about her, and that we as part of society are caught up in the confusion and bewilderment.

This is inherent in the nature of the situation. Society, any society, erects codes of social behaviour for the prevention of actions against persons or property or the infringements of rights. These codes evolve because certain actions have what society regards as bad results. Thus it comes about that in a society based upon the family structure and the institution of monogamous marriage, there is a strong, though far from universally accepted, taboo on sex relations outside marriage. Yet an action which society frowns upon may result in a human being—for which and through which society exists, and which alone possesses ultimate value. All societies rely more upon the sanction of social disapproval than upon the sanction of law to get their rules kept. Here, then, is where the inescapable dilemma of society starts in relation to the unmarried mother and her child. The result of her action is not bad-in-itself, as is the breaking of most other social codes, but good-in-itself.

Historically there have been a number of different answers given in our society to this dilemma. First, the institution of marriage fought for recognition against promiscuity, and monogamy against the keeping of concubines. For some centuries there was no slur attached to illegitimacy, then it became a matter of class: it was fashionable to have a natural son amongst the aristocracy but very reprehensible amongst the lower orders. Then we tried to uphold the sanctity of marriage by social ostracism of the unmarried mother and her child. It was not so very long, however, before we began to revolt against the injustice of

[1] A Paper given at the Annual Conference of the Standing Conference of Societies Registered for Adoption, 1953.

this to the child and its cruelty to the mother. There is in this century far greater tolerance for both but we are still experimenting with our attitudes and very conscious that we are far from having discovered the right answers. The thing which has so far proved too difficult for our clumsy social codes is to uphold the institution of marriage yet to honour motherhood and protect childhood under whatever circumstances they occur.

Thus in substantial measure, though of course by no means wholly, the problem of the unmarried mother and her child is the problem of society's attitude towards them. To say this is not to fail to recognize the effect of illegitimacy on the institution of the family. Nor is it to fail to recognize the personal problems of the unmarried mother, particularly those who are mentally sub-normal or emotionally disturbed or socially immature. But all the same, as we all know, the inherent difficulties of the situation are enhanced by the social disgrace attached to it. And is society's attitude so wholly reputable? Where there is no clear and consistent code of sex morality are there justifications for imposing so heavy a slur upon unmarried mothers and illegitimate children? Are we really only saying that it is not legitimate to be caught out so blatantly? And do we ourselves always escape from society's less worthy attitudes? When we say the mother should keep her baby, are we sometimes trying to force upon her the responsibility for the result of her actions, whether or not she is capable of assuming that responsibility? Equally, when we think she should part with the baby, do we sometimes feel in our hearts that she ought to be forced to give up her ill-gotten gains?

Are we always prepared to face honestly and realistically the strength and pressure of social attitudes, taboos and conventions, even while we work to change them? Or do we sometimes force the unmarried mother and her child out into the world to bear the brunt of it while we voice our moral indignation against society's attitude? The great pioneers, Captain Coram, Josephine Butler and their like did two things. They tried to change the attitude of society at large, to make it more civilized, and they also provided places of sanctuary where the victims might find a greater warmth and friendliness. In doing these things the brunt of society's disapprobation fell upon them. Nowadays we suffer no such ill as we sit in our offices or write articles or speak on public platforms. The suffering is done by Mary Smith when the other children at school ask 'Where's your Dad?' or when she gets engaged and wonders whether the bond with her fiancé—and his tie to his parents—will stand his knowing about the blank space on the full

birth certificate. In a more tolerant age we ourselves no longer court social scorn or ostracism by espousing the cause of the illegitimate child and his mother and that places all the more obligation upon us to look calmly and objectively at their needs and their interests. But instead of this it would be hard to find any social issue on which there is more heat and less light than this one.

Those who advocate adoption feel strongly about its advantages for the child: those who want to help the unmarried mother to keep her baby feel if possible even more strongly about it. Yet there are no long term follow-up studies available of illegitimate children kept by their mothers, illegitimate children brought up in the care of a local authority or voluntary children's home, and illegitimate children adopted. But until such studies are done, and done right through from birth into late adolescence on a scale large enough to afford significant results, we shall have no real evidence on which to base our opinions. It comes as something of a shock to realize that a number of persons and organizations are so deeply identified with one point of view or another that they sometimes cannot even discuss the issues impartially, far less produce objective evidence—for a few spectacular successes or failures, one way or the other, are not objective evidence. Having said this, let us see what kind of questions need to be asked and what partial answers may be available.

First of all, why do people have illegitimate children? That may seem a very simple, even naïve question. But the social taboos are in fact extremely strong. In childhood we all take into ourselves the social morality of our parents and our immediate social group so that they become part of us, and by and large we conform to these conventions later, or feel guilty when we fail to do so, unless the convention itself has changed meantime—and then we probably say people's morals aren't what they were when we were young. Incidentally this tendency to conform may be one of the reasons why illegitimacy rates are high in those sub-groups in large towns or some country districts where less stigma attaches to illegitimacy. But by and large those who have a child out of wedlock knowingly offend against a powerful social standard. Some of those who do so are no doubt too mentally subnormal or too emotionally immature for the convention to hold or too irresponsible to take precautions. On the whole, though, careful studies of the personalities and life histories of unmarried mothers would seem to suggest that at rock bottom the baby is often much less of an 'accident' than used to be thought or than the mother herself often professes. There are those who ignore the conventions because

they love the man and want the baby, optimistically hoping that some-how everything will turn out all right. There are, too, some women who have looked the taboos and their consequences full in the face and decided that their relationship with someone they love and the baby whom they want are worth the price. In so deciding they decide also for someone else who can in the nature of things have no say in the decision. There are others who are often less responsible people. There is the passive, generous, can't-say-no type, often an adolescent girl, whose craving for tenderness leads on to pregnancy. She is often good at mothering but incapable of taking on the responsibilities of being a mother. Such girls may come from broken homes but they may also come from homes where there has been a good deal of affection, of which they may have been suddenly deprived later. For them their baby is their shield against the harsh, cold indifference of the world, 'my baby is all I've got'. And this is often true in reality. Some other unmarried mothers are self-centred people who have wanted a tangible proof of love, without the give and take of marriage. Some in adolescence have a wish for a child which carries on the little girl's daydreams with her doll: mostly these remain daydreams but some-times if the provocation is too strong or the character too weak the controls give way. Sometimes when the unmarried mother is herself illegitimate she may be responding to a compulsive identification with her own mother. Such compulsive factors are also sometimes the cause of further illegitimate pregnancies. Then there are the motives of self-punishment too, as though something inside said, 'If you're going to feel guilty I'll give you something to feel guilty about.' And this very feeling of guilt, this acknowledgment of social disapproval, can apparently itself lead to several illegitimate births.

Just as society uses the unfortunate baby as a weapon wherewith to chastise the unmarried mother, so also she herself may use the baby as a weapon of revenge. Sometimes he is the symbol of revolt against her mother, or maybe against her whole home background and its stan-dards. Hence some of the unmarried mothers from especially 'good' homes. Hence, too, the danger of plans in such circumstances for the family to receive her and her baby back into the home circle. The baby may also be a symbol of revenge against the father, an expression of her resentment against what he has done to her.

All these motives, these and many others, may precede the birth of the child. The mother may want to *have* a baby, just the fact of having had him. Or she may want to have a *baby*. When it comes to keeping the baby, her feelings are as we well know often extremely mixed. Not

only are they mixed but they swing violently from one extreme to another, and with every justification when society itself is so mixed in its attitudes. She has not got behind her the support of the social institution of marriage and all that that means in helping to stabilize a married woman, who may be just as immature or sub-normal or neurotic as she sometimes is. If she wants to keep the baby she knows if she is realistic at all what the social handicaps and the financial struggle will be; if she thinks of parting with him she feels guilty, 'I have given away my baby.' She often can't let her feelings go out freely and naturally to him because of all her internal struggles and conflicts and because of society's attitude and the attitude of her own friends and relations towards her. Underneath these social conflicts she either straightforwardly wants the baby and wants to keep him or she wanted to have him but doesn't want to mother him or she swings between the two. Then there are her feelings about the father of the baby—a whole range through warm love, indifference, resentment to frank dislike. And there are his feelings too if he knows what has been the result of their relationship. It is curious that so often in our dis-cussions we seem completely to ignore the unmarried father as though he were almost a lay figure or just the subject for an affiliation order, whereas he also has had a child, and he must be going through a conflict of feelings too about the whole affair. Of course if the couple set up house together in a common law marriage this is something different and outside the scope of the present discussion.

Social workers come into this whole tangled situation with tre-mendous responsibilities and with need for much knowledge, wisdom, freedom from moral judgment or rigid ideas or rules and for much understanding of what is involved, not only for unmarried mothers in general, but for this particular unmarried mother and her baby. One of the most difficult things in the world in such a situation is to remain helpfully neutral; to let her express all her mixed feelings freely and as she will without conveying that the social worker thinks she 'ought' to do this or 'ought' to think or feel that. She must be allowed to talk about wanting—or not wanting—the baby, even if the worker thinks she should not want—or want—the baby. It is fashionable now to talk of helping her to arrive at her own decision but this does not mean so much putting rational alternatives in front of her as letting her have plenty of opportunity to get her feelings off her chest and to feel she is supported and accepted, so that in time she may be able to think as straight as she is capable of doing. She may not be capable on her own of making a wise decision but she should at least be so helped that

whatever decision she and the worker arrive at she will not regret it too much nor feel that she was talked into it. She is involved at the time in all the strains, the strong and conflicting emotions of the moment. Very often she cannot see beyond the present: at all costs she must keep the baby: at all costs she must part with the baby. We, on the other hand, stand or should stand, outside the battle, able to see the whole situation and not to become too much involved in it. As Dick Sheppard used to say, 'if someone is lying in the ditch you won't help him by going and lying down beside him'. From our more upright position, then, we ought to be able to see further along the road; back the way this unmarried mother has travelled; ahead in the direction she and her baby will probably travel in the future. Is there a clear road ahead for her and her child to walk together? Did she have a loving relationship with the father of the baby, so that the whole event is in itself something happy and natural? Is she mature and realistic, capable of being a mother to a child and an adolescent as well as to a baby? What are her long-term plans for work? Can she have the baby continuously with her? Do her people accept her and the baby? How does it look for the child along this road with his mother? He will start with the tremendous handicap of being fatherless, a handicap only second to being motherless. And his mother is not a widow with all the social compassion which that arouses, but an unmarried mother, subject to pointing fingers and whispering voices; subject, too, to fiercely over-protecting her child and spoiling him. In addition to being fatherless, will he also be an only child? Certainly social convention says he should be, if he exists at all, unless his mother marries.

Will this fatherless only child stay closely with his mother throughout his babyhood and while he is a toddler, will he feel safe with her, perhaps in her family group and in familiar surroundings? Or will he spend his days in a day nursery or with a series of minders and will they move from place to place, unwelcomed by landladies? Worst of all, will he be sometimes in a residential nursery, sometimes in foster homes, sometimes back with his mother, so that he does not feel he belongs anywhere or to any one?

Reading some literature on this subject one might think that the whole situation is ideally settled if the mother later marries and her husband accepts her illegitimate child, perhaps is party to a joint adoption application. This is really to take the same irresponsibly rosy view as those novels and films which end with the sound of wedding bells. Maybe that is where the story ends for many of us but it is only years later when children of the marriage arrive that we shall know

whether all is still well with the illegitimate child. From the vantage point of those of us who sit in juvenile courts, taking him into the subsequent marriage is often not a happy end but just one more stage on his unhappy journey. In a busy London juvenile court it is an all too common experience to have before us the illegitimate child who has at first been accepted but then, as children of the marriage come, is more and more rejected and made to feel odd man out—a reminder to the mother of guilty feelings which she resents and to her husband a query about her morals. Sometimes the child's protests take the form of truanting and delinquencies. Sometimes he (or she) behaves in such a way as to divide husband and wife by playing off one against the other until the marriage may be at the point of breakdown when the child reaches the juvenile court. Often at that stage or later there is nothing for it but removal from home. Thus the child's worst fears of rejection are finally justified and at an age when with all his difficulties it will usually be impossible to find a substitute home for him. This is of course only one side of the picture, we all know in our experience cases where the illegitimate child has been accepted into a happy, normal family and treated in every way as a full member of the family. But the illegitimate child taken into the mother's marriage appears to be subject to greater hazards than the children of the marriage.

This is also normally true for the illegitimate child who remains (in whatever sense) in the care of his unmarried mother. The dice are in greater or lesser degree loaded against him and the chances of his having a normal, happy, secure childhood are much less than the chances for the child born in marriage. The high proportion of illegitimate children coming before the juvenile courts in relation to the total child population is significant in this respect. And the sufferings of illegitimate children do not always manifest themselves in the behaviour problems which lead to a court appearance. When an adopted child appears before a juvenile court it may turn out that the child was already badly damaged before he was adopted or that the adoptive parents have rejected him, or else that they have been very unwise about how and when they told him he was adopted, or that he found out on his own and is reacting to the shock with delinquent behaviour.

Such scanty material as exists on this subject of unmarried mothers and their children seems, looked at objectively, to give little guidance as to what course of action will be in the best long run interest of both the mother and the child. Much of the available material is repetitive and based upon preconceived ideas or value judgments rather than upon actual studies. We all need to guard against the bias about

desirable action which comes from seeing many unhappy illegitimate children (as well as their fellow legitimate children) with ineffective, inadequate parents unable to make rich and warm family and social relationships. We must beware too of the other bias which comes from seeing stable and happy adoptive couples proudly welcoming a baby into their homes. We also have to guard against what might be called the wedding bells complex. We need to be conscious of the long-term problems involved in the unmarried mother trying on her own to give her child a satisfactory babyhood, childhood and youth; each of these stages is important and the risk of breakdown during each period is considerable. But, as always in this discussion one comes back to saying that because circumstances and people vary greatly this is no situation for rigid rules or rigid minds.

To sum up the various elements in the situation: Firstly, to part with the baby will generally involve a major emotional surgery for the mother. Secondly, sometimes we advocate policies which make that operation more acute than it need be. And we do not always support the mother adequately enough or for long enough when it is over. Thirdly, the emotional operation may not be serious for the baby if it is performed early enough. If it is performed at the wrong time or badly performed or half done, it may damage the child for life.

Lastly, if the operation is not performed, there may be in some circumstances a risk of prolonged social illness for both mother and child which may or may not prove more damaging for both than would the initial radical operation of separation. These social disabilities may result in financial problems, social attitudes, loneliness and problems of child rearing which make the struggle too great for even stable and responsible unmarried mothers, especially if they are young. Unmarried mothers themselves may not be able to appreciate the quality and degree of these social disabilities and the effects on them and their child beforehand. This places a great responsibility on those who advise her to be as widely informed as possible about the social effects of illegitimacy on the child and the mother at every stage; to make a realistic prognosis for this particular mother in the light of all the available information (including of course her own personality with its strengths and weaknesses) and to help her to make her decisions in the light of it; to help her, too, without praise or blame or coercion to express all her feeling about the baby, her parents, its father and the situation in which she finds herself. And to help and support her through all the subsequent stages. It is also essential to remember that for the sake of both mother and child thorough enquiries must be

combined with swift action at the point where speed is necessary, and that in any event there must be a minimum of moves—particularly for the baby. Administrative convenience and the attitude of Mr Micawber may both work havoc in this situation.

Since the stable family composed of two parents and several children seems to be the order of Nature as well as our social order, there can be no wholly satisfactory solution for the problem of illegitimacy except prevention. Once the illegitimate child is born he is by that fact 'at risk' in a way which the child born in wedlock is not. And the inescapable tragedy is that too often the best we can do for him is only a second best. Over and over again there is no such thing as a fully satisfactory answer for him and his mother. If they do come through, as mercifully many do, with their essential personality unimpaired, then it is because of that splendid human faculty for 'turning loss to glorious gain'. There are mothers, perhaps thousands of them, who triumph over all the handicaps that cluster down the years and give their out of wedlock children as good a life as other children have. All honour to them.

6

THE JUVENILE COURT AND
THE CHILD[1]

THIS article is an attempt to capture in an impressionistic fashion the role of the courts in the minds of those who stand on the other side of the magistrates' table. In order to do this it will be necessary to consider whether the attitude of enlightened magistrates administering justice in well-run courts is out of accord with the more primitive assumptions of young delinquents and their parents.[2] This will lead to a discussion of some of the many anomalies between judicial and treatment functions in relation to such children. This raises the further question of whether there is in society a necessary place for a final impartial decision-making authority which also represents society's disapproval of certain socially harmful actions, protects others, and indeed often the young offender himself, from the consequences of these actions, and exercises a useful function in appropriately raising, canalizing or assuaging guilt, hostility and anxiety. This will naturally lead on to a consideration of whether, because of the present gap in our social services, juvenile courts are in danger of being twisted into family and child welfare agencies. Finally, the possibility of constricting the juvenile courts' jurisdiction if such a service were developed will be considered. This article is based only upon one person's reflections in the light of experience.

From time to time common terms of speech will be employed in order to bring out significant assumptions which often underlie them. Thus the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency itself recently published a leaflet announcing a series of lectures in which it

[1] This paper appeared in the *British Journal of Delinquency*, Vol. VII, No. 3, January 1957, pp. 181-5.
[2] For the purpose of this part of the discussion children and young persons brought before the courts charged with an offence are primarily considered. For convenience sake, the term 'child' is used to include young persons. The terms 'court' and 'juvenile court' are used interchangeably. Sometimes what is said applies to courts as such, but this article is concerned only with juvenile courts.

was said that 'the children who come before the Juvenile Courts, like the children who come before the psychiatrist, must all be treated as separate personalities'.[1] This gets square into a basic difference, because although children 'come before' courts they do not 'come before' psychiatrists. They go, or rather they are taken, to the latter because it is hoped that treatment will help to rectify some behaviour problem which they present, and thus bring about improvement in themselves and their situation. This is certainly not the usual expectation of the children who come before the juvenile courts, nor that of their parents. They tend to think that courts are necessary for others though not for themselves, and they probably all regard them as an evil to be avoided if possible. It is only desperation which drives parents to bring their children who are beyond control before the court. And certainly only the rare delinquent would wish to take shelter under its dangerous wing.

The juvenile courts are, then, in a major respect different from schools for maladjusted children, child guidance clinics, and the like, in the eyes of those who come before them. Here at the outset is a barrier, a difference in thought worlds, between those who serve in a modern juvenile court and those who come before it. For between what we, the magistrates, strive to be and what delinquents, particularly the most regular ones, think we are there for, a great gulf is fixed. If we who sit in a present day court could see ourselves and the role we are cast to play through the eyes of the young offenders and their parents the picture would undoubtedly be a very different one from our own. For one thing, that picture would contain none of the light and shade cast by new knowledge about child development and the psychiatric aspects of juvenile delinquency and its effects on the current penal system. Thus the picture in their minds is far closer than the one in ours to the old concept of the cruel, punishing court, meting out harsh sentences to make the punishment fit the crime. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why some of the things we say so obviously seem odd and confusing to them. There is another major source of misunderstanding in that, though they often appear unreasonable to us, they have in fact a much greater belief in the power of rational argument—particularly if applied to others—than do the more sophisticated of us. The father who demands that we should give his boy 'a good talking to and then perhaps 'e'll be'ave 'imself better. 'E knows if 'e don't I'm 'aving 'im put away', is making a direct appeal to us to

[1] Leaflet entitled 'I.S.T.D. Lectures: Society and the Delinquent', Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency, Autumn 1955.

exercise the power of rational argument backed by the weight of authority. If to us, surveying father and his emotionally disturbed small son, this approach is clearly doomed to failure, the result is nonetheless confusing to both father and child. They both had the same assumptions about the role of the courts, and we have failed to do what in their view could be legitimately expected of us.

Every now and then, in what delinquents and their parents say to us, we get a glimpse of their idea of the court's function, of the role in which they cast us. Very often their attitudes are not at all merciful ones. They believe in punishment; that is to say, they believe that courts are there to find out things which, as applied to themselves, they had much better not find out, and then to punish. The whole idea of reform, of consciously desired change, as a possible and desirable goal which brings its own reward in greater well-being is something which is usually alien from their thought—except, of course, the reform of other people's behaviour in line with their own desires. What they do understand, as their fathers did, is making the punishment fit the crime, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. If you are unlucky you get fined or sent to the attendance centre; if you are very unlucky you get 'put away'; if you are lucky you get 'let off', that is discharged or put on probation. 'Being given another chance' does not mean that the form of treatment must be more adequately related to the needs of the situation, but to be allowed to go home in the hope that if ' 'is father gives 'im a good 'iding' all the real problems can be ignored.

Here, then, in the juvenile courts are two sets of people talking to each other from within two different worlds, the magistrates and probation officers on the one hand and the children and their parents on the other hand. It must be remembered, too, that in addition to differences in fundamental assumptions, this difficulty of communication also arises because we magistrates unfortunately use long and unfamiliar words from our more extensive vocabulary. This causes further confusion in a situation which is in any event fraught with tension, thus often giving to the court appearance the half unreal quality of a dream. Only occasionally does this come home to us, as when a boy, asked to say what he thought probation meant began painstakingly, 'cremation is . . .' These difficulties of communication, added to by the incomprehension caused by anxiety, merely enhance the deeper problem of the difference in the minds of the two parties about the role which the juvenile courts should fill.

Increasingly in the minds of enlightened authority that role is a benevolent, reformative one. We should seek, with the aid of psy-

chiatrists, psychologists and social workers, to understand the individual child's life history and what at this point in time made him commit a delinquent act. In the light of this understanding we should aim (for therapeutic reasons) either to ally or mobilize guilt, to lessen family stresses and to bring about beneficent changes in his environment. This is highly desirable in the view of many of us. But it is very different from what the young offender and his parents expect of courts; for their expectations have roots in the expectations of mankind ever since courts began. The role of courts throughout history has been to try cases, to condemn and to punish. The courts thus symbolize in the minds of many the punishing gods, the avenging fates, the 'bad' parents. These are the long centuries of tradition, still alive in our historical memories. Thus two worlds meet but do not mingle as we well-intentioned magistrates, full of modern knowledge, sit behind our table in the juvenile court. For before us stands the ancestral child to whom, as we say the well-worn and significant words, 'we find you guilty of this offence', we are the avenging gods. It may well be objected that, quite on the contrary, the trouble with many delinquent children is that they do not feel guilty at all. They are, that is to say, deficient in that super-ego formation which leads the normally developing child before even the age of criminal responsibility to seek good and eschew evil on the lines favoured by father and mother. Trouble may arise, as we know very well, when the parental concepts of 'good' and 'evil' differ markedly from those of society at large, more especially from those of the lawmakers. This is all very true, but it does not affect the essential argument. The concept laid down in the bloodstream of the avenging justice is there whether or not the offender feels appropriately guilty. This is not to suggest that the child who feels extremely guilty, who has the avenging justice gnawing away inside him, does not suffer very much more than the comparatively guilt-free child, who fears only the unpleasant things which external authority may do to him if he is caught.

Again and again in the remarks of parents and children it is apparent that their idea of justice is of punishment as the restoration of a disturbed balance, paying off a debt in appropriate coinage. This concept of reparation is in fact synonymous with that embodied in much legislation. ' 'E's 'ad 'is punishment, ain't 'e?' ' 'E didn't do no worse than the others; why should 'e be put away?' In their minds the court's decision ought to be related to the nature and gravity of the offence and not to the nature and gravity of the offender's behaviour difficulties. 'I've told 'im that if 'e does it again I'm 'aving 'im put away.' 'It's 'is

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first offence, you can't put 'im away for that.' For this same reason
there is no demur about the justice of some restitution from pocket
money or earnings for stolen goods or damage done. You didn't get
away with it, you broke the eleventh commandment, so now you've
got to pay up, and that's fair enough. This concept of a relation
between the offence and the gravity and nature of the sentence is
embodied in the law and shared by magistrates. It is rational so long as
children are brought before courts charged with specific offences and
are, upon being found guilty of these, subject to the appropriate
penalties which the law provides. The language used in the preceding
sentence brings out the confusion in the function of the juvenile courts
which are at the same time required to 'have regard to the welfare of
the child'.[1] The point for the purpose of the present discussion is that
the attitude of parents and their children is perfectly logical if courts
exist to find guilty and punish. Their picture is of the figure of Justice,
whose scales have been tipped in one direction and must be balanced
true again. Justice also holds a sword in her other hand, and this sword
may fall justly, but it falls nonetheless. There is justice in an eye for
an eye and a tooth for a tooth—paying back that money you pinched
out of Mrs Brown's gas meter. That's fair enough, but to be caught
stealing something worth a shilling or two from a shop and be put
away in an approved school? 'There's lots of others done worse than
'im, ain't there? Why pick on 'im?' Why? Because you are one of a
large family, your mother is apathetic and broken down in health,
your father is in and out of prison, and you are running wild in the
streets. But how shameful is the court's decision! Those things you
stole were worth almost nothing; it's only your second offence and
you're to be put away for up to three years. And in what frame of mind
will you, the boy who needs so much if you are not to perpetuate the
vicious circle in your generation, go to an approved school if we send
you there? Even if we do so, there is no certainty that this or any
other treatment will meet your needs. For, as Margery Fry once said,
'You can't give children love by Act of Parliament.'

Here, then, is the dilemma in relation to the judicial and treatment
functions of the juvenile courts. We who are connected with the courts
in various ways are so familiar with this dual role that perhaps its
oddities do not always strike us. How strange it would be, though, if
we translated into terms of medical treatment this concept of the
relation between the offence and its equivalent punishment. 'She had
to have a major operation and they only kept her in for two weeks;

[1] Children and Young Persons' Act, 1933, s. 44 (1).

while I had nothing but a little patch on the lungs and they kept me
there for months.' It would be odd indeed to have to pronounce at the
time of diagnosing almost any malady exactly how long the treatment
should last; while at the same time having only the haziest idea, based
largely upon conjecture by untrained people, what the malady was
and what the effect of the prescribed treatment was likely to be; and
finally, in spite of these substantial disadvantages in diagnosis and
prescription, being forced to come to a decision about appropriate
treatment, which it thereupon becomes obligatory upon the person
concerned to undergo—on pain of further and more drastic treatment
—because failure to respond will demonstrate, not that the treatment
was wrong, but that the person undergoing it is at fault. By and large,
the law is based upon the assumption that the lawbreaker could have
refrained from breaking it and is therefore guilty of an offence; while
medical treatment, on the other hand, is based upon an attempt to
understand causation and to prescribe appropriate treatment. This
latter assumption is the new wine which is proving so heady in the
juvenile courts.

At present, of course, we know comparatively little about the precise
diagnosis or effective treatment of those complex behaviour disorders
and environmental maladjustments which sometimes manifest them-
selves in delinquent behaviour. In addition, there are still too few
people who like difficult children and can tolerate their behaviour,
who are, moreover, trained to give treatment with systematic under-
standing of what they are doing and to study the results objectively.
This is especially true of the staffs of remand homes and approved
schools and hostels. But already what is actually known and can be
applied enlarges the gap between these crime-punishing and person-
treating aspects of the courts' function. This becomes particularly clear
if we consider the actual court appearance from the judicial and the
treatment angles. From the first, the judicial point of view, the offender
is being judged by his peers, fellow-citizens who have no axe to grind
and who have sworn to administer justice 'without fear or favour'.
He is in the court in any event because an offence, the commission of
an objectively verifiable specific illegal act, is alleged against him. He is
is innocent unless he is proved guilty, and he receives all the protection
of British justice. If, for example, it is likely that when he took the
bicycle he meant to put it back, then that is not stealing and the case
is over, no matter how clear it may be that he and his family are in
need of skilled help in relation to his personal and social problems.
Moreover, everything that is said about him, whether or not he is

found guilty, must be said in open court in his presence or that of his parent. Similarly, the gist of what is contained in written reports handed in after the case is proved must be read out so that he and his parents may have the chance to rebut anything with which they do not agree. In other words, the assumption is that stigma attaches to being found guilty and punishment will follow from it, therefore he must be given every safeguard to protect him from the court being able to concern itself with his affairs. Once again, this is entirely logical if the purpose of the courts is to judge and upon finding guilty to punish. But if it is also the duty of the juvenile courts to have regard to the welfare of the offender once the case has been found proved, then much of the procedure appears to be very strange from the point of view of understanding causation in order to prescribe treatment. Considered from this angle, we might regard a court sitting as a very odd diagnostic interview, conducted by lay people in most unsuitable circumstances and with a number of conditions laid down which effectively prevent them from getting all the material necessary in order to arrive at a reasonably accurate diagnosis. These lay people are in any event committed to telling the child and his parents, in the presence of the Press, the content of the material available to them, although to do so may sometimes in itself aggravate the malady.

Common sense seems to suggest, though, that there is something wrong with the extreme contrast presented above. If so, is this because our existing knowledge about causation and treatment, as well as the facilities available for applying what we know, are both too patchy at present to enable us to handle the delinquent and other anti-social behaviour of children by means of some form of psycho-social treatment service? Is the whole issue in any event solely a matter of trying to increase knowledge and transmute it into skill in practice? Will people in future centuries think us as barbarous in our treatment of delinquents as we think those who chained, beat and ridiculed the insane? Or does part of the dilemma go deeper than this, down into ideas about condemnation and restitution deeply engrained in us from our earliest experiences and therefore part of our cultural heritage? To ask this last question is to ask whether the courts do in fact perform a useful function in society which is necessarily different from, though it should be complementary to, the function of treatment agencies as these are usually understood.

It is unfortunately true that when we do not understand or know how to remedy we condemn, push out of the way and punish. This is especially true if we feel fear or guilt about particular kinds of people.

There but for the grace of God go I, in that insane or delinquent person. Although the law and morality are not synonymous with each other, there is yet a moral stigma attached to breaking some parts of the criminal code. The very words 'found guilty of an offence' attest to this; while to be found to be suffering from a disease (the expression is again significant) makes a man a subject for compassion rather than condemnation. But already we know that the root causes may not have been dissimilar in two people who ultimately appeared the one in a court and the other in a hospital. This implies a suggestion that we continue to find guilty, condemn and punish those who break whatever may be the law at any particular time and place partly because we ourselves are too ignorant and too full of righteous indignation to know what else to do. If so, how particularly barbarous this practice will one day appear in relation to children. Even now some other countries regard with surprise our low age of criminal responsibility. We ourselves have been increasingly questioning certain retributive forms of punishment during this century; for example, birching passed back into history some years ago, though some still mourn it. We begin, too, to question some of the assumptions about rational behaviour and freedom of choice on which much of our law is based.

These and other considerations pose the immensely difficult question of whether the logical end of this process is, so far at any rate as children are concerned, that the court should be swallowed up in the clinic, with a family and child welfare service as the first line of defence. The essential problem is whether such treatment services could adequately meet the total needs of the situation. It seems as though there is no escape from the exercise of authority, the ultimate sanction of coercion, used by society against the individual, whether it be to prevent him from roaming the country with smallpox, endangering the lives of himself and others because he is suffering from schizophrenia, trafficking in women and children, or stealing someone else's property. However much we may in time succeed in narrowing the area of its operation and improving the ways in which it operates, the need to use authority, in the last resort to make binding decisions as between one person and another and between the individual and society, will still remain. If it is the treatment agency which exercises this final authority, it is arguable that it would have too much power in its hands over against the individual citizen. Moreover, however skilled it might be, it would still be subject to human fallibility, and ever prone to forget that 'power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. One of the chief social roles of the courts is to be impartial

tribunals with no axe to grind and therefore able on occasion to protect the small individual against the administrative leviathan. It is presumably an aim of a democratic society to tolerate a wide range of behaviour, to leave people free to make their own decisions about their lives, to help them to do so more effectively if they desire this help, and only under certain defined conditions to impose help upon them or to make decisions on their behalf. This is not, of course, to deny that some socially inadequate and emotionally immature people may continue to function socially and do so more effectually with the help of benign authority. But it also means that in the interests of the liberty of the individual there must be an impartial tribunal to which the small individual and the public authority may or must come in the last resort for a binding decision to be taken about the individual's way of life.

These considerations seem far removed from these dark feelings of fear, guilt and anger with which generations of children and their parents have come before courts. Much of the core of the problem is, of course, centred on this whole issue of fear, guilt and aggression, for here is something far more complex, going far deeper into the strange, hidden layers of our nature than any consideration of the rational use of authority. Perhaps we may begin to see a glimmer of an answer to this if we approach it in a rather simple common sense way by saying that guilt, fear and aggression are there anyway, or at least that it is extremely awkward, even pathological, when any one of them is lacking. It is equally unfortunate when there is too much of them. The healthy child of good parents learns as his ego develops to use them constructively instead of being dominated by them. Similarly, there is probably a place in society for some specific means to regulate both their flow and their expression, to define acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, to help the individual to feel appropriately guilty or afraid in relation to the external world; and thus to set some barriers against aggression becoming soured into hostility. The courts may be thought of, then, in one aspect as the mouthpiece through which society repudiates certain actions and expresses disapproval at their having been committed. But at the same time that the court arouses and plays upon fear and guilt, it also sets limits and bounds to them. In being the parental figure which judges but does not condemn, it may often be wiser and more merciful than the real parent. This in itself may be an educational experience for both parents and children. This guilt-assuaging, limit-setting function of the courts is important in relation to mismanaged children. This does not apply, of course, to children with a compulsive need for punishment whose problems we may

unfortunately only aggravate. The courts may, however, play a constructive role in relation to those children whose parents swing violently from cajoling to cuffing, and who therefore have little framework of security to protect them from the dark terrors and raw emotions of childhood. The same considerations apply to some extent to the child of rigid or rejecting parents. For all of these it may be that the role of the courts is to represent authority as that which disowns certain actions but seeks to understand, believes in and wishes to help rather than condemn those who commit these acts.

Considered thus, a function of the courts is to be the focus for, to direct to itself and away from the actual parent-child relationship, some of the feelings of guilt, hostility and fear which are poisoning them. It is often only when the court has been the 'bad' parent that it can act like the 'good' parent. Related to this is the important function of seeking to arouse fear and guilt in some and to allay these in others. To arouse fear and guilt is a traditional purpose of courts which has been exercised far too unselectively. Their part in assuaging or deflecting guilt, fear and hostility is tacitly accepted so far as the juvenile courts are concerned, but perhaps not often discussed or deliberately used with this end clearly in view. Yet it often happens that if we lessen a parent's guilt about his own parental inadequacy and his fear of social condemnation, at the same time letting him see that we understand the real difficulties he is facing and think hopefully both of him and his delinquent child, we may reduce the tensions in both of them. Sometimes we may do this by means as simple as a matter of fact attitude, an unruffled courtesy, an implied suggestion that this situation is not uniquely terrible, that help is possible and that we intend to offer it. Where there is a real lack of guilt feelings we may perform the same function, but from the opposite end, so to speak. We limit guilt and fear, but we also limit acting out anti-social behaviour. In so far as we do this effectively, it is largely because to those to whom we speak we are the voice of society. We are authority reassuring that things are not so bad, so blameworthy, as they seemed. Or else we may be saying in effect that this is the boundary limit of behaviour which is permissible in the community, and that to go on crossing it will have to mean being taken out of the ordinary community for a time.

What this seems to come to, then, is that a major social function of the juvenile courts is to be the ultimate boundary-setting authority for both parents and children. This means to act in the same way in the use of discipline and authority as would the wise parent. To do so is to disown the use of condemnation and retributive punishment. It also

necessitates the use of guilt, fear and aggression so that they may be turned outwards realistically to real situations. In addition, it is essential to recognize and to work with the highly ambivalent feelings towards each other and the juvenile court of those who come before it; indeed, of those on both sides of the magistrates' table.

It may seem that this discussion is equally far removed from the dark avenging gods and from the day to day performance of us very ordinary magistrates. But this is really not so. The dark avenging gods are there in any event, deep in the recesses of the minds of all of us, and we have got to come to terms with them somehow. We have done so in the past by courts which condemned and imposed all manner of cruel punishments; we have made the fantasy in the mind come true in the external world. Now one of the things which we are trying to do very gropingly, perhaps intuitively, in our present-day juvenile courts is to turn the dread punishing gods into the wise and good parents, who desire to help and nurture the child rather than to injure him for wrongdoing. This may seem like a piece of special pleading, an attempt to preserve an outworn institution by some far-fetched analogies. It would certainly not be denied that other authority figures in the community—priests, doctors, teachers and others—already fulfil this function in some measure. It is also not contended that these powers should continue to be exercised by the juvenile courts for the same wide range of children as at present, or in the same judicial form. Later on in this article the case for a substantial constriction of the courts' jurisdiction and a change in its form will be argued.

There is another related side to this whole problem, in that we magistrates are most of us very ordinary people; very unlike avenging gods or even wise and loving parents. That is part of the difficulty because, without always realizing it, we do get a good deal of satisfaction out of playing one or other of these parts. We either want to teach the young hooligans a lesson they won't forget in a hurry, or else to assure them that we aren't so bad really and to bribe them to like us with holidays and presents from court funds. We long for the glow of satisfaction which comes from being the fairy godmother who waves her magic wand and restores the lost child to his loving parents. And yet a perverse fate so often casts us in the eyes of the child for the part of the wicked ogre snatching children away from parents who would otherwise love and cherish them. Sometimes, however, we get a glimmer of understanding that, if the child feels in that way about us, it may help him to defend himself from the wholly shattering realization that it was his own parents who rejected and got rid of him. If we

are the wicked ones who could not be resisted, then some fantasy of his own parents as good and loving may live on to nourish him emotionally. In these ways it may perhaps begin to dawn upon us little by little that these two roles of the avenging gods and the kind parents are not really two but one. We cannot disown the darker side of that role because in the nature of things we are cast to play it. The most we can do is to try to understand it and to use it in ways which may be helpful to the child. This touches on our own attitudes and prejudices. It involves us in facing and trying to understand the reasons for our dislike for any particular type of offender, of our sentimentality towards others, of indignation with children for their treatment of their parents or parents for their treatment of their children, of being riled by the cussedness of some adolescents, of feeling that the moral law will fail unless we vindicate it. To be of those who judge, who enforce the law, touches on some very weak spots in all of us, just as some kinds of offence get us on the raw; while conflicts between parents and children find none of us immune from the effect of our own conflicts. To know ourselves, then, to get some beams out of our own eyes is the first, though curiously disregarded, requisite for sitting in judgment on others. We have this need in common with psychiatrists, social workers and others who work with people, though our functions are different. If we cannot achieve this freedom from our own irrationality, it is very unsafe to trust us with the sword of Justice, for the chances are that we shall strike blindly—and Justice is not blindfolded in order that she may make hit or miss decisions. If it is necessary to have institutions like courts whose decisions are binding and enforceable against the will of those concerned, then the people who arrive at those decisions must be given every possible help to make the right ones. They should be trained to do this, and they must also be able to accept—and paradoxically to refuse to accept—that sometimes there is only a choice between two wrong decisions. At the same time there is never in the courts the possibility of refusing to make a decision at all, for every alternative including adjourning the case *sine die*, is in fact a decision which is also a diagnosis and a prognosis about the offender.

This amounts to saying that we who sit in the juvenile courts are authority personified; that authority there must be; and that it can itself in its nature be used constructively as well as destructively. If this is so, then there is not necessarily an inherent dichotomy between the understanding, kind, scientific treatment centre and the punitive, condemning legalistic court. But how about that other division, the gulf which separates us and our good intentions from what the defendants think

about us? There are two inter-related means to bridge this. One is the long slow change over the centuries in 'man's inhumanity to man'. In this we have made some progress; for example, by replacing the family blood feud by impartial justice administered by courts, and by abolishing the death penalty and imprisonment for children. These changes after all only came because the majority of people supported them. The other more direct approach is by modifying the attitude of young offenders and their families, thus narrowing the gap between their assumptions and ours. Sometimes a good deal can be done by the magistrates themselves. For example, the parent who, while the chairman is speaking to the child, winks at the magistrates from behind the child's back, or the boy or girl who impulsively shakes hands before leaving the court, have both begun to grasp the relation between authority, compassion and reform. The police are there some time before we appear on the scene, and they may or may not have helped children and their parents to understand the meaning of benign authority. Then, later, practically every child who comes before the juvenile courts has a contact, whether fleeting or spread over years, with a probation officer. It is the probation officers who, more than anyone else, must reconcile these two functions of treatment and authority—the clinic and the court. If we magistrates embody pure authority, that which judges and makes binding decisions, it is they who help the offender and his parents to come to terms with each other and with society, and to find greater freedom for growth and initiative within the bounds and limits which society imposes than by overstepping them. Indeed one of the basic functions of probation officers is, through the use of casework methods, to help children and their parents to shrink the avenging gods to their proper size, to see in the probation officer not only power to be feared and hated, but also the wise and good parent. That is to say, someone who accepts the necessity of discipline and authority, but who uses them with understanding for the individual and his feelings, in order to foster his growth rather than to secure rigidly enforced conformity.

Even though juvenile courts can be used in this way, some of the same objectives could be secured by other and better means. In particular, it is hard to justify our practice of bringing younger children before courts on criminal charges. Most of the problems of reconciling punishment for the commission of an offence with treatment of the offender spring from these criminal charges, which are in fact condemnation for having committed an unlawful act. The position is very much more straightforward in care or protection or beyond control

cases where the focus is upon the child in a total situation which is held to require society's intervention to protect and control him. From the start the emphasis in such cases is on the helping activities of this authoritative decision-making body rather than upon its guilt-finding and sentencing aspects, which accord so ill with our growing humanity towards children. Even if major changes were to come about in the courts' function, it would still not be desirable that they should expand into a rather peculiar family and child welfare agency. This latter could easily happen at the present day, *faute de mieux*. For example, probation officers now give that casework help in truancy cases which ought to be available much earlier through the local authority service. It is a common experience that many children come before the courts who need not have done so if there had been a family and child welfare service available to help them and their parents at an earlier stage. In the present very limited state of our knowledge about effective alleviation, treatment, prevention or cure of family disharmony or breakdown, it is all the more necessary that help should be available as soon as possible, when there is a greater chance of success. Yet again and again by the time a case reaches the juvenile court it is too late to do more than alleviate the damage which has occurred to the child. This is particularly true in beyond control and care or protection proceedings involving adolescents. Often these boys and girls and their parents would have been ready to accept help based upon understanding of their problems if they had known where to go for it. But they do not know where to go because there is nowhere to go.

The strange social myopia which prevented us until 1948 from setting up a public service for children deprived of a normal home life still prevents us from seeing the necessity for a family and child welfare service. Fortunately we are now beginning to concentrate our attention less on particular deficiencies from which people suffer and more on the person himself who has the deficiency or need which calls for social action. This in relation to children clearly involves a concern with them in their family and community setting, and with the provision of such services as may serve to strengthen family life. This must inevitably lead in due time, so it would seem, to the provision of a family and child welfare service.[1] Such a service would concern itself not only with 'problem' families, but with any family undergoing a period of stress, whether socially caused or due to internal strains, which called for skilled help of one kind or another to prevent or lessen

[1] This now exists in embryo under Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons' Act, 1963.

emotional and social damage, more especially to the children. This service should be in a position to discover or to have referred to it at an early stage children showing symptoms of breakdown. It should then be able to offer help on the basis of strengthening initiative and responsibility rather than imposing authoritarian solutions or 'warning' and 'admonishing' parents and children. It would seem reasonable to hope that if this were a universal local authority service with an adequate and well-qualified staff it would take care of many children who at present come before the juvenile courts. They would thus be saved the stigma and fear inherent in a court appearance. This naturally raises the question of whether the court's jurisdiction could then be substantially narrowed; for example, by raising the age of criminal responsibility to the school-leaving age. This would only be feasible in the present state of public opinion and of our knowledge about the causation and treatment of juvenile delinquency if the present care or protection provisions were broadened, so that children who had committed what would otherwise be delinquent acts could be brought before a juvenile court if it was in their interests or that of the neighbour-hood to do so. This would place what are at present criminal actions on very much the same footing as the present position in regard to 'sex delinquencies' committed by those under seventeen. It would also eliminate some of the procedure which confuses the child who pleads not guilty. Strong arguments have also been advanced from time to time for raising the age for care or protection proceedings to eighteen.

It would, of course, be essential to maintain freedom of access to the courts in order to prevent the family and child welfare and other services from acquiring too great power over people's lives. We are steadily, though slowly, gaining greater respect even for socially in-adequate people and for their right to be helped to make their own choices within certain wide limits, rather than having these imposed upon them by others. As this attitude grows it would be hoped that the family and child welfare and other services would work with rather than 'for' people and thus that many necessary decisions would be jointly reached. There would, however, be times when this did not happen. At that point either party should have easy access to the court.

If there were a general family and child welfare service which also of necessity concerned itself with matrimonial disharmony, there would be a very strong case for ending the present separation between the juvenile and domestic proceedings' courts. If these two were amalga-mated to form family courts we should then have a coherent system in which, if adequate supporting services were available, use could be

made of increasing knowledge in this whole complex field. The func-tion of the courts would be preserved as impartial tribunals making decisions which are binding; that is to say, exercising the ultimate sanction of compulsion with all the necessary safeguards that that necessitates. At the same time they would become more fitting instru-ments than they are at the present time for the expression of the community's best and most enlightened aspirations about the treatment of anti-social behaviour by children.

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THE DILEMMA OF THE
JUVENILE COURT[1]

ALTHOUGH there are substantial differences between the juvenile court systems of the United States and the United Kingdom, some of the inherent dilemmas of juvenile courts are in their nature universal. Progressively, as the aim shifts from punishment to reformation, problems of conflicting purposes stand out more sharply. Yet few would suggest that the dilemmas should be resolved by the abolition of juvenile courts. The alternative solution—the abolition of juvenile delinquency—is not more than a Utopian dream in view of the many crimes of violence by young people in the United States and the rapid increase in the juvenile delinquency figures in the United Kingdom.

Putting the matter at its simplest, it would seem that in complex societies there is bound to be a fluctuating proportion of young people who break the social codes of their society. When people violate those portions of the codes which have been crystallized into legislation, there must necessarily be legal sanctions. At the same time, there is an obligation on society to do what lies in its power to make it both easy and desirable to keep the rules and difficult and unpleasant to break them. This is in line with the broader processes by which people in any society are brought to observe recognized social obligations in that society. One might express this idea rather differently by saying that a great deal of human behaviour is moulded by the carrot in front of the donkey and the stick behind him. Progress no doubt consists in increasing the size of the carrot and decreasing the size of the stick. Some societies have relied upon a maximum of stick and a minimum of carrot. Some idealists have dreamed of all carrot and no stick. But, as

far as our present knowledge of human motivation goes, there seems to be no escape from a mixture of the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

This leads to one of the basic dilemmas of juvenile courts. The delinquent children who come before these courts have *ipso facto* been accused in one way or another of breaking the law, of putting themselves, so to say, in a stick situation. Yet this in itself gives rise to a dilemma which Bernard Shaw expressed vividly when he said, 'To punish a man you must injure him: to reform a man you must improve him: and men are not improved by injuries.' It is for this reason that all enlightened juvenile court systems tend to concentrate on the offender rather than on the offence. Indeed, it may well be that separate juvenile court systems exist only because we can tolerate a degree of humanity towards children which we are not yet sufficiently civilized to tolerate for adults. In this respect, as in others, the child is father of the man. Yet it is significant that, step by step, we increase the age range of those whom we take out of the adult court system, whether the result is separate youth courts or simply an increase in the upper age limit of those within the juvenile court jurisdiction. The essential difference—and the heart of what constitutes the dilemma—is that in the juvenile courts (however constituted) we try primarily to understand and treat persons, whereas in the adult courts the primary focus is upon punishment for offences.

It gives us a nice warm feeling to talk about treating persons rather than punishing offences; but do not let us delude ourselves about it. It is comparatively easy, straightforward, precise and measurable to punish offences—an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—whereas to understand and treat persons presupposes that we do in fact know how to diagnose and treat them and that we have the necessary facilities available. This is not a valid assumption. If it were, we might expect a decrease in juvenile delinquency, whereas our growing understanding of the complexities of social, family and personal factors leaves us as yet comparatively powerless in face of this interwoven causation.

Thus what progressive societies have in fact done is to embark on juvenile court programmes based on humane and enlightened motives, without knowing or having what it takes to produce the results which we feel should follow as a result of our humane intentions. In other words, our juvenile court systems are in one sense experimental laboratories in which we try to discover, empirically for the most part, the things we need to know in order to achieve the objectives of the system. They are, of course, Alice-in-Wonderland laboratories if we

are thinking in scientific terms, but in this they do not differ from many other respected social institutions.

The issues are further complicated by interwoven strands which yet bear no immediate causal relation to each other, for example, holding the balance true between the interests of the offender and the interests of society and facing the further complication introduced by moral condemnation of delinquent acts. The necessity not to condemn and not to condone is a familiar principle of social work, but it is a concept that requires a high degree of maturity to accept, and still more to practice. In any event, most people do in fact believe that a real difference exists in the moral sphere between committing murder and catching chicken pox.

In addition to these two factors—reconciling the interests of the offender with those of society without falling into moral condemnation on the one hand or moral anarchy on the other—there is the further problem that over the centuries we have evolved a highly sophisticated legal system, while our diagnostic and treatment systems are at a quite different, even rudimentary and fragmentary, stage of development. Moreover, those who serve in juvenile courts have varying degrees of competence to do so, coupled with widely differing views about the function of courts as social institutions and, therefore, of their responsibilities and aims in relation to individual offenders. This means that there tends to be no such thing as a juvenile court system in a given country but rather a broad legal framework within which each specific court develops its own individuality, its social climate, its ethos. The result is that we are abandoning the certainties of a rigid legal system without yet being able to substitute another kind of certainty based upon scientifically determined diagnosis and treatment. This creates not only a dilemma but also a real danger in view of the unique characteristics of courts as social institutions—the fact that society entrusts to them the ultimate sanction of compulsion.

It is this power to exercise compulsion, to make binding decisions, which essentially differentiates courts from all other institutions in a civilized society. The juvenile and family court system, as it has developed in western countries, even limits the power of parents to exercise coercion in relation to their own children—an interference by the State with the rights of the father as head of the family which is not yet a century old in either the United States or Britain. This power of the courts to make binding decisions is a tremendous one. Here is power, enforceable coercion, over people's lives: the power to order their lives, to make devastating mistakes sometimes, without their

having the freedom to accept or reject the proposed solution to a problem. Power is always in its very nature dangerous. Some controls on the arbitrary use of power exist when power is inherent in knowledge, when power is exercised within a philosophy of respect for the individual human person or in a legal system which ensures a fair hearing. Power should be, though frequently it is not, exercised with self-awareness and, to quote from the magistrate's oath in England, 'without fear or favour'. Moreover, it is important to have the cross-check of a right of appeal from one tribunal to a higher and similarly impartial authority. The offender over whom power is exercised must himself have power to call the court to order, to hold it accountable for its actions.

This power aspect of the courts—and therefore of the juvenile courts—is often forgotten or minimized or glossed over, or we comfort ourselves by thinking about our good intentions, as if they alone somehow guarantee the constructive use of power. This power situation is not fundamentally different whether young people are brought before a court for protection or whether they are charged with criminal offences. There are other reasons which may make this latter practice undesirable, but whatever name we give to things—and we have a touching belief that we can alter the nature of something by changing its name—the fact of this ultimate sanction of coercion remains. The power to send children away from their homes, to break up families, to impose various conditions if the delinquent or wayward or neglected youngster stays at home—these things remain inherent in any juvenile court system, no matter how or for what avowed reasons the State brings children before courts.

The real heart of this dilemma is that there is no escape from this exercise of power, the power vested in courts to make binding decisions between one person and another or between society and the individual. It is generally agreed to be necessary to take forcible steps to protect some children from some parents. It is also agreed to be necessary to restrain young people who break the rules of society. But, given the recognition of this need to coerce, the parallel necessity for safeguards immediately becomes apparent. Some of these safeguards are, in broad terms:

1. To minimize the confusion between law and morality by limiting the number of acts designated as offences to those that are widely recognized and clearly defined.

2. To seek so to order the life of the community that it is comparatively easy to keep the law and hard to break it—or to fail to get

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caught after having done so. This is, of course, a highly complex issue, related to cultural patterns as well as to social and economic conditions.

3. To provide a strong and deep first line of defence through services which will catch and help people on the way to becoming delinquent—what the Webbs used to call, in the context of social security, 'blocking the downward way'.

4. To endeavour to secure an incorruptible police and court system, so that accused persons are protected from wrongful arrest or destructive experiences after arrest and are, when charged, given a fair hearing within the rules of evidence by an impartial tribunal concerned to establish that they are properly before it as a precondition to deciding upon a course of action.

5. To build into the law the possibility of enlightened decisions by the courts and to make available to them the necessary range of supporting services for diagnosis and treatment.

These safeguards set the power of the courts and the ways in which they operate within a total social context. They also bring out an essential function of courts to which reference has already been made, i.e. holding the balance true between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. Ultimately there may be no antithesis between the two, but in any given situation the dilemma may be acute. For example, the child of eight or ten who feels deep down inside him that he is rejected by his parents, who shows his disturbance, his anxieties about his status in the home, by truanting from school, running away from home, and stealing, first of all perhaps from his parents and then from his neighbours, is, in fact, creating a social situation in which it may be almost inevitable to bring him before a court and remove him from his home, thus sometimes creating for him the final rejection.

It is only fairly recently that we have come to accept the need for mutual adjustment between the offender and society, rather than regarding the offender as an outcast from society to be banished by death, imprisonment or deportation. At the present day, in this stage of transition in our thought about the purposes of courts, we may be groping towards the concept of courts as a primary means of remedying a breakdown in the relations between the individual and society. To illustrate by way of analogy, the nineteenth-century Poor Law aimed to make the lot of the pauper worse than that of the poorest labourer in order to deter people from becoming paupers. Later we made three major discoveries about the assumptions on which this system was based—a system which seemed so logical to our not very distant ancestors: (1) that much poverty was socially caused and therefore the

individual was powerless to help himself out of it; (2) that human motivation was not quite so logical as it had seemed; and (3) that pauperism was grossly wasteful to society as well as harmful to the individual. The result was that we began to study and to find remedies for the social and economic causes of poverty; to provide preventive services—employment services, rehabilitation facilities and the like—for individuals; and without stigma to care for and try to help towards independence those who nonetheless fell destitute.

As far as attitude changes are concerned, we have gone some way towards adopting these same concepts in relation to young delinquents. Looked at from this angle, the court would be the personal rehabilitation service at the point of individual breakdown, probably not earlier. A variety of preventive services, youth activities, neighbourhood services, special educational provision, child guidance clinics, family casework services and the like should be available before or at the point of incipient breakdown into delinquency, waywardness or neglect. It is not desirable that the court should become a kind of family and child welfare agency, but rather that it should be used as a last-resort service. That is to say the court should come into the picture only when questions of restraint and compulsion necessarily arise. To use it otherwise is to confuse its proper function in society. The essential purpose of the court is to enforce social controls, to set limits to conduct which society regards as undesirable. This is different from the purpose of clinics or family agencies. In relation to young people and from the point of view of young people, the function of the court is thus not essentially different from parental and school discipline and limit-setting. The court is the voice of society saying to wayward parents and children that this is behaviour, as Winston Churchill has expressed it in another context, 'up with which we will not put'. The advance we have made is to recognize that we, society, have got to go beyond limit-setting in order to try to discover why individual young people do not respond to the social controls which most observe. This understanding is necessary in order to be able to help them positively rather than negatively to accept these controls—in other words, to make their position better rather than worse as a result of a court appearance. This is the heart of the matter. This should be the aim of the court in relation to each individual child who appears before it. It is the direction in which, hopefully, we are moving, though not a point at which we have arrived. Unfortunately, it would still be true of very many juvenile courts that they confuse limit-setting with moral condemnation and think that children are improved by injuries.

There are, of course, several other complexities associated with limit-setting. One of these is that unless the limitations are part of the offender's own cultural assumptions they will merely be, in his eyes, arbitrary rules to be observed only if he cannot get away with breaking them. This is true for everyone to some extent as far as some aspect of the law is concerned. Prohibition is the classic example of a law which was not accepted by large numbers of people, did not become part of the culture, and was finally rejected. The educative function of courts is, however, made infinitely more complicated if the rules to be enforced seem meaningless to young people from certain subcultural settings. For example, petty theft from large shops is not culturally condemned in certain groups. Bridging the gap between opposing views about socially acceptable behaviour is not, of course, something which courts can do alone. It is, however, very important that courts should be aware of the gaps that may exist in the local setting, and should make it clear to children and young people and to their parents that there are real differences in points of view but that, in spite of this, the law made by the majority must prevail, though with respect for offenders as persons.

The other problem attached to this limit-setting, social-control function of courts is more subtle and in some ways more difficult to deal with. It concerns the gap which separates the attitudes and purposes of an enlightened juvenile court from the function of courts as such in the minds of young offenders and their parents. We commonly talk about juvenile court reform as if the only issue were to reform court procedures and to improve the probation, detention, psychiatric and other services available to the courts. But we forget that there is probably no more unenlightened and reactionary group of people than those who come before the courts. We talk a good deal, rather self-righteously sometimes, about the punishing attitudes of courts fifty or a hundred years ago, the harsh sentences, and the emphasis on making the punishment fit the crime. However, these attitudes are not things of the past; they may flare into life at any time in any of us. Such attitudes, together with the fear, anger and hostility which underlie them, are often very much alive in the minds of those young people and parents who come before the courts. Thus one of the dilemmas of the modern juvenile court is that in proportion as it concentrates on understanding and treatment of persons rather than on punishment for offences, it widens the gap, raises the barriers of communication, between it and those who appear before it. Probably this is what lies at the root of some of the criticism about the softness and sentimentality of juvenile courts.

Generally, those who come before courts are some of the least law-abiding, the most frustrated and hostile, members of any community. Their attitudes are destructive, condemning and punishing, for others if not for themselves. Add to this what courts have symbolized through the long centuries in which their role has been to try offenders, to sentence and to punish. The courts thus take to themselves a cluster of inner fears, so that deep down in the mind they symbolize to many the bogy man who will 'get you if you don't watch out'—the 'bad' parents. The courts are, then, in one potent aspect, the embodiment of inner fears and fantasies turned into external reality. They symbolize that sudden pang of fear and guilt which many of us experience when the policeman turns and looks at us. For the delinquent who has actually been caught, the chase is ended, the hunted quarry is trapped and is now to be condemned and punished by injury. There is no escape now from the nameless fears, for soon they will be turned into reality. 'They', that great powerful 'they', have caught you, so now they can push you around, change your life as they want, and all you can do is to keep on saying nothing, or sham dead, or spit at them to show you can take it, or else just become immobilized by fear. In other words, all the personality defences come into play when the picture of courts in the mind is one of something hostile avenging and punishing.

Very often, of course, these fantasies originate also in experiences of hostile, inadequate or rejecting parents, or of life in neighbourhoods in which community life has either never formed or has disintegrated for economic or social reasons into group warfare or individual isolation. Some juvenile delinquency also appears to be primarily caused by the intolerable boredom and frustration for some young people of life in big cities.

Whatever the causes of delinquency, these are the fantasies which the police charge and the court appearance seem to bring to life. This is true not only for children but also for many parents. They also have punishing attitudes; they too feel anger and hostility to their children, to society, and more particularly to the law, the police and the courts. They express this in various ways; some reject the child in front of him in the court, say that they are through with him, and ask that he be taught a lesson. Others deny all responsibility for his actions; yet others contend that many other offenders have done far worse and got away with it, that it is grossly unfair to single out their boy, that he is really the embodiment of all virtue and will demonstrate this to everyone's satisfaction if, but only if, he is entirely let off.

This is obviously not a complete description of the attitudes of all

those who come before juvenile courts. To some the court experience is an exciting game of wits, others are really apathetic to the point of indifference, while others, those who are mainly 'delinquent by cir-cumstances', may have sufficient belief in the good will of authority to be able to co-operate with the court from the beginning. But, in general, the more treatment-centred the court, the greater the gulf between it and the assumptions of those who come before it, and therefore the greater the skill required to establish some basis for com-munication. Moreover, unless the court succeeds in establishing some real communication with the young people who come before it and with their parents, it will widen the gap between such families and society and so make the larger society, with its demands, controls and rewards, even more remote, incomprehensible and undesirable. It may also widen the gap between the generations, thus leaving young people still more at odds with the wider society which they must be helped to enter. So, because of its deep significance, a court appearance can be a damaging experience, no matter how benign the attitudes of those who adjudicate in it.

It may be that a court experience is more likely to be damaging if the court is concerned from the first with the total welfare of the child, what is termed in English law 'care or protection' proceedings, than if it is concerned with charges for specific offences. This is for many reasons a disturbing possibility. It seems to be related to that sense of justice which can be quite strong in young people and should be worked with rather than damaged. Young people can understand and see justice in being brought before a court because they have stolen and are now required to pay a fine or make some specific restitution. In fact, this type of court appearance can be a therapeutic experience if it is rightly handled. This is largely because the diffuse, nagging fears of being found out and punished are ended, the sense of guilt has been assuaged, the court appearance itself has been just and has helped to restore self-respect, the debt to society has been paid, and restitution has been made. This guilt-limiting, guilt-assuaging function of courts is an extremely important one, with a deep meaning particularly to youngers who feel guilty about their own hostility or who commit offences because of their lack of confidence in themselves. It is, of course, dangerous, unless well understood, with young people who have a compulsive need for punishment.

Considered from another angle, children attach guilt to actions rather than to situations; therefore they can understand restitution—making it up—in relation to an action. Moreover, at a simple and therefore

comprehensible level, making restitution has preserved the distinction between the person and the action, because it is primarily the action, not the person, that is disowned. It is also possible to give a fair hearing, a hearing that appears to those concerned to be fair, when the concern is with establishing whether a specific illegal act was or was not com-mited, rather than whether a general socially unacceptable situation exists.

Here, then, is a further dilemma of juvenile courts, in that if we set out to deal with persons and situations rather than with offences and restitution we are introducing complexities which people themselves do not grasp. In this, to them, confused situation, those who come before the courts may feel lost and powerless against authority, not understanding what it is all about, and thus may be threatened as persons just because the aim of the courts is to treat them as persons. This is indeed no argument for going backwards in our juvenile court practices; it is an argument for trying to understand, as clearly as we are able, what courts mean to delinquent youth, and for trying to establish some basis of common understanding which will be more constructive than the old common understanding of finding guilty and punishing.

Do not let us delude ourselves into thinking that this will be easy just because our attitudes are enlightened and our practice based on knowledge from psychiatry, sociology and cultural anthropology. Indeed, this knowledge may merely widen the gap between us and those who come before the courts. Persons who come before the courts usually still believe that conduct is rationally controlled or controllable, and that being either let off or punished is the way to settle all problems of human desire and motivation. The new kind of juvenile court thus has a much more difficult task for the very reason that we begin to conceive of its function in terms of improving people rather than punishing them. There is also the further dilemma that undoubtedly many people would prefer to be punished rather than improved. They want above all things the kind of punishment which will enable them to get it over and done with and to be free to go on with all their fundamental weaknesses unfaced.

This whole situation seems to point to a changing concept of the way the courts should actually function. It has been inherent in the nature of courts that those who come before them are expected to adapt themselves to the court and its requirements rather than that the court should seek to adapt itself to them. Yet the dilemmas which have been outlined so far can be resolved, if at all, only by considerable conscious

understanding by those who serve in the court of these dilemmas and possible ways of lessening them. This may seem to lead to an almost hopeless picture of this particular aspect of the eternal problem in socia philosophy of reconciling the rights of the individual with the claims of society. It is undoubtedly important to be constantly aware that a court appearance can, if it is sufficiently badly handled, damage a child permanently. But if, as has been argued earlier, courts are a necessary element in establishing social controls, then there is an obligation to try to understand how to operate them so that they provide a constructive experience of authority, authority as not only necessary but also as serving to promote rather than destroy well being.

This can be done, though not for every child who comes before the courts. Unfortunately, some are too badly damaged by the time they reach the court for other than palliative action to be possible in our present state of knowledge. But if the court itself can be conducted in such a way that persons can be treated rather than offences punished, then it can help in varying measure those children who are not damaged beyond repair. First of all—and this is fundamental—those who serve in the courts must sincerely desire the welfare of delinquent, wayward or neglected children, must realize how difficult it is to achieve this, and must be able and willing to use all the help that psychiatry, sociology, cultural anthropology and social work can give. They must be sufficiently self-aware and experienced to be fair and unbiased, and they must have a deep-seated sense of the orderly impartiality of the law. They must also have accepted the necessity of authority—power—and must be able to exercise it selectively, to exactly the extent required in a given situation, without trying either to evade it or to use it unnecessarily or to satisfy their own sense of self-importance.

This acceptance of authority is vital. Inevitably, people appear before courts because decisions must be made. There is no evading decision-making—the use of power. This is why it is essential that the binding decision should be based as far as possible on knowledge. This may include a social or diagnostic report by a probation officer, a report from a child welfare agency, and, if necessary, a psychiatric report. These may provide some of the psychosocial diagnostic and prognostic material on which the decision must be based. Some of these decisions themselves are very much like surgery, in that they are often major interventions in the complex psychological, and social web of relationships which constitutes human life. In actually making the decisions which comprise this social surgery on individual young people and their families, one is equally oppressed by power and powerlessness. Those

who serve in the court have power to change the setting of people's lives, to sever them from their roots, but in making these drastic decisions they grope in darkness and ignorance of much that needs to be known in order to make a sound social diagnosis and prognosis. Although having negative power, they have very little positive power to give damaged young people what they really need—to be wanted in a happy home, to find socially acceptable satisfactions in the neighbourhood, to get along well in school and work, and to have friends. Nevertheless, it is possible sometimes, primarily through good casework by probation officers, to set off a chain reaction that makes these desirable things begin to happen and thus reverses a destructive process.

A court appearance can cause irreparable damage, but damage is not inherent in the nature of the experience as such, provided it is handled rightly, with regard for the individuality and needs of the particular offender, and if there is sufficient time for the court to consider the needs of each individual person who appears before it. There are two parts to this court appearance, which in many instances should be kept separate as elements in making the whole experience a constructive one. The first part consists of the initial hearing of the case. At this point it is vital that young people should feel that all the circumstances are being fairly, unhurriedly and impartially heard. This is the point at which they or their parents are being held accountable to society for some alleged breach of the law. At the same time, the prosecution is equally accountable to prove that they are properly before the court. They should be able to feel that the court is impartial rather than that it is on the side of the police or other public authority. They should not only be allowed to say what they want to say but should also be helped to do so, in order that they may begin to experience understanding by the court, even though at the same time they are held to account for what has happened if the case is found proved.

Most of those who come before courts are anxious, confused, hostile and sometimes aggressive. Often they take in and remember almost nothing of what has been said, though they do remember the feeling tone. One of the most effective ways to decrease this anxiety, hostility and confusion is by the greatest possible orderliness, calm and courtesy in the manner in which the proceedings are conducted. The framework of the law itself helps in this, and often a wild and aggressive youngster may be calmed and made able to co-operate by the structured order of the proceedings and by being treated with great courtesy and consideration. The primary impression we want to get across in courts is that this kind of behaviour or type of action will not do, that the social

rules must be observed, but that we value this child, want to understand him and the difficulties that are standing in the way of his taking his rightful place in society. Having done this, we are prepared to help the child or family to keep the rules if they themselves will co-operate. The adjudication of the court is always directed to that end. It will actually mean very different things for different young people, according to their own personality, family setting and social milieu; and all these must be assessed to measure the extent of the individual's capacity to respond to help.

This courtesy and manifest desire to understand is also related to the necessity for the courts to strengthen rather than to destroy a sense of responsibility. This sense of responsibility is obviously weak in many young offenders, but if they are to be held accountable then the court should try to involve them in thinking about the kind of help that would make it possible for them to act more responsibly, and how they and their parents can contribute to this. This discussion about what each can do to help remedy the situation is the second stage in the total court experience. The court's part in this is not confined only to the magistrates role; probation officers, and indeed all the court officials, play a vital part in this aspect of the court's purpose. Unless all those who serve in a court operate as a team with different functions directed to the same end, a court cannot pursue any purpose consistently. To exercise power arbitrarily, or to refuse to use it, is in fact to become powerless to reform and to improve. It is only as we win some measure of co-operation, directed to positive ends, that we can make the offender's position better because he came to the court. This is one reason why a wise court will nearly always try to involve the offender and his parents in its decisions, so that they may know the reasons on which they are based, and if possible take part in making them and agree to them. Nonetheless, there are times when the court must deliberately act arbitrarily in order to draw onto itself hostilities which would otherwise further poison family and neighbourhood relationships. But with most grossly mishandled young people the most important thing may be to give them an experience of authority as steady, reliable and good intentioned, in contrast to the violent swings of discipline and laxity which they have often experienced and from which they have drawn the natural deduction that authority is something to be outwitted or evaded.

Another aspect of the court experience which can be used constructively is that a court appearance creates a crisis situation which cannot be slid over or ignored. Part of the skill required of the court

is to heighten or lower the crisis element in accordance with individual responses to it, so that it mobilizes the resources within the offender and his family, rather than immobilizing them, thus making it possible for them to look more realistically at their own part in the situation and what they could do with appropriate help to improve. This aspect of the court as an instrument of reform deserves very much more consideration than it has yet received.

These are some of the inherent dilemmas of a juvenile court system. Perhaps the essential dilemma could be summarized by saying that at present the juvenile courts have too much power and too little knowledge. This frequently results in moral judgments, because in general we make moral judgments or act destructively when we have insufficient knowledge to act constructively. Therefore, one of several ways through the dilemma—and it is a long, slow way—is through increased knowledge about the causation of juvenile delinquency and about better preventive and treatment measures. Yet even to say that is an oversimplification, because knowledge alone cannot give us the answers. We must also look to a social philosophy in which the young delinquent is respected and dealt with as an individual human being. Even this is not enough, unless there are in each generation those who not only have the knowledge and skill but are also prepared to give a substantial part of their professional lives to working with delinquent youth. These must be people who continue to believe in young delinquents in spite of frustration and failure. Changes in social attitudes about young delinquents and changes in the function of juvenile courts can reasonably be expected to follow as we develop and learn to use more effective preventive and treatment measures. To a large extent it is greater knowledge which makes us more tolerant. For example, we do not nowadays condemn or punish someone suffering from smallpox, but we do urgently require him to seek treatment. At the same time, we make vaccination easy and its evasion difficult. In the same way, in the course of time, we may become mature enough to hold the delinquent responsible without condemning him. We may still need to exercise compulsion. But in so doing we may grope less blindly than at present when it comes to treating him—and also to treating that society which, as Victor Hugo puts it, 'stands in the dock with every criminal'.

8

JUVENILE COURT REFORM

THE problems of juvenile court reform raise questions about the place and function of courts in society; the age of criminal responsibility; the alternative to courts, and the nature of the essential preventive and supporting services. Behind these lie the basic problem of reconciling the interests of the individual with the interests of society. It is some-times said that modern juvenile courts have swung too far from the protection of society and concern themselves with the welfare of the child at the expense of the community. Risks are indeed taken but they are usually calculated risks, as when a child guidance clinic's report emphasizes that a boy may commit further offences, in other words, will grow worse before he grows better, but will only really grow better in the place where his roots are.

In the juvenile courts we are also acutely aware that one of our aims is to try to insert some positive factors into very bleak situations so as to enable a boy or girl to cope rather better than they would have done if the court had not intervened. Sometimes we have to adjust our sights pretty low in these respects. Any particular boy's or girl's grudge against society may have bitten too deep for cure except by the blessed chance of a healing relationship. And both this boy and this girl as they stand before us may be clearly the parents of those who will be here ten or fifteen years hence, because these future parents have been so grossly deprived of nourishing human relationships that they will have almost nothing but their own poverty of personality with which to nurture their children.

It would probably be true to say that our current social philosophy rests upon the assumption that the interests of the individual and the interests of society are not in the long term opposed to each other, that the wellbeing of the individual should not be purchased at the expense of society; and that conversely the wellbeing of society is not something other than the wellbeing of its members. Our aim is not to force conformity on the individual but, as far as society can do this, to

enable him to grow as a person and to live in reasonable harmony with his fellow members of society. To descend from the general to the particular: the real dilemma is what to do about Tommy who is nicking things from Woolworth. The question is how to reconcile Tommy's wellbeing with the interests of a society which dictates that people shall not steal other people's property, and therefore shall be restrained, even punished, when they have done so. At present Tommy (if over 8)[1] is charged with an offence, comes before a criminal court, and (if the charge is proved) found guilty. At that point (though not before) the law says that the court is to have regard to his welfare.

Thus for the first part of a juvenile court hearing the emphasis is on crime and proof of crime; while for the second part it is upon causation and treatment. First the limelight falls on whether Tommy stole the goods from Woolworth and then on Tommy. This illustrates the in-herent dilemma of the whole situation. To Tommy and his parents, the focus is (quite naturally) on the offence. They are often puzzled by this shift after the finding of guilt, and they tend to think that the punish-ment should fit the crime, not the needs and circumstances of the offender. As the Ingleby Report succinctly expressed the dilemma: 'It is not easy to see how the two principles can be reconciled; criminal responsibility is focused on an allegation about some particular act isolated from the character and needs of the defendant, whereas welfare depends on a complex of personal, family and social considerations.'[2]

Moreover, the whole structure rests upon the assumption of capacity for rational choice. If Tommy is under 14 the common law assumes him to be *doli incapax* and therefore the onus of proving guilty intent is upon the prosecution. This is usually done by the simple expedient of the policeman who catches, cautions and then questions Tommy asking him if he knew it was wrong. If he says he did this is usually taken as proof of guilty intent. This implies a curious confusion between knowledge and intention—perhaps, too, it oversimplifies the manifold ramifications of the human heart. For example, take the boy who breaks into a lock-up shop and steals with a gang of other boys, basic-ally in order to prove to himself and them that he is a tough guy. He knows that to break and enter is wrong, i.e. illegal, but what is his intent, of which maybe he is only vaguely aware? Surely to prove his enterprise and manliness, though unfortunately in ways which are rightly frowned upon. But the appropriate action for a public authority

[1] The age of criminal responsibility is to be raised from 8 to 10 under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963.
[2] *Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons*, H.M.S.O. 1960, p. 24. See also p. 26.

is to understand his motives better than he does, and to help him to redirect them, rather than to belittle him and make him feel even more inadequate because he failed to get away with it. It is depressing to reflect how frequently juvenile courts find themselves forced to damp down energy and initiative rather than being able to direct young people to legitimate outlets for still more energy and initiative.

Obviously there have to be controls for boys and girls, through their parents, school and, ultimately, the courts. Most of the rules embodied in the law are also culturally accepted and therefore observed through cultural sanctions, like not murdering the boss after a row at work.

The problem is whether in the juvenile courts we are lumping together two things which do not of necessity belong together, whether when boys and girls break the law or need protection, we could effectively deal with many of them outside criminal courts and the criminal law, at any rate up to school leaving age. Perhaps, as Margery Fry once said, we are 'using a big sledge hammer to crack a lot of poor little nuts'.[1]

Clearly society must set limits, be able to say 'you can't do that there 'ere' and enforce the prohibition. Our society also assumes responsibility to make up for the inadequacies of those parents who dramatically fail to give their children sufficient social training and social standards. Sometimes this failure is due to the poor standards of delinquent neighbourhoods as well as to defective family relationships, which in effect means emotional, intellectual and social impoverishment. But if society steps in not primarily to discover causation, to protect and make provision, but rather to find guilty or punish, it is piling deprivation upon deprivation. 'From him that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath.'

The good and sensible parent in bringing up his children imposes rules, sets limits, teaches good manners, uses authority to help the child to come to terms with his raw emotions, his sudden impulses, his fears, angers and jealousies. But he does this by setting the maturity and calm control of the adult over against the impetuous immaturity of the child, so that the latter may find security and the capacity to achieve greater integrity within himself and relations with rather than alienation from his environment. In other words, neither the good parent nor the good teacher becomes involved in the primitive, punishing anger and aggression of the child. They do not use fear, destructive

[1] During discussions with the author in the course of preparing evidence in 1957 for the Ingleby Committee.

anger and physical attack as weapons against the child. In the same way, it seems that society is struggling to free itself in its handling of delinquent children from punishment and condemnation, in order to give them understanding and help in learning to observe necessary social controls. If this is so, is it, perhaps an anachronism to continue to bring children before criminal courts, with much of the panoply of criminal procedure? In any event, the real test of a juvenile court normally comes not in relation to whether something happened but why it happened, and what is to be done to motivate Tommy not to do it again. In other words, as the excellent discussion on sentencing in the Report of the Streatfeild Committee puts it, '... where the court is seeking to reform, to deter or to protect, it is seeking to control future events rather than simply to pass judgment on past events'.[1]

These doubts are increased when it is remembered that the vast majority of children before the court on criminal charges plead guilty and are guilty. Moreover, when it comes to decisions about treatment, any sensible magistrate will discuss this with the child and his parents in such a way that in most cases the decision is reached with the agreement of all concerned. This is indeed almost essential if the treatment is to succeed because no one can be forced to co-operate against his will. Obviously some children who have to be taken from their homes do not go willingly, but some go feeling the decision is just and others not because of an arbitrary court decision but with the knowledge that their parents want to be rid of them.

This means that there is only a small number of cases in which any dispute arises either about the facts of the case or about treatment decisions. If this is so, why need children come before criminal courts whose essential function is to adjudicate on facts which are in dispute and to impose penalties which are not acceptable? Is this nut so hard that only a sledge hammer can crack it?

Those of us who are habitually mixed up with crime in one way or another as the servants of the court may be blind to what court appearances really mean to the young offender and his parents. We are so used to courts and their ways and we ourselves feel so benign that we fail to take in the effect on the defendant and his family. There is plenty of fear attached to going to hospital but there at least the expectation is that they will try to diagnose and cure, and anyway you can stop going or discharge yourself; whereas the expectation of offenders who come to courts is that they will be punished. This means

[1] *Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Business of the Criminal Courts* H.M.S.O. 1961, p. 79.

that many young offenders and their parents come to the court in a state of excessive apprehension, guilt, anxiety sometimes masked as false bravado. The result is that often they do not take in clearly what is happening, nor remember it afterwards. We who serve in courts and build up our myth of the non-punitive atmosphere of the juvenile court may thus be blind to its real meaning to those who come to it, as doctors and nurses were until a few years ago with their myth of the happy small children in hospital. To say this is not to deny the value, indeed the necessity, for some degree of anxiety and guilt about having broken the law. But apprehension, confusion and failure to take in what is happening are as destructive of co-operation as the indifferent, couldn't care less attitude of a few delinquents. In any event the very concept of courts in people's minds means that they do not see them as places where Tommy's difficulties and naughtiness will be understood, though not condoned, and where they and he will be helped to get over it and behave better.

Maybe we could solve these and other dilemmas, without creating new ones, by inviting parents whose children are stealing, wandering, truanting or otherwise being a social nuisance to come before a children's advisory board or family welfare board—the name does not matter.[1] These boards should be independent of either the local authority or the court. The board itself might be composed of two or three people with understanding of wayward children, indeed much the same people as the best of the present juvenile court magistrates. They should interview in an ordinary room with no one present but the child, his parents, a social worker and the secretary to the board. They would have before them a statement as to why the child appeared to need protection and help. The precipitating factor might be that Tommy had been caught stealing from Woolworth. If he agreed that this was so, the discussion could quickly proceed to his total behaviour, including his school record, and how his parents think he might best be helped to overcome this anti-social behaviour. The children's department might know the family already; it might be agreed that Tommy and his parents could benefit from casework or other help; or that a psychiatric report should be obtained and discussed before the best line of action seemed clear. When an agreed decision about further action was reached this should be put in writing and signed by the chairman, the parents and (over a certain age) by the child himself.

Initially the board should invite the attendance of parents and

[1] This proposal was made in various forms in evidence to the Ingleby Committee but rejected by them. See the Ingleby Report, op. cit., pp. 27-30

children. It would be hoped that these boards, though maintaining their complete independence, would work closely with the local schools, clinics and children's services; that they would have a good deal of moral authority and would become known as helpful places. For those who did not attend there would either have to be compulsion to do so or else they should be given the alternative of coming before the board or being summoned to appear before a juvenile and family court, where the case would be heard with all the legal safeguards.

The complaints brought to the board would probably be worded in much the same way as the present care, protection or control provisions.[1] Alternatively it might be desirable simply to specify that the child is said to be falling into bad behaviour, for example, stealing, or behaving badly at school, or truanting from school or staying out late.

If either the child or his parents denied the truth of the allegations, then it should only be possible for the case to be determined by a court. It might be possible in such cases for the board to hear both sides, as examining justices do now, and then decide whether there was a case to answer. This might dispose straight away of some cases which really did not need the intervention of either the board or the court. This would also help to create the feeling that the board was not necessarily there to pry and snoop into people's affairs in order to 'welfare' them.

Similarly, if there was disagreement about treatment the case should go to a court for decision. This would almost always centre round the child being sent away from home, or failing to make restitution for damage done or articles stolen. Of course parents habitually send their children to boarding schools or the dentist or hospital without the latter's consent. Indeed children continuously have what feels to them like compulsion exercised over them by adults at home and at school. It is probable therefore that only the parents' refusal of consent would lead to the case being taken to a court. In the eyes of most parents who come before the juvenile courts to send children away from home is tantamount to failure to provide for them. Old memories of the Poor Law still linger. And indeed, except for the small number of children who go through the local education authority or privately to boarding schools, it is only the family disturbances which result in children being received into care, or delinquencies that lead to approved school orders, which take children away from their own neighbourhoods and families. Thus naturally enough it seems the final calamity or last resort to the child and his parents.

Failure to co-operate in the agreed treatment would bring the child

[1] Section 2, Children and Young Persons' Act, 1963.

back before the board. Only non-co-operation which was manifestly detrimental to the child should result in the case going to court.

The term 'child' has been loosely used so far. The board should probably deal with all cases up to school leaving age (which might include educationally subnormal children up to sixteen) though with the provisos already mentioned. Between ten[1] and the school leaving age the board should have power to remit to the court if after hearing the circumstances the case seemed to them to require the intervention of a court. Cases of murder should obviously, as at present, go direct to a juvenile court for commital to a higher court. Other serious charges, for example, causing actual bodily harm, would no doubt go direct to the juvenile court. Between the school leaving age and seventeen the police and the local authority should have discretion as to whether they brought a care, protection or control case to the board or to the juvenile court, for example, a sex delinquent girl, or a boy constantly in and out of work. Even with these modifications there are many who think that all court hearings for those under school leaving age should be through some modified form of care, protection or control proceedings. That is to say, the focus throughout should be on person-in-situation, not on person-alleged-to-have-committed-illegal-act. The arguments against this are varied, cogent and frequently expressed. Every aspect of the dilemma was discussed during the Committee stage of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, and may be read in Hansard. They all add up to feelings of unease that neither the juvenile court system nor the non-judicial board system combined with it would present the ideal solution. This is due in the last resort to the very nature of a situation in which, because of our scant knowledge about the causation and treatment of delinquent and wayward behaviour, we trust analysis of complex human behaviour and decisions about treatment to lay people. It is also due to our conflicting views about judicial proceedings in relation to children, and about the nature of responsibility for anti-social conduct.

We still tend to think of the juvenile courts as primarily judicial bodies rather than as an element in a total range of services for the protection of children designed to strengthen family responsibility and to enforce social controls. Because the courts should be and be seen to be independent, this does not mean that they should not be part of our whole provision to safeguard young people. The question of an effective juvenile court service is linked with attitudes towards the purpose and function of these courts and with the provision of an

[1] The age of criminal responsibility under the Children and Young Persons' Act, 1963.

adequate first line of defence service. We cannot decide the structure and limits of the last resort service until we are clear about the structure, resources and functions of the first resort service. This should be the effective local authority family welfare service which has been made possible by the Children and Young Persons Act, 1963. This service when it is built up should have adequate resources of its own (including specialist and research facilities) and should operate in close liaison with health visitors, maternity and child welfare centres, schools, the youth employment service, general practitioners and voluntary organizations. It might sometimes provide a school welfare service as agent for the education authority, by attaching some of its social workers to work with teachers, thus catching behaviour problems in the 5–15 age group at an early stage. It will be able to help any family in stress or disharmony which is referred or comes to it and which is willing to receive its help; as well as being responsible for children received into care. Its services would be available to the board, though it is very important that the board should be—and appear to be—quite independent of the local authority. The social workers serving the board should be either family service social workers of the children's department, or probation officers of the juvenile and family court.

The family service of the children's department will be successful in so far as it effectively helps people in trouble and not because it imposes advice or authoritarian solutions upon them. The authority exercising function should reside in the moral authority of the board, based upon the assumption that beyond a certain point there is an obligation to explain anti-social behaviour, and to accept help and take responsibility for putting it right. Finally, there would be the courts with their essential function of adjudication in disputed cases and exercising the ultimate sanction of compulsion. The courts would continue their present valuable function of creating a crisis, of bringing offenders and others up against unpleasant facts and accountability for bad behaviour. This crisis situation can have great value in strengthening family bonds and responsibility. The board would also create a crisis but without the stigma of a court appearance. This would mean—as it does already—society and not the parent having the final say about the welfare of the child in relation to the good of the community.

Much, indeed most, of this is highly controversial. This is so because to some extent we in this generation are caught between two worlds, one not yet dead, the other waiting to be born. We have enough knowledge about the causes of anti-social behaviour in children to know that many of our assumptions and some of our methods are outmoded. Our

attitude also is clearly changing from condemnation to understanding, a desire to help rather than to punish. But knowledge about contributory causation, however limited, is still far ahead of ability to remedy what is amiss. We may understand the deprivations, boredom and frustration which have led á particular child into delinquency but we do not know how to remedy these conditions, particularly in big cities, nor how to reverse defective relationships, which may have persisted over several generations. And we still confuse necessary social controls and limits with teaching the young thugs a lesson. Nonetheless in the last few years we have been led once more to look at the juvenile courts afresh, to question basic assumptions and to seek for new solutions. It is only as we are willing to entertain new ideas, to examine and try them out, that we have any hope of finding better solutions.

PART II

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
SOCIAL WORK

1

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL WORK[1]

AT the present day social workers, and therefore schools of social work, are being demanded in ever expanding numbers in nearly every country. There are many people in government ministries, in local authorities and in voluntary organizations in different parts of the world who now wish to employ social workers in their agencies. The reasons for this are varied, but sometimes these reasons include the more or less unconscious hope that social workers might be able to perform miracles—at least the right kind of miracles. There is always one profession or another on which we rest this hope for miraculous change in other people, and at the present time social work is one of these. Not that we by any means always love or approve those whom we hope will work miracles on our behalf. For one thing, it is only the kind of miracle that will make life easier for us that we really want, and we always have a lurking suspicion that the miracle might misfire; for another thing, the miracle worker sometimes demands changes in us as well as in those other people who need to be altered in order that they may become less delinquent or promiscuous or resistant to change or poor and ignorant. And finally, we don't really believe in miracles anyway, so why imagine that social workers might be able to perform them? And in that event they can continue to do all the routine difficult jobs and we need not give them the working conditions or the new framework of policies that just might make miracles possible.

Let us be quite clear that social workers are no more able than any other profession to wave a magic wand and perform miracles. Let us be equally clear that we live in an age of miracles. Some of those miracles have been wrought as a result of patient, single-minded and disciplined scientific study, and the application of scientific findings. Other miracles have come from the awakening of the common people, an awakening to the fact that each is a unique individual human being

[1] A paper read at the First Greek National Conference on Social Work, Athens, September 1961.

with unrealized potentialities, and that new possibilities for freedom of choice about their way of life, whether individual or collective, open up in front of them as never before in the whole course of human history.

Social work has been described as an embodiment of the social conscience: it might equally well be called an element in man's awakening. This claim is however valid only if it is true to the facts of experience rather than being a claim which social workers make for themselves. Social workers are everywhere typically employed at those spots where the social conscience is most tender. That is to say, at those points where we feel guilt or an ambivalent humanitarianism or sometimes true compassion about what are called social failures. And it is surely significant that by this term we used to mean people who had failed, whereas now we also mean people whom society has failed to help.

Our natural tendency in relation to those who are different, perhaps handicapped, or with a different skin colour, or mentally ill, or who behave in ways which violate the accepted standards of our society is to push them away from us, to isolate them, to cut them off from us, lest they threaten our virtue and our pride of place. But these are some of the people with whom social work is most deeply involved. Indeed the social worker is concerned with all those whom, for whatever reason, the community has isolated. As a manifestation of this concern, the social worker listens to what they have to say without preaching, even though they will often be bitter or hostile or full of self-pity; and seeks always to build bridges between them and the rest of the community. These bridges must carry a two-way traffic, so that the isolated may become as much like other people as possible, since the fact that they are human beings is much more relevant than that they are blind or unemployed or black or delinquent or old or out of their minds or unmarried mothers or children without homes. This is one way in which social work embodies the social conscience.

Another way is by seeking to help a wide range of more or less ordinary people, people who live in those communities where life is grossly constricted, where there is almost no freedom of choice, where existence is a hard, debilitating struggle with little joy to it, and where families see no hope that their own efforts might enrich life in their familiar surroundings for them and for their children. This social paralysis in some places, or social anaemia in others, may affect old custom-bound rural communities sunk in poverty, or slum areas of modern cities. It may take the forms either of resistance to change, often

coupled with realistic impossibility of change without outside help; or of disintegrated 'fringe' or central areas of growing cities; as well as of slum communities which are highly integrated around patterns of behaviour characterized as delinquent and immoral by the community at large. In none of these circumstances is it effective to aim primarily at changing individuals. The client is really the social milieu, and changes must be effected in those economic and social pressures which largely account for the people's behaviour. This, however, will be insufficient, and may produce some undesired side effects, unless at the same time social workers and others are able to help people in these constricted communities to release their own inner reserves of energy and initiative, so that they begin to feel that they need not, and do not want, to go on accepting things as they are, but that given outside help, they can begin to change their circumstances for the better.

This work with deprived and encapsulated communities is of course another aspect of breaking down isolation. Indeed, to help back into the ordinary life of society those who for any reason are cut off from it is one of the basic functions of social work: this is because social work is, in its essence, concerned with the interaction between man and his social relationships. One might put all this in a nutshell by saying that social work belongs wherever it has the ability to contribute to man's awakening. This you may feel, and rightly feel, is a very beautiful thought, you may even remember the old saying about bringing the sleeping Christ in man to life. But remember too how dangerous that is. We are playing with fire whenever we help people to become more alive, so do not let us have any illusions of soft comfort, for this venture brings not peace but a sword.

Perhaps this is one reason why those who want more social workers do not altogether love social work. For social workers are very close to those who suffer most in our society, either through their own inadequacies or because of those of others or through circumstances some of which it lies in our power to change if we would. Social workers will not be much use unless they are able to get alongside such people, to listen to what they want to say, to understand with imagination what life is like for them, how frustrated they are in meeting the universal human needs for food, clothing, shelter, love, recognition, a sense of personal worth, a secure place in the community, and for a belief in some coherent and beneficent purpose to life. If social workers have intimate knowledge of these things, then they will not serve society well as part of the social conscience if they keep silence; if they fail to tell the rest of us about our obligations in relation to gruelling

poverty, unemployment, ill health, the relations between public assist-
ance rates and a minimum standard of living, child neglect, bad housing,
lack of educational opportunities, bad employment practices, prostitu-
tion, illegitimacy, delinquency, family breakdown and so forth.

It is implied in all that has been said so far that social workers must
have an ingrained respect for people, not because they are respectable,
many of social work's most regular clients certainly will not be, but
because they are human beings. It is ultimately in this, in the dignity
and worth of man, that the philosophy of social work rests. Sometimes
this may be solely a humanist ethic; sometimes it is based upon a
religious belief in man as the child of God. The philosophy of social
work is rooted deep in Greek-Judeo-Christian soil. In its respect for the
individual man and his right of choice in relation to his destiny, it can
have no partnership with any system which seeks to mould people to a
rigid conformity, or which is indifferent where they are poor or
oppressed, or where they live in material or spiritual squalor.

As Rudyard Kipling once expressed it:

'. . . Gardens are not made
By crying "oh how beautiful!"—and sitting in the shade.'

Knowing how to make gardens is both an art and a science, an applied
art and science which require much hard work to achieve results. Social
work is no different. In the last resort it is an art, and an art which can
only be practised by those who are able to make relationships with
other people that are creative in so far as they have the effect of helping
them to become more free and more able to meet the realities of life in
society. But there is much else to it too. The sciences of psychology and
sociology are advancing very rapidly and we now have knowledge
about human personality and about man in his social relationships
which can be applied in the practice of social work. This means that we
know a good deal more than we did, even a decade or two ago, about the
kind of family relationships, the social pressures and the economic
factors which lead to breakdown or inadequacy in the individual's
capacity to function as a mature and self-reliant member of the com-
munity. We know, too, that a great deal of failure and misery is not
due to original sin or to rational choice but to personal and social
deprivation, or irrational motivation, or lop-sided development which
gives the individual little chance for freedom or growth, even though
everything possible must be done to foster the little he has. The knowl-
edge from the social sciences the social worker must have—more and
more of it as it becomes available—and must learn to use it and to add

to it with increasing precision and effectiveness. At present our tools
and our skill in their use are clumsy and blunt but steadily they are
growing more delicate and our use of them more sure. There is indeed
a duty laid on all of us in every country to help forward this growth of
knowledge and skill. But behind it all lies the will, the desire to under-
stand rather than to judge and condemn, the humility to let the scales
fall from our eyes so that we may be able to see with insight, to watch
the processes of life and change at work, to listen, and to hear both words
and silence; the imagination to see the connection between one process
and another; and the creativity to use our own intervention in human
affairs in ways that promote people's capacity to see their life circum-
stances more clearly, to gain more control of their fate, and to become
more able to respond to human relations.

If this intangible world of relationships and values is primary in the
sense of being the most important, do not let us forget the part played
by material needs. Social workers know all too well that it is part of
their function to be able to provide for material needs, and it is also
part of their function not to remain silent when they know that these
needs are not being met, or being inadequately met, or met in ways
which injure people's self-respect. It is the duty of all of us, as citizens
of our own countries and citizens of the world, to know when our
fellow citizens are living in gross poverty from unemployment or
under-employment or because public assistance rates are too low or
too restricted, or when they suffer from lack of food or housing or
medical care. And knowing these things, to strive for economic and
social policies which will progressively remedy that which is remediable
in the current state of knowledge. In short, social workers and all the
rest of us must think it impossible not to try to set right that which is
intolerable.

Social workers are part of social agencies, and these agencies them-
selves are an embodiment of social philosophy and social policy. It is
therefore the duty of the policy makers to frame social agency policies
so that these contribute to better human relations and better human
functioning. This necessarily also includes providing for social workers
the kind of working conditions, the salaries, the recognition which will
facilitate rather than impede the fulfilment of their onerous task. If it
true that meeting material needs is part of social work, then it must
also be remembered that social workers themselves have material needs,
as well as need for respect and recognition.

The schools of social work and professional associations of social
workers are in their separate but related ways the two main power

houses of social work. The schools of social work select candidates and educate them in professional knowledge, skill and responsibilities. The professional association supports them in extending and deepening the knowledge and skill, in formulating and enforcing a professional code of ethics, and in clarifying the nature of the task and the commitment to serve the under-privileged. Social workers have indeed in entering this profession not merely taken up a career but have entered a calling. They are committed thereby to certain fundamental human values, to a deep-rooted belief in human beings, compassion for the suffering, faulty living and ignorance in which we all share, and determined effort to work for their relief.

This raises the question of how the philosophy and ethics of social work can and should be taught to students. For the purpose of this discussion the distinction between philosophy and ethics relates to the kind of broad philosophical standpoint already discussed and the translation of the philosophy into day to day ethical standards of practice; for example, the principle of confidentiality, or the individual's right under most circumstances to make his own decisions. Some may object that a philosophy of human values is primarily a matter of attitude and feeling rather than an intellectual exercise, and therefore it must be caught rather than taught. It is certainly true that students will have little regard for a high-sounding philosophy if this receives only lip-service and is denied in practice in the attitudes of social workers and the policies of social agencies. Nonetheless there is a sound intellectual basis to the social philosophy on which social work rests. In their day to day practice social workers are faced with some of the most difficult problems of individual versus social responsibility; of liberty and social justice; of the point at which necessary social control becomes pressure to conform; of private morals and public consequences, and the like. Indeed they continually face problems with which great thinkers have wrestled from the days of Plato and Aristotle onwards.

The three questions which confront all schools of social work everywhere in this respect are what shall be taught; how it should be taught; and how they can find teachers who are able to inspire students with a sense of the greatness of this philosophic discussion as one of the highest achievements of man. The question of what shall be taught resolves itself into looking at the practice and social milieu of social work and distilling from this some of the major philosophical issues which face social workers. These must then be set in the context of social philosophy, the study of the purpose of society; and a distinction made between science and philosophy so that knowledge may be used

in the service of formulated goals. In fact it always will be used in relation to goals in the sense that the achievement of some aim, whether explicit or implicit, is inherent in all that we do. Because social workers, like doctors, deal with people who are often powerless in their distress it is especially important that they should be clear about the aims which underlie what they are doing.

Some of the teaching may thus be given in courses specifically on social philosophy and social policy, while the ethics of social work professional practice will inevitably enter into the methods courses. But it is equally important that all through the curriculum, including the field work, students should be helped to think about 'why' as well as 'what' and 'how'. Professional schools of all kinds aim to bring about in students, as they take upon them the mantle of a profession, the necessary changes from lay to professional attitudes. Attitudes as such are a psychological phenomenon; they are related to values, which are in one aspect a sociological phenomenon, but from another angle embody ethical codes and a philosophy about social ends or the social good. These responsible attitudes a school of social work must seek to develop in its students, not in any rigid way or learned parrot fashion, but as an inspiration and a light to their feet.

In short, some part of the philosophy and the ethics of day to day practice can be taught to new members of the profession in their student days, a good deal will be made explicit or be implicit throughout the whole of the theoretical and practical studies; but in the end of the day it will only cease to be solely an intellectual exercise and become incorporated in the students themselves as a result of the influence of members of the profession, from their attitudes towards people, including students, and their practice in their work.

Father Biestek has put in a nutshell all that needs to be said about the social worker in the following sentence: 'with the motive of love, he strives for skill in the use of the wisdom of sciences to help his brother in need'.[1] In proportion as social workers become able to fulfil this ideal they will serve society.

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[1] Felix Biestek, *The Casework Relationship*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, p. 137.

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THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CHANGE
TO SOCIAL WORK[1]

WE are perhaps almost too used to clichés about rapid social change to be really aware of its wider significance. Thus we all tend to think of change primarily in terms of events which actually affect our own personal lives or the lives of those whom we serve professionally as social workers. Perhaps certain cultural and personal attitudes also enter into this. If we belong to the New World (howsoever defined) we tend to think of change as synonymous with progress. If we belong to the Old World (again howsoever defined) we tend to look back with nostalgia and to be acutely aware of the good things that seem to be lost in a technological, mobile, anonymous society. And to whichever world we belong we are amazed alike by man's increasing control over his world and by his inability to control himself in the use of his power. Indeed the power and the powerlessness of man alike confounds us. And the more the individual is lost in the mass populations of great cities the more we talk about respect for the individual, and the right to self-determination.

The truth is that we of this generation, no matter where we live, have been hurtled in our lifetime through a degree of social change more rapid and universal than that which has ever hit any previous generation of mankind. And it is important for us to realize that, if the human race survives its new-found ability to destroy itself, this change will prove to be but an earlier stage of a phenomenon which will increase in geometrical ratio as the years go by. This technological revolution started with the substitution of power-driven machinery for human and animal muscle, though latterly we have gone far beyond what muscle, even though multiplied to the Nth degree, could do. And now we are beginning on technological extensions of the human brain.

[1] A paper read at the Eleventh International Congress of Schools of Social Work, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, August 1962. Published in *International Social Work*, April 1963.

In a sense, too, complex bureaucratic organizations are also an extension in time and space of the capacity of the individual human being to know, to remember and to act: while the team work and equipment in laboratories and the like are similar extensions of individual capacity. To put it in a nutshell, we have enormously enlarged, through devices external to man, the power of his muscle and brain. But the problem is that we have found no such means to enlarge his heart and his emotions. Thus we inhabit a world in which we are giants in our muscles and brains but correspondingly pygmies in our affections and emotions. And, since the motivation to do and to be comes from our emotions, this widening imbalance in man's development means that the benefits conferred by his mind may be negatived by the infantile and uncivilized responses of his emotions. This is of vital importance to social workers because in essence social work is concerned with emotions—with human relationships.

In the very nature of things it does not seem as though the emotions could be refined and enlarged by any device external to man, since they are essentially those elements within him which, in interaction with his social milieu, create—or destroy—a living interrelation between him and others, and with the universe as he perceives it. Thus it is only on the growth of man from within himself that we can rest our hope for his control over himself and the external world. Yet on this count if we contrast cave man or the primitive savage with our current civilization we may well see more reason for hope than for despair. On this scale of contrast, in spite of all our setbacks, we have gained, however fitfully, a capacity for disinterested love for those who stand in close relation to us, sometimes even for those who do not, and compassion for the suffering of strangers. We have also achieved, though again uncertainly, that margin from the pressure to survive, whether physically or emotionally, which frees us to use our hearts and minds in the pursuit of goodness, truth and beauty. This growth of man from within himself is, however, slow, spasmodic and continually threatened. Moreover it does not necessarily proceed parallel with advances in physical well-being or cultural complexity. Indeed in some conditions in modern cities persons at the top and bottom of the economic scale may be living lives of emotional squalor and savagery in which they suffer from a degree of emotional malnutrition sufficiently severe to produce emasculation and deformity in their development as human beings.

Of course we have long been aware of these failures in human relationships, of the battle of love and the urge to master circumstances on the one hand against hate and inertia on the other. But we have tended to

see the issues almost wholly in terms of moral imperatives, what people 'ought' and 'ought not' to do, rather than in terms of trying to understand the basic human needs and desires so that we may begin to gain conscious control of the conditions which nurture emotional growth. By emotional growth is meant those conditions which make it possible for the individual to pass through the stages of self-love without being arrested in his development, and thus unable to reach the further stage of love of others and the world around him. This also includes capacity to use the aggressive drives constructively rather than in destructive hostility. It implies, too, that a sense of self-identity is achieved, that the conscious and unconscious elements in the person are fused together, and that he functions and continues to grow and respond to change in fruitful relationship with others and with his own *milieu intérieur*. John Bowlby once said that 'the central problem of our age is the regulation of ambivalence'. This puts the problem in a form too brief for its meaning to be immediately assimilated. But, given that ambivalence is part of human nature, it is self-evident that at present collectively and individually we topple over far too easily onto the infantile, self-love, hostile aggression side of the fence. There is indeed no cause more urgent in the world today than that man should discover how to stabilize his internal and social milieux on the love-achievement axis rather than on the hate-hostility axis. And thus to rescue himself from retreat into rigidity, apathy and frustration, especially when he is confronted by change, by new demands and new challenges.

It is arguable that in the small, isolated communities of the past and with the small-scale destructive devices of the past we could, so to speak, afford a degree of hate and hostility which at the present day has become dangerously immature and archaic. Today, indeed, disinterested love is the only emotional response which is capable of matching our giant intellectual and technological powers. It does not usually matter very much if when we are children we pick up whatever comes handy and hit out when we are frightened or in a temper. But if collectively as adults we have the same uninhibited reactions and if the implements to our hands are modern weapons of war, then the consequences enter another dimension. At present we are in a most perilous state, personally, socially and internationally, in which neither our emotional development nor our knowledge of how to regulate it match up to the demands made upon us by the conditions which we ourselves have created. Intellectually we are adults but far too many of us continue to behave to a large extent like petulant, self-centred children who don't know what they want and won't be happy till they get it.

The two time lags we face, then, when time is not on our side, are the comparatively slow growth of knowledge in the behavioural and social sciences, and the further time lag in applying this knowledge. For example, we have a fairly adequate blueprint of the physical, emotional, social and intellectual development and needs of children from nought to five. But we have almost no idea how to prevent the sins previously visited on the parents being in turn visited by them on their children. We know too something about the conditions which make it hard for parents to nurture their children and which create social disaffection, disintegration and pathology. But we know almost nothing about how to reverse these trends. Moreover we have no answers to that key question which is concerned with the relations between time, space and human well-being. The old stable communities of the past matured over the centuries, while the personal relationships of the past endured for a lifetime. In conditions of rapid social change how quickly can a deliberately planned community begin to cohere? In a mobile society for how short a time can face-to-face relationships last without their severance leading to psychic injury or shallow capacity for forming or sustaining relationships? If we learn to get along with everyone we meet on the basis of being perpetually a good fellow in a group and thinking as the group thinks, shall we have much capacity for independent thought, shall we ever tolerate knowing ourselves in solitude, or sink deep roots in the lives of meaningful others?

We know that strong and rich relationships within the family, between husband and wife and parents and children, are necessary if the seed of growth with which the human child comes into the world is to find soil in which it can take root and flourish so that a human personality comes to fruition. But on a time-scale this is a matter of years, many more years than the members of a mobile society may spend in any given surroundings. Can the family group find within itself the depth and richness of the oak tree while its social relationships grow and die like mustard and cress? At present we know that some families if transplanted close in upon themselves, fearful and suspicious of their neighbours; while others seem to fragment, individual members consorting with their work or age groups, and home becoming a place to eat and sleep. In the rapid social change produced by technology we are drastically altering the time spans of social relationships without knowing the consequences or how to control them, nor indeed knowing very much at all about the life history of these relations between man and his human and physical environment.

From another angle, the whole picture drawn up till now is a very

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much over-simplified one which does not allow for the good things which have come to us through scientific advance in the last century. It is a picture which, for example, does not allow for the fall in the western world of infant mortality, of crippling disease and mass un-employment; nor for the rising expectation of life, the increasing elimination of gross poverty and squalor, the expansion of education, of decent housing and leisure; and the opening up for ordinary people of horizons unknown to them before. Nor does this picture include the relations between the biological, physical functioning of man and his psychological and social growth, nor their long-term effects on each other. For example, in some countries the dramatic fall in the infant mortality rate means that more of the delicate boy babies are being kept alive, so the balance of the sexes in adulthood is being redressed, with the consequence that in future there will be few unmarried women. But what then will become of the careers that have hitherto relied upon large numbers of single women: teaching, social work, nursing, office work and the like? How, too, shall we reconcile the desire of the educated professional woman for a career as well as a family, the needs of her children and her work for her reliable presence in two places at the same time? These amplifications of the too simplified pictures are all matters of enormous significance, but they do not alter the central thesis, which is that if scientific advance and the application of scientific knowledge become lopsided, then the consequences in social imbalance and inadequate emotional response are bound to be far more startling in the present than in the past centuries of slow change.

There is another aspect of social change which is also of great significance to social workers. This relates to the new opportunities for individual choice, which rest in the last resort on the expansion of technology, and which in varying degrees everywhere are either breaking down the old closed societies in favour of the modern open society or else widening the gulf between them, a gulf which may leave the inhabitants of isolated villages several centuries behind a modern city in the same country. Freedom of choice is of course conditioned by economic circumstances and by rigid or more free cultural values and expectations. In all but the most modern societies this freedom is greater for men than for women, and more varied in urban than in rural communities. Freedom of choice clearly implies freedom to choose between two or more alternative courses of action. This may cause stress when the individual must decide for himself between conflicting claims rather than have the decision made for him by invariable custom or economic necessity. In any event, the exercise of choice, whether

about material goods or the demands of human relationships, calls for a capacity to weigh up issues, to regulate desire, guilt and ambivalence, to face current reality, to make responsible decisions and to abide by their consequences. In other words, here again the demand of social change is for a higher degree of maturity than was needed for reasonable survival in simpler social conditions.

It is significant that professional social work from its early begin-nings in the last century has probably been more concerned with freedom of choice than with anything else. At first social workers spurred on the poor to make pre-selected right choices on a puritan scale of values. But at the same time they campaigned for the alleviation of the ruthless poverty, sickness and illiteracy which permitted almost no freedom of choice to the poor. Later, social workers transferred their interest to the intra-psychic and inter-personal conflicts which also imposed rigid limitations on the individual's freedom to choose. Finally, social workers have now begun to make use of knowledge about that network of social roles, values, strivings, stratification, mobility and communication which often seem to offer too much or too little freedom of choice to the individual. Perhaps indeed it would not seem too far-fetched to see the positive role of social work in the community as a regulator of change and choice, always seeking to precipitate change where rigidities hinder the exercise of responsible choice; but at the same time trying to temper the speed or impact of change where this would create for individuals or communities a pres-sure of choice beyond their capacity to master and deal with it. In essence this means supporting people through the processes of choice, so that as traditional patterns of living or codes of behaviour dissolve, individuals and groups may be reinforced in developing new qualities of judgment, new capacities for adapting to change without destructive stress, guilt or loss of personal integrity. One of the biggest tasks ahead of social work is to discover how to help people to make these transitions smoothly, so that in transition they may yet preserve con-tinuity between the old and the new in the rapidly changing social scene of modern life.

This task we might well call preventive social health and relate it to mental health and public health programmes. But social work is also closely involved with social pathology. And this too is intimately related to social change. Some social deviants are of course pioneers and innovators of social change, but others are the unfortunate, maybe even inevitable, by-products alike of social cohesion and of a fluid, non-conforming, restless society. In relation to them, social work

seems to have evolved a bridge function, a bridge on which the social worker crosses from society to them and tries to bring them back into ordinary social relationships. It is arguable that this is a dangerous and unnatural activity, for society may be preserving its own health when it cuts off, isolates, ostracizes its deviants, in the same way that the body by inflammation seals off poisons that would otherwise invade it. Yet a mark of the degree of civilization attained by any society is the extent to which it can tolerate and absorb difference without resorting to or provoking hostile aggression.

The most rampant differences of our current societies are of course racial and political but they are also mental and intellectual. The first two are self-evident. But why the last two? Because the mentally dis-ordered are becoming more apparent, perhaps even increasing in num-ber, while the mentally sub-normal or dull find it harder to keep up in the increasing momentum of modern urban society with its demand for more, and more varied, technical skills. These are indeed but two striking examples of that large group of the inadequate, the handicapped, the old, the estranged generations, the petty delinquents, the multi-problem families, the unemployable who stick up like sore thumbs in successful go-getting societies. Yet our civilization by its attitude to them will in ethical terms manifest its health by what it does about their ills. Here indeed there are welcome signs that the natural tendency to ostracize and condemn is at times giving way to a more civilized determination to bridge the chasm, a chasm which separates not only nations and races but also the non-conformers and those who fall behind in any given society. Social work can proudly claim that here too it was deeply involved long before professional social work began to develop. In practice social workers know more than the members of any other professions about the diversities of social failure. If the contribution which social work has made to the scientific study of social pathology has been lamentably inadequate, this is more for lack of resources than for lack of first-hand knowledge.

The conclusion, then, of this brief survey is that there are two kinds of social change, both of which intimately involve social workers and those who are concerned with the education of social workers. The first comprises technological and other developments, which may or may not contribute to man's wellbeing, and which may produce long or short term side effects which can fundamentally affect his ways of behaving. The second kind of social change is the growth of man from within himself, the growth of his capacity to love, to tolerate, to show compassion, to create and to dream rather than to destroy or

to sink into materialism. If this growth of man is to match the external growth and change it must expand so that it embraces not only his own family, his neighbours and his work-mates but also other races, and members of other creeds and other nations. It is the task of social work to learn to contribute better to both forms of social change so as to promote over the long centuries the growth of man to the stature that could be his.

3

SOME HIGHLIGHTS OF
SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION[1]

THERE are three terms: 'health', 'education' and 'social welfare', which nowadays make all embracing claims that each has the answer to society's ills. We used to be told in the more optimistic days of the nineteenth and early twentieth century that if people were better educated they would produce something akin to Utopia. Then, when this manifestly failed to happen, we were told, and still are told, that our ills are fundamentally due to physical or mental ill health. And, of course, we have been and continue to be told that the cure for many ills is to improve the economic production of a given nation. But now, fairly recently, new knowledge from sociology, psychology and psychiatry have turned the limelight onto the fundamental importance of personal and social relationships. We understand better now the enormous significance of a people's culture and all the little sub-cultures of a neighbourhood, a village, even a street or a family group as it affects social welfare or, to coin a word which does not exist, 'illfare'. Whether a people fares well or ill is quite considerably affected by their culture. We also know a great deal more in more precise terms nowadays about the life or death importance of personal relationships to the individual. Without these relationships in rich and stable measure a man wilts and in the last resort may cease to be a man, because, as Aristotle said, 'Man is a social animal'.

Here then are three terms: 'health', 'education' and 'social welfare', each claiming dominion; each claiming that any two of the others are only aspects of itself. It is not very surprising that health and education should make these large and all-embracing claims. They are old, well established and recognized as enormously powerful, whereas 'social welfare' meaning the application of knowledge from the social sciences and the sciences of human behaviour, is quite new, though it has its roots long back in the past of political theory, philosophy and religion.

[1] A lecture delivered on May 29, 1959, Athens.

Let us for a moment forget the power struggles of these words and look at man himself, that infinitely complex being, the creature of his physical environment and his society yet transcending these and dreaming dreams which change the course of history. Today we divide our knowledge of ourselves into many different sciences: biology, physiology, bio-chemistry and endocrinology, psychology, psychiatry and sociology, to name only some of these sciences; but meantime, man himself is greater than all these, he functions as one, as a biological, physical, social and psychological being, as something that is greater than the sum of all its parts. The result is, that as knowledge about ourselves grows, we necessarily invent or evolve more and more professions to apply the knowledge with the particular skill that application of that kind of knowledge requires. Looked at in this way, the fight between health, education and social welfare for all-inclusive dominion is understandable enough, because each must have in it a big element of the other two if it is to do its own job properly. This is because man is an indivisible whole, which cannot be chopped up into nice, neat little compartments for the sake of any particular aspect of knowledge or any particular professional activity. And yet we have the paradox that, as knowledge and skill grow, each profession becomes more specialized both in depth of knowledge and in the range and specific nature of the skill it requires. This has three results. Firstly, that the core, the essence, of each profession is quite unlike that of the others, for example the function of a doctor is different from the function of a teacher. But at the same time, there are no hard and fast boundaries between any of these professions; indeed they must necessarily enter each other's territory to dovetail. If they fail to do this, they will be failing, with all the disastrous results with which we are familiar, to recognize the indivisible nature of man. Thus all three—health, education and social welfare—must each use knowledge and skill that belong to the others in order to succeed in their own spheres. The doctor who does not give his patients health education will be a poor doctor, and so will the teacher who does not try to educate his pupils in the principles of health. And both will fail if they neglect the social aspect, if they make no systematic study of personal relationships and the social milieu as these affect the exercise of their own particular function.

These three terms: health, education, social welfare, are not synonymous with doctors, teachers and social workers. Nowadays in every country but the most backward there is a complicated and rapidly expanding provision of public and voluntary services designed to provide health, education and whatever we mean by that rather fluid

term social welfare. These services are mediated to people through an organizational and administrative structure providing financial and other material help, and professional and technical services. And all these are continuously nourished, deepened and expanded by world-wide scientific research; by the application of science in economic and social development; and by changing political attitudes in different countries towards the well-being of peoples. Doctors, teachers and social workers are the core of the activities that make health, education and social welfare possible, but they are not the totality of any of these services. The service could not function without them, but equally without the service they would be rather like the crab without his shell, because their activities and resources would be limited to what an isolated individual could accomplish. Thus in some ways the organizational setting is itself a part of the function. This applies with especial force to social workers. We have become fairly clear, particularly in the last hundred years, about the content and place in society of the professions of medicine and teaching. But social work is something very much newer, and is still extremely fluid. Although we see rather more clearly now what this activity is in its essence, we have still got to learn a great deal more about how to achieve its purposes.

A United Nations expert group drawn from all over the world to try to clarify the nature of social service and the function of social workers decided that: 'Social work is concerned with all those social relationships which may result in problems of mutual adjustment between the individual and his environment. The contribution of social workers in this broad field of social relationships is made through their experience of working with people, their knowledge of community resources and their ability to mobilize these resources to deal with the needs of the community.'[1] This means, then, that the aim of social work is to promote an improvement of environmental and social conditions, concurrently with helping people, whether individuals, groups or communities, to perceive more accurately the cause of any particular social or personal problem which affects them, and to help them to become more able to mobilize their own strengths and to master these, assisted by the resources of the community. This of course includes giving people the material help and other services of which they stand in need. Part of the skill of social work consists in doing this in such a way that people's own inner resources, their independence, their responsible mastery of their affairs, are strengthened rather than weakened or

[1] *Report of the Expert Group on the Development of National Social Service Programmes,* United Nations, New York, 1959, p. 17.

destroyed by the ways in which we make goods and services or other help available to them. An Eastern proverb puts this in a nutshell: 'Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Teach him to fish, and he will eat for the rest of his days.' And that is the essence of social work.

The actual social work function is exercised at points where people may experience incipient or actual breakdown owing to undue personal or social stress. For example social workers in the medical or delinquency services help people to deal more effectively with the often immobilizing anxiety, stress, anger or hostility from which they suffer, so that they are better able to use medical care if they are in hospital, or to find their place again in society if they are delinquent. Another main area of activity of social work is to cultivate change for the better in the mutual adjustment between the individual, the family group and the social and physical milieu in which they find themselves.

The aim of social work in any given circumstances, according to the possibilities of the situation, would be: firstly, remedial, where actual cure is for one reason or another impossible; for example the personal and social rehabilitation of a badly disabled person, in co-operation with medical and vocational services. Secondly, curative; for example with an adolescent delinquent to intervene at a point where the most effective changes can be brought about in him, his family and his circumstances in order to prevent him from growing up to be a confirmed law-breaker. And thirdly, preventive action, that is using knowledge gained from work in 'breakdown' situations to contribute to the formulation of social policies and social planning which correctly analyses the genesis of social problems and takes social action to prevent breakdown. It is often said against social workers that they are concerned with breakdowns, social failures and social misfits, but that in many countries we cannot afford this individual service. We are now more clear that the knowledge of causation gained from working with social breakdown situations gives social workers the ability to contribute to policies designed to forestal or mitigate some of the causes of breakdown. In medicine the treatment of the individual patient is the means of gaining further knowledge which enters later into preventive medicine, and this also applies in social work. The fourth element in the social work function is the constructive aspect, helping to bring about a positive improvement in the situation of an individual, group or community, as in community development.

These aims of social work are not achieved by chance. They require a good deal of knowledge, skill and method, as well as continuous

research. The essential working method of social work, whether with individuals, groups or communities is the skilled use of a social healing or therapeutic relationship. We all know from our own experience of life that because man is a social animal, human relationships are perhaps the most potent influence in his life, whether for good or ill. We also know in much more precise terms nowadays from modern psychology and physiology that anxiety, fear and hostility, if they rise beyond a certain point, result in stress and frustration which, like the water boiling in a kettle, must find an outlet and can have all kinds of damaging consequences. We know now some things which perhaps the ancient Greeks knew about the relations between these emotions and physical illness. We also know a good deal more about their damaging effects in the whole sphere of personal relationships and the individual's life achievement. We also begin to know something else which is an old truth being made systematic, which is that hope and confidence, using those two terms in a fairly precise sense, are necessary to the human being because hope and confidence propel him to master his difficulties, to work for improvement in his circumstances, and add grace to his personal relationships. We also know that fear and anger on the one hand, or hope and confidence on the other, are infectious like smallpox or measles. But, although we know this, we have not gone very far in learning how to apply this knowledge or how to prevent the destructive contagion of fear and hostility, or how to further the constructive contagion of hope and confidence.

We are thus just beginning to see that the real purpose, the real social function of social workers, is to use the contagious nature of human relationships in such ways as to lower the negative stresses which result from too much anxiety, fear and hostility and to increase the positive drives of realistic hope and confidence through the experience of actual achievement. To say this is not to deny the importance of material goods and services. Sometimes the material goods and services may be the essential means of bringing about the desired results. For example, we do not give hope and confidence to a mother whose children are starving simply by talking to her, we give her hope and confidence by making it possible for her to feed her children. Similarly we do not give villagers sunk in poverty hope and confidence by telling them what they ought to do, but by helping them to decide how they want to improve the conditions of their life and making it more possible for them to do so. But the material goods are the means, and the increase of hope and confidence, of capacity for achievement are the ends or goal. It is very important to remember this, and to test

what we do not by the material goods we confer but by the effect on people of our activities.

In conditions of rapid social change—and conditions of rapid social change will very soon become universal—the aim of social work will include taking all appropriate steps to further the tensile, flexible strength of the family, that is to say to help to decrease rigidities in the family structure and to reinforce those things which strengthen its cohesiveness, the essential strength of the family group as the basic social unit. Social work is centred in the family because of its vital importance for the individual. This is one of the reasons why modern social work seeks whenever possible to help individuals to achieve a better adjustment within their own family group or in a new one, as in foster home care or adoption, rather than taking them right out of a family group into the necessarily artificial conditions of institutional care. We have often thought that we knew better than nature about nurture, but usually we discover that we do not.

The three social work methods of work with individuals (to which unfortunately we give the ugly name of casework), with groups, and communities, all have the same essential purpose, they all call upon the same body of knowledge and to a large extent upon the same skill. And certainly all are essential in a total social service programme. Nowadays the emphasis in education for social work is on skill in working with people, whether as individuals, groups or communities, rather than upon learning details of practice in specific social agencies.

This brief analysis of the function of social workers throws some light on their training. This must be divided, as for all professions, into knowledge, skill and attitudes. So far as knowledge is concerned there is now very considerable agreement internationally that the 'social' in social work obviously means an understanding of man in society. This includes the biological inheritance of man and his physical and psychological growth and needs as a member of a family group, and of his society. This of course necessarily includes an understanding of the basic human needs. Some human needs are with us all our lives, for example the need for food for the body and love for the spirit. Other needs are characteristics of particular stages of the life cycle from birth and infancy through adulthood to ageing and death. Social workers need to know a good deal about the things which go wrong with the development and functioning of people, because these are the points at which they are especially involved—with anxieties and stresses, with anger and frustration, with the effects of separation, of great loss or

acute deprivation. They must also recognize the symptoms of the neuroses and psychoses.

Interwoven with the study of man is the equally important study of society, which includes the social structure of society, its social institutions, and how people live. The whole concept of culture is equally important because it deals with the ways in which and the extent to which individual behaviour, values and attitudes are culturally conditioned; and how different peoples handle the great life experiences of courtship, marriage, birth, growing up, work, old age, death. Every society has its particular ways of dealing with these and other life experiences. The social worker must also know a good deal about the formal structure of government, about the legal basis of social welfare provision, and more especially about public and voluntary provision to meet social need, and how social workers are expected to operate these services. Running all through this study there is need to take account of the effect of the physical environment and the natural resources of the country on a people's life and ways of living. And this of course is closely related to what social workers need to know about how the national income is made and distributed, how the natural resources of the country are turned into goods and services, and the relation between this and family levels of living. Underlying this study of man and society and of the nature of social welfare provision is social philosophy and political theory. It is impossible to study any of the foregoing subjects without beginning to ask questions which are really questions about values, and more particularly, without raising all kinds of questions about social obligations, the relations between the individual and the state, the nature of rights and duties, the boundaries of freedom and responsibility, the aims of social progress. The term social progress itself is a philosophical, not a scientific term—indeed it involves everything which is comprehended in the saying: 'It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.'

The knowledge from this enormous range of subject matter must be very carefully selected and related together as a coherent whole and then some of it translated into social work skill. It is no good giving social workers knowledge unless they also know how to apply it through the social work method of using relationships in work with individuals, groups and communities. This methodology also has a framework, like that of any other professional practice. The steps in the progress, which must be thoroughly assimilated by social work students, are: how to study a situation, how to collect all the relevant data; and in the light of relevant data, how to make a social diagnosis, that is to say,

how to try to formulate the best possible answer to the question: 'What is the matter?' And then in the light of this diagnosis to decide upon and carry through the social treatment which seems to be indicated. This of course includes making a periodic re-appraisal in the light of subsequent developments, and also deciding when and in what way intervention should be terminated. The essential point is that social workers, like members of other professions, must know why they do what they do. They are not there simply to dispense a rather aimless good will, even though good will provides an essential motivation for professional practice. Their activity must be based upon accurate knowledge and have a defined focus and goal in each situation in which they are involved. There has been a great change in very recent years in all these respects. Good will is essential but good will is not enough, and simply to be responsible for carrying out administrative procedures is also not enough. Professional skill and professional knowledge are essential nowadays in social work.

The development of appropriate attitudes is the process by which the ethics of a profession become part of the practitioner's way of thinking, feeling and acting. Naturally the ethics of social work have a good deal in common with the ethics of other professions. They include an obligation to serve rather than to seek for self-aggrandizement; a commital to the interests of the client; respect for each individual, however degraded, and of his fundamental human right to make choices for himself and to think things out within the limits of the law and of reality, rather than having solutions of his problems forced upon him. A profession is also committed to undertake research in its field; to stand for those working conditions which are necessary to enable its members to give the best possible professional service; and also to engage in social action to remedy those social ills of which it becomes conscious.

In social work, as in other professions, knowledge, skill and attitudes can neither be grasped, assimilated or put into practice in classrooms and libraries alone. Field practice under skilled guidance is as essential in social work as it is in medicine or teaching, because knowledge can only be effectively put to use, skill developed and attitudes changed in the real life situations of practice. But this is not something which students can do for themselves simply by being put into social agencies for long or short periods and left to themselves—any more than a medical student could learn by being shut up with surgical cases in an operating theatre and being told to get on with it and apply what he had learned about surgery in lecture courses and through reading. We

should be reluctant to go to a surgeon trained in that way, and some day we shall be equally reluctant to employ social workers trained like that. This carefully planned and applied field teaching, closely related to what is being taught in the school of social work, is so essential to good social work practice that quite a major investment of time and resources at this key point by social agencies would pay dividends in better services, and in the long run in decreased social costs.

It is important to think about social costs because social work is not and should not be a luxury, provided without very much thought of the consequences. We ought to be able to think about it and to make calculations in terms of reduced social costs. For instance, a delinquent boy, if he is under supervision of a wise and helpful probation officer, may be reclaimed as a law-abiding citizen. If so, the long term reduction in social costs of that reclamation, measured against what would have happened if he had gone on with a delinquent career, is very considerable. The trouble is that we have not so far managed to work out ways of measuring these social costs; we are beginning to do it but we have not gone very far yet.

Social work is only a part of social welfare and it has certainly not made the contribution to it that medicine has to health or teaching to education. But since it is the profession most nearly related to social welfare the interests of society require that it should expand, that it should become both more accurate and more diversified, in order to meet more effectively than at present the demand in the most diverse societies for social welfare as well as health and education.

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AN INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL OF TRENDS IN EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL WORK[1]

EDUCATION for social work in a formal sense began more or less simultaneously in the 1890s in Amsterdam, London and New York. But over forty years later, by the outbreak of the second world war in 1939, it had only spread to about twenty countries in all, mostly in North America and Western Europe but also including Latin America, Egypt, India, South Africa and Australia. The real explosion in education for social work in these and other countries did not come until after 1945. The first phase of expansion owes much to that great friend of social work the Belgian physician Dr René Sand. The second phase has been mainly due to international action through UNRRA and the United Nations, to the Fulbright programme and the Agency for International Development (AID), to the International Association of Schools of Social Work and the Catholic International Union for Social Service. Underlying all else it has been due to changes in attitudes towards social welfare. At the first stage the impetus to improve training and to employ qualified social workers came from voluntary organizations. Since the second world war it has come mainly from governmental sources.

In the last resort, there can be no question that the growth of schools of social work since 1945 has happened as new and old countries alike have begun to ask that question which could only be asked for the first time in this century: 'Why should there be poverty, squalor, ignorance and disease?' So far as education for social work is concerned, it is significant that the attempt to find answers to this question necessarily seems to involve public provision for welfare with social workers playing a key role in its implementation. The social aspect of total welfare is emerging as something which exists in its own right rather than

simply as an adjunct of health, education, social security or rural extension work. From this has come recognition that persons trained in this social aspect, with the focus of their work on the interrelation between man and his social environment, are a necessary element in comprehensive programmes of social development. In other words, social work had to come sooner or later as attitudes towards social welfare provision changed from negative to positive, and as scientific knowledge relevant to it began to reach a point where it could be applied in practice. The term poverty itself has also expanded to include not only lack of basic material necessities but also become linked with attempts to forestal or control social deviance, neglect and isolation, as well as to improve in positive ways the quality of life in big cities or remote rural areas.

This expansion of education for social work by the founding of many new schools, as well as by curriculum improvements and extensions in existing schools, has been quite spectacular in the period between 1945 and the early 1960s. It is basically due to international aid and co-operation. The biggest contributor has of course been the United Nations, which has taken a major responsibility for starting schools of social work in some countries as well as giving very substantial assistance to many more through the services of consultants and through fellowships for faculty members to study abroad. Its international seminars have also over a period of years brought social work educators together to clarify and deepen their thinking about the content and planning of social work education. While the international surveys of training for social work which it undertakes every four years provide the basic material with which to evaluate the development of social work as it struggles to become one profession, no matter where taught or where practised.

Substantial contributions have also been made to certain countries by the Fulbright programme and through bilateral programmes of technical assistance, of which the American AID and Canadian technical assistance are outstanding examples. The growth of the International Association of Schools of Social Work since it was founded in Europe in 1929 shows the need for a strong and virile international association to serve as a meeting ground for the schools and to help to raise standards at this stage in the development of social work as a profession. The Association is essentially a mutual aid organization whose effectiveness depends upon the contributed services of its members. It now affiliates over 280 schools of social work in forty countries.

The difficulties with which schools of social work struggle are

inherently the same, whether in old or new situations. They all centre round the gap which exists between what is known at this present time about the best kind of education for social work and the actual possibilities of implementing this knowledge in the education of potential social workers. Many employing agencies also do not know how to use social workers nor how to help the newly qualified to consolidate precarious skill, with the result that often training is largely wasted and adventuresome curiosity dies. But the best social workers carry on and go on learning in spite of all the odds against them. Indeed no praise could be too great for those in different parts of the world who struggle, often in situations of overwhelming mass poverty or administrative apathy, to fashion the profession of social work into an effective instrument of social reform.

Where there were already established social services before training for social work began to expand the people employed to give the service at any level, whether or not skilled professional help was needed, were minor administrative officials trained up in the service. Their expertise consisted in knowing about administrative procedures, how to establish eligibility and make arrangements, rather than how to give a professional social work service. This has created difficulties and friction when small numbers of trained social workers began to be introduced into such services. Moreover, the senior administrators still tend to be men educated in the university, often in the older academic disciplines of the law, medicine, political science or economics, while the qualified social workers are mainly women educated at a lower level. In newly developing countries with very few qualified social workers those with a university education who are available may go into senior administrative posts with little experience as direct practitioners. Or they may have their social work education in another country with a culture and level of living very different from their own and go straight home to teach or to administer a service without having any substantial opportunity to test out and consolidate their practice skill in relation to their own country's culture and social and economic needs and possibilities. Thus in some countries professional social workers are at the bottom of the administrative ladder while in other countries they are at the top of it.

A major dilemma in every country is the small number of professionally qualified social workers in relation to the total number of persons employed in jobs with a substantial social work content. The vicious circle effects of this on social work education and on the outside world's perception of social work are too well known to need emphasis. If

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social workers enjoy a low status and are sometimes regarded as nothing but persons on the lowest rung of the administrative ladder without professional skill this is not surprising if in many social work jobs that is exactly what they are. Moreover, a new dilemma has arisen because social work is becoming fashionable in many places where it was unheard of or anathema not long since. This change springs partly from a growing perception of the range and complexity of human relations, and some commitment to constructive measures of help where these manifest themselves as social problems. This fits in with social work's claim to be able to help people towards a more accurate perception of current social reality and their relation to it, rather than that they should continue to interpret the present in terms of the past, or respond unrealistically to current reality because of personal spectacles which distort its nature.

The problems of educating students to be able to use the knowledge which exists are manifold. Not least because the most highly systematized and readily teachable social work method is casework, whereas the need of newly developing countries, and indeed of others too, is for well-qualified social workers able to motivate and guide change in groups and communities, and to contribute their knowledge of human needs and responses to large-scale programmes, to social policy and social planning. The new-found emphasis in social work education in North America on group process, whether in multi-client interviewing, small therapeutic groups, or group and inter-group relations in institutional settings and local communities is a significant step in the right direction if social work is to be realistically oriented to developing services, whether in economically developed or low income countries. Both dimensions, depth and breadth, are as necessary in social welfare as individual treatment and broad public health measures in health services. In the realities of the situation, social workers have to act ahead of knowledge or the translation of knowledge into operational terms, and thus have to learn as they go, as did the pioneers of social work. Community development projects are a good example of this, since concepts and principles are beginning to be distilled from records of actual projects. We know, for example, that mobilizing people to take action is a process with certain clearly marked characteristics at different stages. The successful community development projects in places as dissimilar as South America, The Netherlands, India and New York seem to show that some of the essential processes are the same behind all the cultural and environmental differences. Unfortunately the enhancement of this knowledge which we desperately

need about ourselves and how we function as members of our particular societies is starved of funds for research and controlled and recorded experiment and evaluation, compared with the expenditure on the natural sciences. But it is growing nonetheless. It must also be remembered that common sense, imaginative insight and experience contribute to extend this knowledge about ourselves to a degree which is obviously no longer possible in the natural sciences.

In the last decade or so advances in knowledge and method have made possible increasing refinements of differential diagnosis and treatment: as well as bringing within the orbit of social work categories of disturbed or inadequate people previously written off as hopeless or given purely custodial care. To a considerable extent, too, the old casework question 'who is the client?' is undergoing a change as social work replies that the client is often not only the individual or even the family but also the school, the prison, the hospital, the work place, the neighbourhood, or indeed some power group in the functional or geographic community. All these trends point irresistibly to more prolonged and more advanced education for social work. Yet the dilemma is not only how to provide this, a dilemma in all conscience big enough in itself, but also how to staff increasing numbers of universal public services with the social workers they need and are willing to employ. It is just because certain public agencies with a clientele running into thousands either desire to give, or are being forced into trying to give, a professional service based on social diagnosis of individual problems (whether the individual situation be a person, a family, a group or a community), rather than making a blanket provision which ignores the refinements of individual need and response, that social work education is faced by one of the biggest challenges in its history. So far, what has been achieved in different parts of the world is either a comparatively large number of social workers trained at a rather low level or comparatively few trained at a much higher level, with the rest given in-service or auxiliary worker training or left to learn from the sometimes dazzling but sometimes dim light of Nature. In many circumstances the real weight of a service may rest upon the shoulders of the partially trained or untrained. The third alternative of more than one type or level of training is beginning to be talked about or tried out in some countries. In the meantime in many situations the social work equivalent of surgical operations is being performed not only by the counterpart of nurses but also by purely lay people. And when it comes to things like mother child separation this may be as disastrous as amputating a limb with a carving knife.

So far only one or two countries, for example Norway, have begun to look at national staffing requirements and the resources of schools of social work in order to estimate what it would take to match them with each other. Many countries are moving into the mid-twentieth century in their social welfare provision but leaving the education of social workers at an out of date level, whether in terms of numbers or standards or both. This disequilibrium between supply and demand applies not only to basic professional education at any level but also to opportunities for advanced study. The world's resources for such study in social work are still to far too great an extent centred in the United States. Although the facilities there for social work research and advanced study and practice are well ahead of the rest of the world, it is highly desirable that other countries should begin to develop these resources for themselves. This applies with special force to a profession like social work which is deeply embedded in the cultures of the peoples it serves, and which gives that service through social agencies which themselves express differing social philosophies.

A vital need in every country is for social work research, allied to more general social research, to provide a basis for both teaching and practice, and directly related to the family and other patterns of life in the local culture itself, however rapidly these may be changing. Another pressing need is for the study and teaching of administration, including communication and group and inter-group relations. This should aim on the one hand to relate agency policies and procedures to social work knowledge about effective ways of meeting human need, and on the other hand to helping social workers to become less inept as administrators, with consequent beneficial effects on their employment in administrative roles. These studies are crucial in any event but particularly so in those situations where agency policies, and even varying standards of integrity, may cut clean across the right of the client to an adequate and impartial professional service.

Schools of social work have sometimes been founded almost haphazardly by little groups of private people with a minimum of financial resources. More commonly at present they are carefully planned and financed as part of a total government social welfare policy. Some schools are directly under State or municipal auspices; some are schools of a university: others are provided by religious or political or trade union organizations: others are a branch of technical education; while others yet are *ad hoc* private institutions. Obviously their sources of finance will differ in all these differing circumstances, indeed schools under private auspices may not get State grants for scholarships or other

costs even though they may be training social workers for the public services. There are national associations of schools of social work in about twelve countries and usually any school with a programme of a given length is eligible to join. In a few countries the curriculum, the student examinations or other matters relating to the schools is regulated by government decree. Sometimes this is the only means of raising standards and cutting off the lunatic fringe, though obviously it can also reduce the curriculum to a dead level of uniformity and make advance difficult.

The whole ideological, financial and administrative framework of the school affects faculty freedom and initiative in various ways. For example, those who are expected to teach for over twenty-five class hours a week may preserve their academic freedom inviolate but not be left with much time for thought, reading, writing, research, discussion with colleagues, individual student tutorials, or contact with social work practice, in addition to leading a full and rounded life as a human being. From another angle, it is self evident that the quality of any teaching is affected by the receptivity of the learner. In some countries men and women students are recruited at a postgraduate level and many have also had work experience; in other situations the schools may have to recruit girls of seventeen or eighteen, often from limited or sheltered backgrounds, who have completed not more than a secondary school education, sometimes based largely on rigid learning of facts without demand for independent thought and enquiry. The same range of difference exists in regard to field work. In situations where there are almost no social agencies it may be an exciting and indeed unique learning experience for faculty and students to work together to study a situation and try to meet need by the use of all three methods of social work with individuals, groups and communities, perhaps in urban slums or apathetic rural communities. But this is quite different from sending students alone and with little or no faculty support to undertake difficult assignments at a distance from the school. Perhaps worse still is the situation in some countries where well-established agencies have rigid old-fashioned practices, where students receive administrative but not educational supervision and where they may be learning in the classroom general principles at variance with agency practice but with no attempt to relate the one to the other. The truth is that not all schools of social work are producing social workers, and certainly not all social agencies want to employ or know or desire to know how to use social workers. There are a good many people everywhere who, as Adlai Stevenson once said in another context, need 'to be carried

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kicking and screaming into the twentieth century'. It is also important to recognize that some economically underdeveloped countries may be in the vanguard of progress while underdeveloped social work areas are to be found in economically advanced countries. Indeed those countries which are newly establishing government sponsored social welfare services have certain advantages so far as social work is concerned. These are that they tend to realize from the beginning the need for qualified social workers to work alongside members of other relevant professions in planning and policy-making as the new services develop; and that where very limited facilities for any professional training already exist, schools of social work may start (often in the university) as more or less equal partners with other professional schools, so that education for social work, instead of being a not very respectable newcomer, is as old—or as new—as some other professions in the economically and socially newly developing country.

One effect of the battle with inadequate faculty time, resources and administrative support is that in many countries very little indigenous social work literature is being produced or even translated. The result is that students rely almost wholly on American material and thus have to learn from the social work literature of a culture which may differ substantially from their own. Moreover they often do not get enough opportunity to test it out and question and discuss it in relation to their field practice. Where translations are not available they are also reading a language of which they may only have a limited grasp, or else their study is almost confined to the teacher's spoken word. To emphasize the need for better qualified social work teachers and improved financial resources is thus to underline how essential it is that concepts and methods developed in North America should be applied, tested, adapted and evaluated in other countries. This is of course happening in varying degrees in certain European countries and in parts of Asia and Latin America. One of the most notable examples is Israel where the combination of a highly qualified faculty and adequate financial resources has made it possible to develop a well-integrated curriculum and to begin to teach in classroom and field practice the common basic elements in social work with individuals, groups and communities.

The most urgent question which faces administrators and social work teachers in a number of countries is how to use the limited existing resources of qualified social workers in ways which will add to rather than diminish these resources. This means very careful deployment so that through supervision, teaching and good recorded practice they

may add to the store of knowledge and of more and better equipped social workers. In one way success can be as stultifying to a profession as indifference and neglect. There is, indeed, a temptation to lower training standards in order to meet increased demand, though to invest resources in quantity at the expense of quality is bound to be self-defeating in the long run. This raises the question of evaluation. Certainly in scientific terms there is practically no evaluation of social work performance with a view to correcting failure and misdirected effort and feeding back the findings into the schools' curricula. So far as student evaluation is concerned, there is undoubtedly too much reliance on formal written examinations without sufficient analysis of what they test. There is also too little clarity about or evaluation of the thing that chiefly matters—the degrees of the students' professional capacity to help people in trouble.

The stages of development through which social work is passing in the world as a whole can by now be fairly clearly identified. In the older schools the curriculum tended to consist of broad social science subjects, coupled with details of administrative procedures, and unrelated field work. The problem for them is to introduce methods courses and supervised field work and to relate theory and practice, as well as to change agency policies. In new countries everything must be started from scratch. At the first stage in either situation it is necessary to send social workers who really know their own country's social problems overseas for professional education. As part of a total plan, there is also a need for consultant and other well co-ordinated services over a period of time until the new education for social work has taken root and been accepted. This includes acceptance of the unfortunate fact that this professional education is much more costly than general lecture courses and apprentice type field work. And there are usually solid reality factors in the way of meeting these costs.

By the second stage there is in the country a sufficient minimum of qualified faculty members and supervisors and real understanding of what is involved in a good educational programme, together with experience of having pioneered this beyond its initial stages. From there on the third stage emerges. It is characterized by a more general understanding of the aims of social work education, a demand for resources to employ more full-time faculty members, for deeper study of social problems, and for means to expand and deepen total educational resources, whether in the schools of social work or in field work. This includes production of case records and other indigenous teaching

materials as well as research. Time for study is as has been said a crucial issue for faculty members in schools which are expanding rapidly in relation to their teaching resources. Yet if teaching is to incorporate advances in knowledge it is essential to keep up with the best that is being written, in other countries as well as in the home country. Sabbatical leave, writing, enquiry and research, curriculum evaluation, all begin to be accepted as pressing needs at this third stage. A demand for further training and opportunities for advanced study also emerges. There are signs that the best university schools of social work in the United States are beginning to enter a fourth stage in which research and teaching go hand in hand to an extent unknown elsewhere. This is a natural development as an occupation becomes a profession and will be inevitable, whatever form social work may take in the future.

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THE RELATION BETWEEN BASIC AND
FURTHER TRAINING FOR
SOCIAL WORK[1]

THE provision of additional and advanced professional studies for social workers is now a pressing issue in many European countries. Certain assumptions have to be made in considering the relation between basic training for social work and its implications for further training. Firstly, at the present time a good deal of basic level material may have to be included in additional trainings in order to fill earlier gaps. Secondly, 'basic' and 'higher' are relative terms which continually change as the level of each rises in any given situation, with the result that previous training becomes outdated, and also social work education regarded as basic in one country may be higher or advanced for social workers from some other countries. Thirdly, the term 'further training' implies that it is in some way superior to a basic training: there is often confusion about this, for example, when certain trainings are regarded as advanced not because they carry basic training further to an advanced level but because they are specialized, perhaps because of their emphasis on psychopathology or on administration, and on account of the more mature age and more careful selection of students. Fourthly, though any good basic preparation for social work should lay the foundations for further training, which must by definition be built upon basic training yet only a minority of those who complete an initial training will go on to such training, whether for advanced specialization, research, teaching or administration. Thus selection of social workers for further training (to some degree self-selection) should be conditional not only upon a relevant basic training but also upon their personality, intellectual capacities, general education and professional competence. The extent to which they have advanced professionally through their own greater experience and maturity,

[1] Paper given at a United Nations European Seminar on Further Training of Senior Personnel for the Social Services, Amersfoort, Netherlands, October 1963.

coupled with opportunities for personal study and cultural develop-
ment, will contribute to suitability for further training, though not be
in itself a substitute for sound initial training as a basis for further social
work education. Whether or not some other professional qualification
can provide a suitable basis for further training for those engaged in
some aspect of social welfare will depend upon the nature of their
future responsibilities, for example, an intending teacher of social work
methods must necessarily be a well-qualified social worker with good
professional experience. It is thus essential that basic training should be
an adequate professional preparation for those social workers who will
later supervise or teach students, ideally with further training before
they do so. But what shall be the design of further training when
because of deficiencies in basic courses it must be to some extent under-
graduate in content, though post-graduate in time? And how can basic
and advanced material be combined for those who have, for example, a
degree in law or sociology but no social work training?

Looked at from another angle, in social work education we are
living in a topsy-turvy world. Social workers with advanced training
are needed in increasing numbers to teach and supervise students.
They are also needed to administer social agencies with professional
and administrative competence so that these agencies may give a higher
level of service to people who need it. But the development of social
work education does not accord with these realities. We have struggled
to raise the basic training to an acceptable standard without which we
cannot give the further training but the basic training itself cannot now
be satisfactory without the further training. In other words, at a certain
stage if the one is not seen as the inevitable corollary of the other
stagnation or regression results. We in Europe have now already
passed this stage in our development and must look at our basic
training in the light of the interrelated need for further training.

One approach to this would be by means of a stock-taking to see
what we have accomplished in basic training in the last fifteen years or
so, what kind of general agreement we seem to have reached about it,
what are the major obstacles to advance and what the growing points
of both theory and practice. Obviously education for social work is
related to the functions of social workers as these are perceived at any
given time in any given society, especially by the agencies which
employ them. The change in this perception has been dramatic in the
last fifteen years, with a cause and effect relationship to developments in
basic training. In the earlier period it might be said as a generalization
that social workers, whether in public or private agencies, were thought

of as field workers who gave material help to poor people—on certain
conditions; who arranged services like convalescence or holidays or
vocational training or a place in an old people's home; or who gave
advice about matters like complex social security legislation; or who
persuaded certain people to do those things which in society's eyes
they ought to do but lamentably did not desire nor intend to do. This
kind of social work, an executive rather than a professional activity,
rested to quite a considerable extent on the assumption that the social
agency, and thus the social worker, knew what was best for people
and must use a mixture of authority and persuasion to see that they
acted accordingly. The social worker indeed was (and often still is)
like the faithful sheep-dog whose function is thought to be to prevent
the sheep from straying and to drive them through the right gate. In a
way this was natural enough in the period before and after the second
world war when most European countries were expanding universal
public social services of education, health, housing, social security and
the like, and when these developments usually rested upon the assump-
tion that such services were in themselves sufficient, if adequately
provided, to ensure social well-being. Later came recognition of some
of the reasons why a minority of citizens persistently abused rather than
used the services and were constantly at odds with a changing society,
besides being remarkably resistant to good advice or admonition. This
new understanding of social deviants and areas of social stagnation or
disintegration has led by degrees to new dimensions of social work.

The concept of social pathology, both more subtle and more com-
plex than had previously been envisaged, has thus been a major element
in the remarkable changes in social work education in Europe in the
years since the war. With this has been coupled better understanding
of the ill effects of continuing excessive stress, whether on the individual,
the family or the community, and the part which skilled social workers
can play in lowering this so that people become better able to cope with
their life circumstances.

This change in attitudes towards the function of social workers
elevates them from a primarily executive to a primarily professional
role. The social worker must know and be able to do different and
more demanding things than previously. Indeed what is seen as neces-
sary at the present day constantly outstrips both scientific knowledge
and the teaching and other resources of educational institutions and
practice agencies. In the earlier period the curricula of many schools
ranged from broad theory to the minutiae of office routine: as though
the objective was to produce someone who would be a mixture of a

Prime Minister and a filing clerk. The defects of this from an educational point of view were that some of the teaching was too general to be used and some too boring to be remembered. And in any event the job itself was closer to that of the filing clerk than the Prime Minister.

The task, then, on which the schools of social work have been engaged from roughly 1950 onwards is to introduce what is sometimes called middle level knowledge (i.e. knowledge at a middle level of abstraction) and methods courses into the curriculum, and to develop systematic teaching in the field work. The current aim is to help students, both in the classroom and the live situation, to relate theory and practice. They are given knowledge to develop understanding and for use in practice. By the term middle level knowledge is meant the study and application of concepts, whether in science or philosophy, at a level sufficiently specific in relation to the immediate society and the students level of comprehension to enable them to make intelligent use of this knowledge in particular situations, both for deeper understanding and for direct practice. For example, the concept of culture is not particularly significant for the practice of social work unless it can be related to various aspects amongst the cultural sub-groups from which the students come and within which they will work. Obviously schools of social work could not aim to help students to assimilate and learn to apply relevant knowledge from the social and behavioural sciences until this knowledge had itself begun to be less abstract and thus more usable by non-specialists for professional rather than scientific purposes. The growth of this middle level knowledge, for example, in role theory or in identifying manifestations of maternal deprivation or the consequences of rapid social change, has been vitally important in providing a sound basis for the social work curriculum and in the contribution it has made to social work methodology as social workers have begun to incorporate these concepts into practice theory. The result is that most methods courses have ceased to be primarily concerned with techniques of record keeping and agency requirements and instead concentrate on professional methods and attitudes, which are largely based upon translation of knowledge from the background courses into social work practice.

The most profound change in the European schools of social work came with the teaching of dynamic psychology, whether taught as such or as the underpinning of casework diagnosis and treatment. The result was that instead of asking in relation to social work's clients 'what are they doing?' or even 'go and see what they are doing and

tell them not to', we began to say 'why do they behave like that?' And often this turned out to be a long story, a story which began long ago for the individual and his society. Now sociology and cultural anthropology are catching up with dynamic psychology so far as their effective contribution to social work practice is concerned. The result of this and of current developments in ego psychology is fresh emphasis on the here and now as well as upon the past still alive in the present. A result of all this change in the social work curriculum has been to depose social legislation and agency structure and practice from the centre of attention and to substitute for them a knowledge about human behaviour and social functioning to be used in social work methods of meeting human need. The legislation and agency procedures are certainly important but only as a means of supplying a service to people which meets their actual—and changing—needs. There is a saying in London that 'the buses don't run for the passengers, the passengers run for the buses'. What has been happening in social work theory and practice in the last decade or two is that we have been trying to establish the proper priorities illustrated by that saying.

It might appear that social work has become almost wholly concerned with social and psycho-pathology. It is indeed true that much effort has been concentrated here, both on account of the sheer social nuisance value of delinquent behaviour or multi-problem families for example, and because of new perception of the range of mental health problems in our society. The study of individual pathology and its interrelation with social pathology and economic deprivation or surfeit, has helped to clarify contributory causation and also added new significance and precision to preventive measures. Thus after the years when social work took a nose dive into pathology, it is beginning to redress the balance by looking for strengths and signs of ability to function, whether in the individual, the family, the group or the community. To some extent in this respect it is returning full circle to its origins in the nineteenth century and earlier. The upshot is that social work has begun to have a body of knowledge to teach and a practice theory related to it, even though this is still riddled with inadequacies and gaps. A good deal of what has been said so far can be summed up in a quotation: 'We feel that in social work a sound and serious preparation should be considered an indispensable element, if it aims at all at catering for a need. It should be a training with scientific aspects, leading to a general sociological development, linked with knowledge of a large field of legislation, as well as historical study of various problems. This should, however, emphatically be of a practical nature

consisting of active participation and experience in the daily task, in a chosen field, and under adequate scientific and inspiring supervision.'[1] The citation for that quotation is misleading. It is in fact from the first syllabus of the first school of social work in the world, the Institute for Social Work Training, Amsterdam. The date is 1899. It shows that from the beginning we saw what we would have to do to train social workers well. Now we know better how to do it.

Dr de Jongh, the present Director of the Social Academy at Amsterdam, wrote an article a decade ago in which he said that the teaching of dynamic casework in Europe would 'act as a time bomb'. The writer of another article at about the same period pointed out that schools of social work in Europe had teachers for everything except social work itself.[2] This would not be true of the majority of schools of social work at the present day. But it has needed nothing short of a time-bomb explosion, a revolution and enormous effort to introduce dynamic psychology and to produce social workers with a methodology to teach. Many studied in the United States or Canada and returned with fresh insight into the content and educational method necessary to make this teaching effective. At the same time it was essential to bring field teaching (the development of skill through guided practice) up to a level where each way of learning reinforced the other, rather than being unrelated or in direct contradiction to each other. It has also been necessary to produce case records and other teaching materials in the countries concerned, so that the methods courses might be related in a living way to the surrounding culture. This too has required great effort and has only been possible as the standard of social work practice also advanced.

The other revolution in basic training thus had to be in field work supervision. This revolution also sprang from the introduction of dynamic psychology because it was obvious that if the emphasis was shifting from legal and administrative requirements to methods of using the new understanding of human behaviour, then agencies had a very different task on their hands. Nowadays every reasonably well-educated social work student must learn to recognize stress symptoms, the defence mechanisms, unconscious motivation and contributory causes of breakdown in social functioning. They must also be able to form a helpful relationship with a variety of people, whether individually or in groups, so that they can use knowledge appropriately in

[1] *Training for Social Work: Third International Survey*, United Nations publication, New York, 1959 (Sales No. 59, IV.1), p. 110.
[2] Quoted in *Training for Social Work: Second International Survey*, United Nations publication, New York, 1955 (Sales No. 1955, IV.9), p. 56.

order to help distressed people to perceive and master their social problems. If this is accepted, then social agencies must provide the right kind of experience for students at the right time. And supervisors must have the necessary knowledge, skill and attitudes and be able to pass these on to others. They must also be trained for a task which calls for teaching abilities and be given sufficient time for student supervision. This field practice involves much longer placements than formerly, close relations with the school faculty, regular supervisors' meetings and training sessions, careful attention to the content of evaluation reports on students, and either concurrent field work or else ample opportunities for professional consultation. Students must also be helped in the course of their relationship with a variety of people in trouble towards a sometimes painful awareness of themselves and the degree to which their attitudes towards others are the result of early family experiences and culturally determined prejudices.

Yet although such teaching in the field work is essential to good basic training, the old one-year apprenticeship or a series of short observational attachments still survive; students may be sent long distances from the school for block placement with a minimum of educational supervision; they may be given too much or too little responsibility; and supervisors still have to be used who have not themselves had a modern professional education for social work. This is happening because some schools of social work even now do not grasp the crucial importance of systematic field teaching. And also for sheer lack of sufficient qualified social workers because many social agencies still do not realize that if the present vicious circle of shortages and low standards is to be broken they must make some of their best social workers available to supervise students and to learn how to do so. It would be idle to spell out in detail what is involved in good supervision, whether educationally or administratively, because this has been written about frequently and adequately. Our primary need is not to know but to do. This again raises the question of priorities. In some situations it may well be that a form of 'higher' training for supervisors and administrators in social work agencies is a prerequisite to the improvement of basic training. If we accept that the purpose of social work training is to give students relevant knowledge, to develop understanding and to help them to transform these into skill, then the field work is as important as study at the school and no training can advance far ahead of the level of supervision (or field teaching).

In international and national discussions as well as at the level of immediate school and agency relations we need to be more insistent,

more realistic, about the supreme relevance of field teaching and prac-
tice to social work education. Let us not despair, however, when we
reflect that but a short time ago supervision as we now know it was
non-existent and students were simply sent into agencies to pick up
what they could from various people, and to act as cheap labour.

A distinction is often made between supervision as an educational
and an administrative process. Surely this is a false distinction. The
supervisor is essentially a teacher who helps the student to use knowl-
edge in live situations through methods which are effective in helping
people under stress or with problems of social functioning. But social
agencies in which social work is the primary activity themselves exist
for the same purpose and either are or should be administered so as to
achieve this result to the maximum possible extent. The agency does
not exist as a framework for professional practice nor practice to keep
the agency running smoothly but both agency and staff exist to supply
a particular service as effectively as possible to people in need of it.
And this is a situation where needs, knowledge and the skill of various
professions are continuously changing. Teaching about agency pur-
pose and structure, administrative procedures, functions and communi-
cation in a hierarchical structure and as between different professions,
planning, allocation of resources, decision making, policy formation,
budgeting and other aspects of administration is thus a necessary part
of learning to become a competent social worker who understands the
use of administration to provide an effective service. The swing away
from agency-centred to client-centred practice was, as has been said, a
necessary process but now a new synthesis is emerging in which good
administration is accepted as an essential part of good professional
service, indeed a way of ensuring that the buses run for the passengers.
This means that administrative structure and process should be taught
in the basic training both in classroom and field work at a level appro-
priate to the students' comprehension and experience. Where this is
not done so-called further training will have to cover the elements of
this subject.

It has always been important in education for social work that
students should develop appropriate professional attitudes. This has
become all the more necessary as a consequence of the application of
dynamic psychology to social work practice. The social workers of the
present day must have an objective understanding of themselves, their
colleagues and their clients which may touch painfully on past unhappy
experiences, likes and dislikes and prejudices. They must also develop a
professional ethic of impartial service; of non-condemnatory attitudes

that call for acceptance and understanding of difficult, immature and
unattractive people; of recognition of the individual's right of choice
and decision. Indeed they must accept wholeheartedly the obligation
to give a professional service to those who need it without distortion
by the social worker's personal likes or prejudices. Students are naturally
disturbed by some of the insight that comes from dynamic psychology
and by beginning to recognize defensive, irrational and childish beha-
viour in themselves and others, when simultaneously they are being
called upon to act professionally in a manner more responsible, mature
and impartial than would be natural to them as private individuals: in
short, to stretch their insight and imagination about human behaviour
and at the same time to incorporate the ethics of a helping profession.
The heavy emotional and intellectual demand made by present day
social work have also led to efforts to raise the minimum age of entry;
to institute more thorough selection procedures and to lengthen
courses.

As has been suggested, the changes of the post-war years can be
summed up as the introduction of more knowledge at a middle level of
abstraction from the social and behavioural sciences which is usable by
social workers; teaching of social work methodology; field supervision
for the application of theory through practice; and an attempt to fuse
all these and their related professional ethic together so that students
will reach an acceptable level of knowledge, skill and attitudes by the
end of their training. In so far as this has been achieved, the result is an
essentially dynamic rather than static situation with a continual im-
balance between the different elements in the curriculum. This
imbalance shows itself in differences of quality, depth, abstraction and
relevance in the teaching of any given part of the total curriculum. The
level of supervision and its relation to theoretical studies often provides
the most dramatic example of imbalance. There are also problems con-
nected with the content and educational presentation of the methods
courses. It is unfortunate that when qualified social workers turn from
practice to the difficult art of teaching there are almost no opportunities
for them to study teaching method and curriculum planning before
they make this transition. It is common to find the small professional
faculties of schools of social work overburdened with too many teach-
ing hours and other responsibilities so that they have much too little
time for study, for the preparation of class material and case records, for
close contact with the practice of social work, for evaluation both of
their teaching and of student attainment, and for research and writing;
while sabbatical leave is rare. This situation makes it almost impossible

to develop further training at an adequate standard. It also occasionally leads to a so-called 'advanced' course being started to break out of the vicious circle. These courses must later become basic training before any truly advanced courses will be possible.

Another consequence of overloading social work teachers is that students may be taught at a more advanced level by members of other professions than their own. This perpetuates the image of the social worker as a second class citizen doing a technical job. Another familiar difficulty arises when social work teachers use in the methods courses teaching material based upon dynamic psychology, sociology and anthropology but lecturers in these subjects teach them academically and with insufficient use of material from current research or practice. Similar difficulties arise when social welfare provision is taught as a dead recital of legislation and governmental structure rather than as a living historical process closely related to sociological knowledge, to cultural attitudes to social policy, planning and economic limitations. It is not easy for schools of social work to find teachers of the background subjects whose own orientation is appropriate and who will be willing to spend time learning about social work, the needs of students and the total objectives of the curriculum, with a view to working out the presentation of their subject so that it becomes well related to teaching in other parts of the curriculum. Some schools are additionally hampered in this by the low fees they are able to offer and the difficulty of paying part-time lecturers for attendance at curriculum planning sessions.

The new perception of the goals, method and content of basic education for social work is responsible for the curriculum studies under way in several countries and in individual schools of social work. These curriculum studies attempt to relate the content and planning of the curriculum to the changing role of social workers as employment opportunities expand and as the concept of the social work function changes. These studies are made necessary by the higher expectation of social workers and by the rapid growth of relevant knowledge. There is a perpetual tendency to overload the curriculum, to throw it out of gear, and to place upon schools of social work new demands which they cannot meet without re-thinking their functions. It is also important to remember that these schools are not glorified forms of in-service training, like other educational institutions they have an obligation to contribute to new thought, research and experimentation, policy and action. In so doing they must aim to prepare students who will be the leaders of tomorrow as well as the practitioners of today. This makes

it all the more unfortunate when schools of social work are living in the day before yesterday, or else are too harassed by today's tasks to look forward to the day after tomorrow. If a school of social work does not live dangerously, is not always seeking for change and progress in its own teaching and in social work practice, then it is not making the contribution to social improvement which society has the right to demand of it and the obligation to make possible.

Curriculum studies are often limited to discussions about what should be added to or omitted from the total course. This is putting the cart before the horse. It is not possible to clarify questions about curriculum content before being clear about objectives. We have to struggle to become clearer about what students must know, do and be by the end of their training—and at what level and over what range—before we can decide the content of the curriculum and the balance of the different parts and subjects in relation to each other. These objectives include a difficult balance between meeting immediate agency requirements and equipping students who will be able to grow professionally ahead of today's practice. No students leave a school of social work fully equipped and needing no support: employing agencies should be more aware than they are at present of the crucial importance of good initial supervision to help newly qualified workers to consolidate what they have learned and carry it further. Otherwise much training is wasted and the schools' objectives must be correspondingly narrowed to meet the realities of a work situation which is self-defeating. Any discussion of basic training and curriculum planning must therefore take into account not only the demands of practice but also the degree of support available to newly trained workers.

Thoroughgoing and realistic study of objectives and assessment of the extent to which they are being attained with given groups of students in particular schools of social work is thus an essential yardstick against which to measure the range, depth and content of the curriculum. The other yardstick is advance in knowledge and methodology which must be incorporated into practice. These together provide the criteria for decisions about the planning and content of the total curriculum and about the various means to be employed in meeting the objectives. In the light of these objectives on the one hand and students' educational and other qualifications on the other hand, decisions must be made about those aspects of the essential background subjects which must be taught and how they should be related to the theory and practice of social work. The background subjects are usually grouped under the broad headings of man in society and social

welfare provision. Various national and international studies and seminars have helped in recent years to clarify the contribution of the social and behavioural sciences in basic education for social work. The position is less satisfactory so far as teaching about physical health and disease processes is concerned.

The range and depth of the curriculum must also be related to the students' level and to the length of the whole course. Ideally, the curriculum should provide a solid knowledge of normal growth and functioning as the context in which to teach about pathology, whether physical, psychological or social. Inevitably there is also a connection between the length of the training and problems of balance between general and specialized content. A general training without sufficient breadth and depth may not qualify students to do anything with any noticeable competence, while to give a specialized training not built upon basic knowledge is once again to put the cart before the horse. The range, depth, length and standard of the basic training thus profoundly affects what will be needed in further training. If the basic training has been unduly circumscribed, specialized, generalized or elementary, then further training will have to contain a good deal of basic material in order to fill in the gaps. Social research method and administration are both good examples. It is desirable that social work students should be introduced to social research findings and the importance of research and be given some general understanding of various research methods. It would not, however, usually be realistic to give them any training in social research methodology at this stage. This would therefore have to be provided at a basic level in an additional training for senior functions requiring research. The same considerations apply to administration where this is not an effective part of basic training.

The discussions about curriculum revision which have been going on in a number of European countries in the last few years have taken two forms. On the one hand, national government sponsored enquiries have been motivated by the shortage of qualified social workers and are intended to give authoritative guidance about expanded and improved training—and the help needed from public funds for this. The national studies in Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom are examples. The revised national regulations for the curriculum in French schools of social work are a significant example from a different angle. Individual schools or groups of schools in several countries have embarked on analyses of their curricula from the point of view not only of length and content but with a new interest in educational method. Examples

are to be found in Italy, Switzerland and elsewhere. A result of this concern with teaching method as well as content is that the formal lecture, in which, as has been cynically remarked, material is transferred from the note book of the lecturer to the note books of the students without passing through the heads of either, is giving way to a mixture of didactic teaching and discussion periods in which the lecturer and students should be in close communication with each other. The time tables of some, though not all, schools are also being lightened as attention shifts from what students 'ought' to learn to how they learn and what they do in fact assimilate.

This new interest in the psychology of learning has also led to the more selective use of visual aids and role playing, and to the need to understand the dynamics of the student group. The curriculum is the tool or means for producing social workers with the necessary knowledge, skill and attitudes, and with sufficient capacity for further development. They must be capable of doing a professional job in the realities of work situations. But this can only be achieved by a well-qualified faculty, a sound curriculum, inspiring teaching, and students who have the right kind of personality for the task. This last requirement includes not only those qualities of maturity, warmth and concern for people about which we rightly talk so frequently, but also intelligence, good general education and capacity for disciplined and independent thought. Thus there must obviously be close attention to methods of student selection, the level of basic education and the minimum age of admission. Some schools still find that much time is taken up in making good deficiencies in general education, in helping the students to learn how to study, how to express themselves orally and in writing and how to take responsibility for their own learning. As one wise administrator put it in discussing a certain school's plans to lengthen its course: 'It's not a third year they need but a first year.' Unfortunately basic training for social work must sometimes include basic education as such if an adequate foundation is to be laid for future practice. The educational background of those who take basic training ranges from completion of secondary education to university graduation. The level of the basic training is thus inevitably affected by the students' previous education, their age, the backgrounds from which they come, and whether there is a sufficient number of applicants to make adequate selection possible. Some schools only recruit women students, though it is found that where men and women train together the whole experience is apt to be more educationally stimulating.

The problem of thoroughness and range in the content of the basic training is becoming more and more acute as knowledge increases and horizons expand. At a certain stage in social work education there was emphasis in some schools of social work on specialized training for casework with particular types of client or social agency, medical social work or child welfare for example. When the emphasis shifted from the specialized to the generic it became clear before long that this too was in some sense a false dichotomy. The generic only manifests itself from within the specific, while the specific branches out into, is indeed rooted in, the generic. An adequate basic training must have specialized aspects which carry generic material further in certain directions.

The swing away from specialization at the basic training stage has also taken on a new and disruptive dimension now that social work educators and practitioners have become conscious of the constant involvement of social workers in group and community situations. If dynamic casework was the time bomb of yesterday, then the dynamics of social work with groups and communities is the explosive of today. Its consequences will spread, like the earlier one, through the whole curriculum as we struggle to incorporate middle level teaching (i.e. at a middle level of abstraction) about group process and interaction, inter-group relations and the characteristics of communities, whether comparatively static or undergoing rapid social change. Perhaps the greatest difficulty we face concerns methods courses and field work in social work with groups and communities. Some schools of social work, notably in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece and Israel, have begun to make a break through in this and are sharing their knowledge with other European countries. Fortunately we recognize that these are not three isolated specializations in social work but that all social workers need knowledge about and some elementary competence in the use of all three methods, though individual students will go further with any one method in their training and subsequent practice.

In a number of situations schools of social work have not got further than an intellectual acceptance of the relevance of social work with groups and communities and the need to develop teaching and field practice in these as well as in casework. This is natural enough in view of the problems involved in equipping competent teachers of these methods as well as bringing field placements and supervisors up to an acceptable level. In some situations the most realistic way to set about this may be to expand casework teaching and practice to include the elements of social work with small groups and local communities. This new emphasis—or a return to an old emphasis—arises from sheer need

because it has now become obvious that social agencies cannot do their job, even if this is to serve individuals, without working with groups and communities. A new interest in the human relations aspect of administrative processes has also strengthened the case for skill in group relations. It is thus certain that further training for senior staff members in social agencies must include understanding of group process and interaction, coupled with ability to use this, particularly in administrative positions, and in community and personnel social work. But how is this senior training to be given if foundations have not been laid at the basic level? When we talk of further training for social work with groups and communities do we really mean that we will be giving to older and more experienced people a training whose actual content they would ideally have received at an earlier and basic level stage? For the time being we are back here at the familiar problem of the egg and the chicken. But the manner in which we have reached our present level in casework teaching and practice is a guide to the necessary stages in reaching the same level in social work with groups and communities.

The ambivalent or aloof attitudes of European schools of social work and universities towards each other are well known, with a few exceptions like Israel and the United Kingdom. These difficulties are related to rigid university regulations, to their attitude towards some forms of vocational education and field work, and to the inability of many social work teachers and students to meet university standards. Schools of social work may thus often have greater freedom for initiative and experimentation if they remain outside the university. In this respect basic education for social work in Europe is following a different line of development from that in much of the rest of the world where the purposes of universities are sometimes more closely related to the current social scene. The barriers that separate European schools and universities from each other, often mean that a school of social work is an isolated *ad hoc* institution, sometimes raising its finances from voluntary sources and students' fees, or receiving grants from public sources which are not always sufficient to provide the library and other resources, the research facilities, the adequate faculty and the opportunities for advanced studies which are necessary for any profession as it moves beyond the technical stage. This statement does not imply that all universities are richly endowed nor all schools of social work starved for lack of funds. But it is difficult to conceive of further training at any reasonably advanced standard without a close collaboration between universities and schools of social work where these are separate.

It would be hard to exaggerate the effect of inadequate resources and the lack of well-qualified teachers and supervisors in hindering the advance of social work education in Europe. This is the fundamental reason why the staff/student ratio is too low, why field work lacks field teaching, why there are too few full-time faculty members, why sufficient appropriate case records are not available, why indigenous social work literature is scarce in quantity and quality, and why social work research is almost non-existent. In discussions about further training this must be remembered and the fact realistically faced that if this education is really to be at an advanced level it will cost more than basic training. Higher quality can only be bought at a higher price. It must also be remembered that unless professional training, whether basic or advanced, produces social workers whose performance is clearly better than that of the untrained or the in-service trained it is merely an expensive waste. A qualified social worker should have a professional identity as clearly recognizable as that of a teacher, a nurse, a lawyer, or a member of some other profession. On this reckoning a costly training may actually be cheaper than a poorer one if the latter only has results which could have been achieved by on-the-job learning. This is a major reason for regular evaluation both of students and courses, for periodic meetings between teachers to assess the balance, content and integration of their different subjects, and between supervisors and the school faculty for regular discussion of the content of teaching in the school and social agencies so as to bring about a constantly improved correlation between theory and practice.

For various reasons it has not yet been possible in all schools of social work to make the best use of and add to knowledge about social work education. There is still resistance or plain failure to understand all that this education involves, whether by school faculties or practitioners or agencies. Indeed the cost, in terms of money and skilled manpower, of the best possible education for social work is beyond the resources of many schools and agencies. The result is that almost universally there is a gap between our knowledge of how to construct the ideal curriculum and the practical possibilities of putting this knowledge to use in actual training. This of course poses the whole question of priorities, of whether in any given situation greater efforts should be invested in improving basic training or whether more could be achieved by further training of qualified social workers in order that they might raise the level of practice and contribute to improving the basic training. Neither the clarification of these issues nor decisions for action should be taken *ad hoc* or piecemeal and in relation to the current

situation only. The demands for and on social workers are now so great that only a well-planned national strategy for advance in the coming five- or ten-year period will suffice. This planning of priorities and use of resources must be designed to increase rather than to dissipate or waste our present scarce resources of well-qualified social work practitioners, teachers and administrators. We must bait a sprat to catch a herring if we are not to find ourselves in a very much worse situation in the next few years than we are now.

The usual practice in any given country has been to provide training at one level, whether 'high' or 'low' by comparison with standards elsewhere. If the level is high this results in far too few social workers being produced to meet demand, with a resultant emphasis on in-service training for large numbers of unqualified staff. Where the level is lower more social workers may be turned out but the training fails to meet the standard necessary for promotion as advanced practitioners or administrators or social work teachers or in social research. Sometimes an individual school may have higher entrance requirements and train at a higher level within the basic programme. In at least one country, Britain, the dilemma is being faced by providing two types of basic training, one in the universities, a one-year course mainly based upon a prior degree or diploma in social studies; the other a two-year course in university extra-mural departments or colleges of further education which are not part of a university.

The differences in these two types of training are the auspices under which they are provided and the fact that most university students have a foundation in the social sciences before their professional training, whereas in the two-year courses in extra-mural departments and colleges of further education social science and professional social work subjects run parallel with each other. No one knows which of these types of curriculum planning is 'best' nor indeed how precisely to frame the questions necessary to discover the answer. In any event this experiment is too new for evidence to be available about the respective levels of actual social work practice of students trained by either method.

The lack of clear objectives and of built-in evaluation procedures related to these pervade social work education in Europe. Yet how can we know whether and how we could do better if we only have opinions —often emotionally coloured—about the results of our various training courses? We also need better answers than we have now about ways of speeding up learning. There is no doubt that students learn more quickly and effectively by some educational methods than others. We should be observing and testing this all the time, not only in terms of

learning at a given moment, but also in terms of more effective motivation, better ability for retention and integration and most important of all, in terms of what becomes available to the student for use. This testing is all the more difficult in a professional education which calls for skill and appropriate attitudes as well as knowledge. It is not what we pour into students that matters when the training period and the examinations are over but what is living within them that will grow and become more coherent, both more specific and more comprehensive as time goes by.

The conclusion seems to be that education for social work in the European schools has changed enormously in the past fifteen years as old curricula have been revised and new schools started. Progress has been uneven and has also inevitably revealed fresh problems. We are all too well aware of the problems but their very discomfort will no doubt be a spur to action in the future as it has been in the past. Progress has set us on the right lines so far as present knowledge about the best ways of educating social workers can indicate. Perhaps the point at which further progress is most needed in the basic training is in the extension of middle level knowledge and of better methods teaching and related field practice. We talk very glibly about the integration of theory and practice, as though our recognition that this is desirable somehow means we have achieved it. In fact we are far from doing so. And the very fact that we have been anxious to give students an adequate grounding in the social and behavioural sciences sometimes means that we, ourselves overwhelmed by the present and ever-increasing amount of highly significant and important knowledge, have stuffed them with far more than they will ever be able to apply, and will therefore soon forget.

These thoughts about basic social work education apply also to further training, except that the latter has the advantage of being built upon the students' past experience of life and professional practice. Basic education for social work is at present in danger of reaching a plateau from which it cannot advance unless it is underpinned by further training. Without this underpinning the quality of basic education is bound to fall as the number of students and the pressure on teaching and practice resources increase, as knowledge expands and as the demands on social workers grow greater. Additional and advanced training is indeed necessary to rescue the practice of social work from degenerating with the passage of time. Conversely, unless basic training is sufficiently good to provide a foundation for subsequent training, the latter will be mainly based on social work experience only and will

in fact have to fill in gaps in the students' basic knowledge and professional skill. This may be inevitable in the earlier stages when the urgently needed further training is being started. But this will make no real contribution to basic training unless some of the best available resources are put into it so that as soon as possible it may become truly advanced and thus produce the urgently needed social work teachers, supervisors, advanced practitioners, administrators and social workers trained to undertake research. Decisions about priorities must not result in a series of *ad hoc* short courses which do not adequately raise the level of professional practice, nor in robbing Peter to pay Paul. We do not need any one kind of senior practitioner more than another. All are necessary to contribute to the expansion and improvement of basic training for social work. And professional training itself is only significant in so far as it results in an improved service.

6

TRAINING FOR CASEWORK:
ITS PLACE IN THE CURRICULUM[1]

In the European situation when we discuss the place of training for casework in the curriculum, this is not at all simple, or even something to be thought about in clear-cut logical terms. In fact we are discussing what happens when new wine is put into old bottles or a new patch onto an old garment. It is only necessary to look at the training and use of social workers in Europe to understand why this should be so. But then we must endeavour the more difficult task of seeing whether and why the new wine need burst the old bottles.

So far as training is concerned, there are of course wide differences in the organization and curricula of schools of social work in the different European countries. But they are all substantially based upon the same methods—that is to say the consideration of principles and the amassing of information within the school, and experience of the practice of social work in various agencies outside the school. In some countries the student is an apprentice for about a year, receiving payment while he gains this experience. In other circumstances he is not allowed to receive payment, indeed the agency may ask a fee for its share in training him.

His training is designed to give him some idea of the current economic and social forces at work in his country and to put these in an historical setting: and to acquaint him with relevant social legislation, the administration of welfare services and the practice of social agencies. He also learns something about social philosophy or ethics, about psychology and health and hygiene, and perhaps about sociology, biology and social anthropology. In his field work he learns a good deal about social legislation in actual practice, about the methods of the agency, and about the proper etiquette to observe in big institutions such as hospitals or factories or in the public service. On the whole he is thought to be able to relate theory to practice for himself, and no

[1] A lecture given at a United Nations Seminar in Finland, 1952. Reproduced as a pamphlet by the Association of Social Workers.

systematic attempt is made to help him to achieve greater self awareness in relation to his work.

When he finishes training and goes into a job a process of unplanned in-service training begins. No one supposes he is fully trained and he will normally be under the direct supervision of an experienced worker. This means that he will be quite carefully helped to fill in forms properly, to say and do the right things to other agencies, to apply legislative provisions correctly, and to pick up a kind of empirical wisdom from his elders and betters about people and their problems. In time he will acquire more and more skill at getting things done and in his dealings with different kinds of people, and in due course he will be regarded as an experienced social worker.

This is still, within broad limits, the general pattern of social work training and practice in Europe. And before we begin to suggest that it is inadequate we should pause to consider the functions that are expected from social workers. For with due allowance for time lags, particularly in academic circles, we shall not usually find training to be wholly out of step with what is required of the worker on the job. And it would be unfair to criticize training institutions for producing people who are not able to do certain things when in fact they have for years been asked to do something quite different. Social caseworkers in Europe are primarily required to fulfil one or other or a combination of the following functions:

(a) To determine eligibility for financial assistance and to give it humanely in consideration of individual needs within the general framework of regulations.

(b) To administer some particular part of a public welfare programme in which provision is made for a personal service.

(c) To interpret complex legal enactments to the client and to enable him to get those services and facilities to which he may be entitled.

(d) To make arrangements on behalf of the client, calling upon the aid of public and private agencies and combining various services to produce the desired result.

(e) To recruit, orient and direct volunteers, who may be the persons directly responsible, for example for supervision of probationers or foster home placement.

(f) In recent years and, to a limited extent, to render a service to individuals which is concerned not only with environmental

changes but also with helping the person to achieve some release from his personal problems and from the pressure of his family and social relationships.

It is this last which is the explosive factor in the situation. When and if social workers are primarily required to make arrangements, to manipulate the environment on the client's behalf, it is arguable that our European training methods are adequate. This is the purpose for which they were designed and the function which social workers have been called upon to fulfil. And this training, if the students who take it are personally suitable for social work and have the right attitude towards people, has done all that was required of it. Indeed, in some ways it has been more than adequate, for (with local variations) it does give a broad general education in the social sciences when it would have been all too easy to regard a narrowly technical training as sufficient for the purpose.

It is well to remember, too, that in most western European countries in this century the emphasis has been upon the diagnosis of the causes of poverty and the provision of universal services for its elimination or alleviation. We have realized that many individual ills were socially caused; and we have been oppressed by a certain sense of hypocrisy at the thought of dealing with the emotional problems of, say, the unemployed man, rather than offering him the job the loss of which has caused his feelings of inadequacy and dependence to flare into life.

But the main cases of poverty are by now either being met or are at least they are understood. And the new wine has been fermenting in the old bottles for a long time now. It began to do so when in the USA casework took to itself the findings of dynamic psychology and began to realize that sometimes the things which were happening inside people were more important, more dominant in the situation, than making changes happen to their environment. The new wine started to ferment in earnest in Europe when psychiatrists moved out of the mental hospital and the clinic to study the reactions of people to situations of pressure, being an evacuee, for example, or a returned prisoner of war. It happened, too, when medicine took over the new territory loosely called social medicine. And it happened when criminology turned its attention from the crime to the person who commits the crime. In America, social workers and the schools of social work took over these advances in scientific knowledge and incorporated them into social work practice. In Europe with certain minor exceptions this has unfortunately not happened. The result is that the skills of the

European social worker lag far behind the uses to which they could be put, the ways in which it is quite generally recognized that they could be used.

The European emphasis on the environment and the American emphasis on the individual are coming nearer together in the concept of the person-in-his-environment as the indivisible unity with which we have to deal. We begin to realize that we, the social workers, are involved in a living network of dynamic, growing, changing relationships, in which we are not gods in the machine but actors in the drama. We may have had a very nice training for social work for the time when we were required to make arrangements and to interpret legislation. But it looks very different if now we need people to play their parts effectively in a series of dramas. Perhaps, indeed, to become actor-producers, because the point about a caseworker is that if he plays his part well other people will learn to play their's better.

If we press this simile of the drama a bit further we may not feel very happy about our present training for social work. We should not think that actors could be very successfully trained if for part of the year they made a study of the history of dramatic art, of stage lighting, scene painting, the structure of language and so forth in their school of dramatic art. And for another part of the year went off and engaged in amateur dramatics, largely on their own initiative. We should no doubt be very ready to point out what a queer training it was that did not include any study of actual plays, nor any teaching of voice production, nor any chance to learn to act in the real situation of actually taking part in a dramatic performance under the direction of a competent producer. Yet if we substitute case records for drama, the principles of casework for voice production, and supervised casework practice for acting a part in a play, we have the analogous position in most training for social work at the present day.

In such a situation it is rather an understatement to speak about the place of casework in the curriculum—just as it would be to speak about the place of acting in a school of dramatic art. For in one sense (though only in one) casework *is* the curriculum. And this is exactly where the trouble begins. There are two main interrelated problems involved:

(a) That it is useless to put into the existing curriculum a course in casework unrelated to other courses.

(b) That real training in casework, like training to act, means training in the practice of casework, and this involves supervision, in the sense of teaching, within the agencies themselves.

Different countries are struggling with different ways out of this dilemma. But the essential problem is that with which we began—new wine in old bottles. It would have been comparatively easy if training for social work could have been started again from the beginning when the new ideas about the function of the social caseworker began to be put into practice. But it is infinitely more difficult to graft it on to the old curriculum. This is especially risky if an attempt is made to do so without lengthening the training, for then students have an inadequate background of basic subjects before they begin to apply their knowledge in the practice of the casework art and techniques. There is also the danger, indeed the certainty, that the casework part of the course will be far too short and superficial. But, since in fact it must be in one way or another built upon the existing courses, three different things are happening in different situations. Either a little casework, the best that can be achieved in the circumstances, is added to the existing course; or a training in generic casework is started, as in the Netherlands; or a series of specialized trainings spring up. This latter has happened or is beginning to happen, in several countries, but it has gone furthest in the United Kingdom, where there are separate trainings, sometimes in a university, sometimes not, for medical social workers, probation officers, child care workers, psychiatric social workers, moral welfare workers and family caseworkers. This results in much duplication of teaching and waste of scarce training resources. Worse still, students concentrate their attention on the differences of different settings instead of upon the essential similarity of casework and its concern with problems of relationships, in whatever setting it operates. However, this process has now gone so far as to demonstrate its absurdity and there is now a general demand in England for training in generic casework.

A consideration of these three different answers to the dilemma brings us to the next problem, which is that in order to teach casework people must exist who can teach casework. And to learn casework, as has been said, involves practising casework under supervision. And good supervision necessarily implies that good casework is being done in the agency where training is given. Thus we arrive at a vicious circle because in order to improve casework practice casework itself must be better taught but it cannot be better taught until there is better practice. Any discussion of the place of casework in the curriculum in the European situation is essentially a consideration of ways in which it might be possible to break through this circle and go ahead.

An improvement in the casework practice of experienced social workers is thus essential for the better teaching of casework to students. This means not only that such workers must gain a deeper insight into clients' needs and greater ability to meet them, but must also do better case recording and achieve a better capacity to form concepts and to express these clearly. This is necessary not only for the personal teaching of students, but also in order that a body of indigenous literature and teaching material may be produced. Professional associations can help in this by encouraging the formation of local study groups and the preparation of written material, including case records for teaching purposes, and also study groups on student supervision. Those social workers who have had an opportunity of learning modern casework methods should be used to the maximum possible extent to take groups for practising social workers on student supervision. It is after all from the body of social workers that those who are to teach casework in the schools of social work and to supervise students' field work must come. It is thus important to stress the responsibilities of practising social workers for improving their performance, both for the sake of the work itself and in order that they may be better equipped to train others. Inevitably the schools of social work will be hindered in changing outmoded training methods unless they can recruit to help them social workers who are good practitioners and who are also able to teach. But when all is said and done, we cannot pull ourselves up by our own boot straps, and we must call upon the help of the United States and Canada, where casework and teaching methods are very much more advanced than they are in Europe. No doubt we shall need to make adaptations in what they give us in order that it may fit our own cultures, but if we do not ask their help we shall proceed far more slowly than we need and also repeat a number of mistakes which might have been avoided.

There is a further risk that if the teaching is not right and if the content of the casework is not of a good standard, students in a school of social work may turn against casework as a subject of systematic study. Perhaps some of us have come across these lecture courses in which students who have never done any casework have a lecture on 'What is Casework?', another on 'Recording', another on 'The Interview', another on 'Confidential Material', another on 'Relationships with Other Agencies', and so on. Much of what is said seems to the average intelligent student both obvious and boring, and he contrasts it unfavourably with the quite different academic level of the long-established subjects. It is even possible by inadequate material and

teaching method to make case discussions sound like Much Ado About Nothing.

So one of the ways *not* to teach casework is to bring it in as an isolated course, neither related to practice nor to basic education in the background subjects. This form of casework teaching is very far from being the explosive force, shattering old ways of which we spoke earlier. Neither is it likely to bring about those modifications of students' attitudes and the greater self awareness which are part of professional education for social work. But if we look more closely at the dangerous earlier statement that in a sense casework *is* the curriculum, we may get a better understanding of how it should and could be taught; though we must pause to notice that, curiously enough, the statement that casework is the curriculum is quite different from saying that the curriculum is casework. The concern of casework is with people, their motivations, their physical and psychological make-up, their family and social relationships, their work, their leisure, their habitual modes of behaviour and their different culture patterns; their standards of living; and the community resources designed to meet different needs. If effective casework teaching is introduced into the curriculum it will inevitably begin to affect the ways in which all the other subjects are taught, because they enter into it as it into them. For example, it should not be possible to teach social administration without considering the human needs which services are designed to meet, whether these needs are soundly met in the light of current psychological and sociological knowledge, the points in the various services at which a casework approach is necessary, and the light which casework principles cast upon the planning and policy upon which the service operates. Furthermore, it is impossible to build sound casework teaching upon courses in psychology which are devoted to discussions on how many emotions there are and whether instincts do or do not exist, or to detailed descriptions of the reactions of the amoeba or experiments on rats. Nor will this situation be improved by plastering on to such a course a few lectures on the psychology of insanity. The lectures on sociology, social psychology and anthropology by whatever name they are called, may also concentrate too exclusively upon problems of terminology and definition and too little upon the characteristics of groups and their inter-relationships and the effect of different social customs and social settings upon social institutions, including family structure.

In other words, casework essentially demands a dynamic approach to the individual and his setting, whereas too often the teaching of the

necessary background subjects which should precede casework teaching and to some degree proceed concurrently with it, is static and dead. The students dutifully learn the material presented to them, the intelligent with zest at mastering an intellectual puzzle, the less intelligent by rote and with pain and grief. But they cannot apply it (for often it does not apply) to the living, changing relationships of the real world. To add some casework at the end of such a training is in effect to teach a series of techniques unrelated to the background studies, instead of integrating it with them as part of a total professional education.

It is not easy for directors of schools of social work to meet the demands of this situation. The Continental non-university schools may not be able to find suitable lecturers locally or may not be able to part with someone who has lectured for years, while the schools which are part of a university may have to take the teaching offered by other departments. But the situation can be changed gradually if those in charge know what they want and if they are able to convince lecturers in other subjects that in asking for specially designed courses they are not asking for teaching at a lower academic level. In the meantime, as things are at present, it often happens that when students come to their casework classes they do not have a real understanding of basic psychological concepts or a sufficient knowledge of community resources, on which the teaching of casework is based. Therefore the casework teacher may find herself teaching psychology, sociology and social administration as well as the principles and practice of casework. This is unsound because it means that too much of the teacher's time is taken up with background material and students learn piecemeal instead of having a real grasp of the fundamentals of the background subjects on which casework teaching is built.

Therefore it is impossible to think of the place of casework in the curriculum without also thinking of what casework does *to* the curriculum, and the kind of teaching which is necessary right through the school if casework is to be taught effectively at a certain point in the training. This again raises the question of the length of the training. Our European courses are nearly all of two years' duration.[1] Those which are called three-year courses usually mean that the students are required to do a year of apprentice field work at the beginning or end of the school period. This may be all that we can afford for background studies though in the United Kingdom many students now take three-year degree courses. But if we are to teach casework this cannot be done, as has already been said, by extra lecture courses added to all the

[1] Many are now (1963) three- or four-year courses.

rest, together with rather more opportunity for discussion during the field work. Neither ought it to result in a series of specialized courses, not integrated with the background courses nor with one another.

If modern casework is really to take root in Europe and to flourish as an indigenous growth, we desperately need a really good third- or fourth-year training in general casework. Such a training programme should in the first instance be highly selective in regard to its students. It should be two years in length, but for practical reasons it might have to be confined to one year, at any rate for the first years of its existence. Its subject matter should be closely integrated with the preceding two- or three-year background course. The background course itself would probably require pruning and reshaping so that students would emerge with certain clear concepts and a good working knowledge about man in society at the present day. The casework training should be designed to teach comparatively few subjects but to relate them closely to case-work theory and practice. It should include lectures on medical and psychiatric information for social workers in order to give them a good understanding of health and disease in their individual and social implications. This would cover crucial periods of growth and decay in their physical and psychological aspects, and the whole life-cycle of the individual from the point of view of dynamic psychology, including deviations from the normal, and the impact of society upon both healthy development and deviation. The history and place of social work in social welfare programmes, and a more detailed study of social ad-ministration and legislation should be taught in relation to the other subjects of the course. Social anthropology or sociology from the point of view of the more direct study of cultural patterns and attitudes is also important. The philosophy of social work might be taught in a discus-sion class in which students should be helped to understand professional ethics, to disentangle psychological from ethical issues (for example in abortion or euthanasia) and to think out these in relation to casework attitudes. The teaching of the theory and practice of casework should naturally be well integrated with the field work. Additional courses will no doubt be necessary for some students according to the setting in which they intend to specialise, for example, criminology for case-workers in the penal service. It may also be possible to introduce courses on the administration of social agencies and in social research method.

Whether the field work should be block or concurrent will probably have to depend partly upon local circumstances. What really matters is that there should be good supervision and that field work and classroom

teaching should be well integrated with each other. Very few European agencies are sufficiently well staffed for this kind of teaching, and usually they have neither the financial resources nor sufficient under-standing of the need for social work education to provide the necessary extra staffing. Thus it seems almost inevitable that, at any rate in the first instance, this extra supervisory staff should be provided by the schools of social work, at least through part-agency part-school appointments. Students should certainly not have more than two placements during a one-year course, though it is difficult to see how they could well have less and at the same time gain general family welfare experience and the knowledge of specialized settings which is likely to be required of them. A training of this nature will inevitably rouse anxieties and conflicts in the students, and the school concerned will certainly find it necessary to have regular meetings of supervisors so that they may be more aware of the nature of these conflicts and better able to handle them in ways which are helpful rather than de-structive for the student. These supervisors' meetings are crucial for the introduction of new methods. They help social workers to become identified with the school and what it is trying to do, and they make it possible to improve the supervisors' own casework as well as teaching them something about student supervision.

The question of cost is an important element in any realistic dis-cussion of the introduction of casework teaching in European schools of social work. Unfortunately a training such as that outlined above would be several times more costly than the usual academic courses, supplemented by field work which costs both the school and the agency practically nothing, indeed, may even provide free labour for the agency. This question of cost is one of the biggest stumbling blocks to starting modern casework teaching. It is not easy to convince university senates or other governing bodies of the need for such considerable extra expenditure, or students of the advantages to be gained from a training charging double or treble the normal fees. This question of cost is, quite as much as the shortage of suitable teachers, one of the fundamental reasons why more satisfactory methods of casework teaching are so slow to be introduced into European training for social work. On the other hand, it is insufficiently realized by agencies which might help by providing suitably qualified social workers to act as supervisors that they have an obligation to make their proper contribution to improving the standard of social work education. This matter may be approached also from the other end by laying bare the hidden cost of poor casework which agencies incur when hopeless

cases remain in the active load for indefinite periods, when nothing in particular happens in situations where something constructive could be accomplished, and when psychiatric clinics, institutions and other specialized agencies are used to fulfil the functions of skilled case-workers.

Any country starting a basic training in casework well integrated with background studies on the lines of that suggested here, would in due time have in its welfare services a body of well-qualified social workers. Some of these would in the course of time be fitted to undertake research and teaching and all of them would have such a good grasp of casework skills that they could with little orientation operate effectively in any setting. The Netherlands have already led the way and there are hopeful signs of development in several other countries. But it must be remembered that, as has been said already, no European country at the present time has within its borders all the necessary teaching resources to take this step forward without help. This means that we cannot start where we should start nor go as far as we could go unless we can send people to North America for training and unless social work teachers from the other side of the Atlantic who understand the European setting and European needs will come over to help us.

THE END

Appearing for the first time in paperback, this valuable book is a study of social work in relation to the evolving role of social workers in the social services, and to their training. Dame Eileen Younghusband considers past discoveries and setbacks insofar as they bear upon the present position, and she studies the present for the light it casts on the future. Her emphasis is upon the new situation which is created as knowledge advances and the social services become increasingly aware of personal problems and social disabilities. In fact, the contribution of social work to mental health is a continuing theme throughout the book. There are chapters on the juvenile courts, and a section on international aspects in which the philosophy of social work and its contribution to social change are discussed.

The author was for many years chairman of a London juvenile court, and chairman of the Working Party on Social Workers in the Local Authority Health and Welfare Services (Ministry of Health). She has been, at various times, a Social Affairs Consultant to the United Nations, Adviser on Social Work Training at the National Institute for Social Work Training, President of the International Association of Schools for Social Work, and a lecturer at the London School of Economics. To social workers, whether active or in training, she will need no introduction and they will welcome a book incorporating her immense experience and all the originality and clarity of thought they have learned to expect from her.

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